268 (1)
“It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could consider any conditioned phenomenon as permanent; there is no such possibility. But it is possible [27] that a worldling might consider some conditioned phenomenon as permanent; there is such a possibility.”150
269 (2)
“It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could consider any conditioned phenomenon as pleasurable; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a worldling might consider some conditioned phenomenon as pleasurable; there is such a possibility.”151
270 (3)
“It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could consider anything as a self; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a worldling might consider something as a self; there is such a possibility.”152
271 (4)–276 (9)
(271) “It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person accomplished in view could deprive his mother of life … (272) that a person accomplished in view could deprive his father of life … (273) that a person accomplished in view could deprive an arahant of life … (274) that a person accomplished in view could, with a mind of hatred, shed the blood of the Tathāgatha … (275) that a person accomplished in view could create a schism in the Saṅgha … (276) that a person accomplished in view could acknowledge someone other [than the Buddha] as teacher; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a worldling could acknowledge someone other [than the Buddha] as teacher; there is such a possibility.”153
“It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that two arahants who are perfectly enlightened Buddhas154 [28] could arise contemporaneously in one world system; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that one arahant who is a perfectly enlightened Buddha might arise in one world system; there is such a possibility.”155
278 (11)
“It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that two wheel-turning monarchs could arise contemporaneously in one world system; there is no such possibility.156 But it is possible that one wheel-turning monarch might arise in one world system; there is such a possibility.”
279 (12)–283 (16)
(279) “It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a woman could be an arahant who is a perfectly enlightened Buddha … (280) … that a woman could be a wheel-turning monarch … (281) … that a woman could occupy the position of Sakka … (282) … that a woman could occupy the position of Māra … (283) … that a woman could occupy the position of Brahmā; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a man could occupy the position of Brahmā; there is such a possibility.”157
284 (17)–286 (19)
(284) “It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a wished for, desired, agreeable result could be produced from bodily misconduct … (285) … that a wished for, desired, agreeable result could be produced from verbal misconduct … (286) … that a wished for, desired, agreeable result could be produced from mental misconduct; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that an unwished for, undesired, disagreeable result might be produced [from bodily misconduct … from verbal misconduct …] from mental misconduct; there is such a possibility.”
287 (20)–289 (22)
(287) “It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that an unwished for, undesired, disagreeable result could be produced from bodily good conduct [29] … (288) … that an unwished for, undesired, disagreeable result could be produced from verbal good conduct … (289) … that an unwished for, undesired, disagreeable result could be produced from mental good conduct; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a wished for, desired, agreeable result could be produced [from bodily good conduct … from verbal good conduct …] from mental good conduct; there is such a possibility.”158
290 (23)–292 (25)
(290) “It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person engaging in bodily misconduct could on that account, for that reason, with the breakup of the body, after death, be reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world … (291) … that a person engaging in verbal misconduct could on that account, for that reason, with the breakup of the body, after death, be reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world … (292) … that a person engaging in mental misconduct could on that account, for that reason, with the breakup of the body, after death, be reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world; there is no such possibility. But it is possible that a person engaging [in bodily misconduct … in verbal misconduct …] in mental misconduct could on that account, for that reason, with the breakup of the body, after death, be reborn in the plane of misery, in a bad destination, in the lower world, in hell; there is such a possibility.”
293 (26)–295 (28)
(293) “It is impossible and inconceivable, bhikkhus, that a person engaging in bodily good conduct could on that account, for that reason, with the breakup of the body, after death, be reborn in the plane of misery, in a bad destination, in the lower world, in hell … (294) … that a person engaging in verbal good conduct could on that account, for that reason, with the breakup of the body, after death, be reborn in the plane of misery, in a bad destination, in the lower world, in hell … (295) … that a person engaging in mental good conduct could on that account, for that reason, with the breakup of the body, after death, be reborn in the plane of misery, in a bad destination, in the lower world, in hell; there is no such possibility. But it is possible [30] that a person engaging [in bodily good conduct … in verbal good conduct …] in mental good conduct could on that account, for that reason, with the breakup of the body, after death, be reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world; there is such a possibility.”
149 Be divides the twenty-eight suttas in this vagga into three sub-chapters of ten, nine, and nine suttas respectively. Ce, which I follow, treats them all as one vagga named Aṭṭhānapāḷi. Many of these utterances are also found in MN 115.12–19, III 64–67.
150 Mp: “One accomplished in view (diṭṭhisampanna) is a noble disciple, a stream-enterer, possessing the view of the path (maggadiṭṭhiyā sampanna). The worldling, in contrast, can consider the conditioned phenomena of the three planes [the sensory plane, the form plane, and the formless plane] as permanent by way of the eternalist view (sassatadiṭṭhi).”
151 Mp: “This is said with reference to the obsession with pleasure that occurs by way of the view of self (attadiṭṭhivasena), as in those who hold that the self is exclusively blissful and immortal, etc. But, with a mind dissociated from views (diṭṭhivippayuttacittena), a noble disciple afflicted with fever might regard even feces as pleasurable, believing it can allay his fever.”
152 Mp: “In the section on self, instead of speaking of a ‘conditioned phenomenon’ (saṅkhāra), the expression ‘anything’ (kañci dhammaṃ) is used; this is for the purpose of including conceptual entities such as the kasiṇas, etc. (see 1:455–64). Whatever the worldling grasps as permanent, pleasurable, and self, the noble disciple disentangles himself from its grip, considering it as impermanent, suffering, and non-self.”
153 The first five are the heinous deeds that bring immediate result (ānantariya kamma), necessarily producing rebirth in hell in the next existence. The five are mentioned collectively in 6:94. The six items together are referred to at Sn 233 as “the six things that cannot be done” (cha cābhiṭhānāni abhabbo kātuṃ) by the stream-enterer. Mp: “This here is the intention: ‘The condition of a worldling is blameworthy insofar as a worldling can do these deeds that bring immediate results, such as matricide and so forth. But the noble disciple is powerful since he does not do such deeds.’” Regarding the shedding of a Tathāgata’s blood, Mp says that the expression “with a mind of hatred” (paduṭṭhacitto) is used to highlight the motive. Devadatta, who wanted to kill the Buddha and take control of the Saṅgha, wounded the Buddha in a failed assassination attempt and thereby committed an ānantariya kamma. But the physician Jīvaka, wishing to restore the Buddha’s health, cut his skin to extract bad blood; he thereby did a meritorious deed. On schism in the Saṅgha (saṅghabheda), see 10:37, 10:39.
154 This is redundant, since sammā sambuddha means simply “a perfectly enlightened one,” but I render the term thus to avoid misunderstanding. Though arahant disciples achieve sambodhi, full enlightenment, and are occasionally spoken of as sambuddha, “enlightened,” the designation sammā sambuddha is reserved for the founder, who alone attains anuttara sammā sambodhi, “unsurpassed perfect enlightenment.”
155 Mp explains the word “contemporaneously” (apubbaṃ acarimaṃ, lit., “not before, not after”) to cover the period from the time a bodhisatta enters his mother’s womb until the Buddha’s relics disappear. There can be only one Buddha at a time because a Buddha is without a counterpart or peer (see 1:172, 1:174). Thus if two Buddhas were to arise simultaneously, this statement would be invalidated. The issue is also dealt with at Mil 236–39, cited by Mp. Mp says that because no suttas speak of the arising of Buddhas in other world systems, while there are suttas that say Buddhas do not arise elsewhere, it is only in this world system (imasmiṃyeva cakkavāḷe) that they arise. Mp-ṭ cites several suttas that it interprets as excluding the possibility of Buddhas arising elsewhere, but these texts do not seem to be as categorical as the author supposes. Perhaps this argument was intended to counter the idea being advanced in early Mahāyāna sūtras (or even among other pre-Mahāyāna schools) that Buddhas arise in the world systems of the ten directions. For the early Buddhist view on world systems, see 3:81.
156 A “wheel-turning monarch” (rājā cakkavatī) is an ideal king who conquers the lands of the four directions by his righteousness. In AN he is mentioned in 3:14, 5:131–33, 7:62, and 7:66. For details, see MN 129.33–47, III 172–77.
157 It seems that in the old Nikāyas the idea of aspiring for future Buddhahood is not raised at all. Thus the claim being made here is not that a woman cannot become a perfectly enlightened Buddha in a future life but that a Buddha is always male. The assertion in this sutta need not be read as excluding the possibility that one who is presently a woman could become a Buddha, but this would have to take place in a future life, after she has undergone a change of gender. The statements are no doubt formulated in the context of the Indian culture of the period, which always assigned positions of authority to males. MĀ 181, a Chinese parallel of MN 115, does not include the section on the inabilities of women. Nevertheless, we do find the declaration that a woman cannot become a Buddha in another Chinese parallel of the sutta, at T XVII 713b20–22. It also occurs in a sūtra quoted in the Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā at T XXVI 502b16–18, and in the *Śāriputrābhidharma Śāstra at T XXVIII, 600b10–12. According to such later canonical texts as the Buddhavaṃsa, if a woman resolves to attain Buddhahood in the presence of a Buddha, her resolution does not succeed (i.e., she does not receive the prediction of future Buddhahood). For the resolution to succeed, the aspirant must be a male who has left the home life. See Bodhi 2007: 251–53. Sakka is the ruler of the devas in the Tāvatiṃsa heaven.
158 The words in brackets pertain respectively to the two suttas that are abridged in this triad. The same applies to the following two triads.