21 (1)
“Bhikkhus, there are these two kinds of fools. What two? One who does not see his transgression as a transgression and one who does not, in accordance with the Dhamma, accept the transgression of one who is confessing. These are the two kinds of fools.240
“Bhikkhus, there are these two kinds of wise people. What two? One who sees his transgression as a transgression and one who, in accordance with the Dhamma, accepts the transgression of one who is confessing. These are the two kinds of wise people.”
22 (2)
“Bhikkhus, these two misrepresent the Tathāgata. Which two? One full of hate who harbors hatred and one endowed with faith because of his misunderstanding. These two misrepresent the Tathāgata.”241
23 (3)242
“Bhikkhus, these two misrepresent the Tathāgata. Which two? [60] One who explains what has not been stated and uttered by the Tathāgata as having been stated and uttered by him, and one who explains what has been stated and uttered by the Tathāgata as not having been stated and uttered by him. These two misrepresent the Tathāgata.
“Bhikkhus, these two do not misrepresent the Tathāgata. Which two? One who explains what has not been stated and uttered by the Tathāgata as not having been stated and uttered by him, and one who explains what has been stated and uttered by the Tathāgata as having been stated and uttered by him. These two do not misrepresent the Tathāgata.”
24 (4)
“Bhikkhus, these two misrepresent the Tathāgata. Which two? One who explains a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation as a discourse whose meaning is explicit, and one who explains a discourse whose meaning is explicit as a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation. These two misrepresent the Tathāgata.”243
25 (5)
“Bhikkhus, these two do not misrepresent the Tathāgata. Which two? One who explains a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation as a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation, and one who explains a discourse whose meaning is explicit as a discourse whose meaning is explicit. These two do not misrepresent the Tathāgata.”
26 (6)
“Bhikkhus, for one with concealed actions one of two destinations is to be expected: hell or the animal realm.244
“For one with unconcealed actions one of two destinations is to be expected: the deva realm or the human realm.”
27 (7)245
“Bhikkhus, for one who holds wrong view one of two destinations is to be expected: hell or the animal realm.”
28 (8)
“Bhikkhus, for one who holds right view one of two destinations is to be expected: the deva realm or the human realm.”
29 (9)
“Bhikkhus, for an immoral person there are two receptacles:246 hell or the animal realm. For a virtuous person, there are two receptacles: the deva realm or the human realm.”
30 (10)
“Bhikkhus, seeing two advantages, I resort to remote lodgings in forests and jungle groves.247 What two? For myself I see a pleasant dwelling in this very life [61] and I have compassion for later generations.248 Seeing these two advantages, I resort to remote lodgings in forests and jungle groves.”
31 (11)
“Bhikkhus, these two things pertain to true knowledge.249 What two? Serenity and insight. When serenity is developed, what benefit does one experience? The mind is developed. When the mind is developed, what benefit does one experience? Lust is abandoned. When insight is developed, what benefit does one experience? Wisdom is developed. When wisdom is developed, what benefit does one experience? Ignorance is abandoned.250
“A mind defiled by lust is not liberated, and wisdom defiled by ignorance is not developed. Thus, bhikkhus, through the fading away of lust there is liberation of mind, and through the fading away of ignorance there is liberation by wisdom.”251
240 Also at SN 11:24, I 239,26–31, where it is embedded in a story and embellished with a verse.
241 Mp: “The former is exemplified by Sunakkhatta, who said: ‘The ascetic Gotama does not have any superhuman qualities’ (at MN 12.2, I 68,9–10). The latter is exemplified by a devotee whose faith is destitute of understanding, such as one who misrepresents the Tathāgata by claiming: ‘The Buddha is entirely world-transcending (buddho nāma sabbalokuttaro); all the parts of his body, such as the head hairs, are world-transcending.’” This latter comment seems to be a dig at the Lokottaravādins, a sub-sect of the Mahāsāṃghikas that held the Buddhas to be entirely world-transcendent.
242 Ee divides this into two separate suttas by way of the two paragraphs, whereas Ce and Be take it as one.
243 The question of which discourses of the Buddha are of explicit meaning (nītattha) and which require interpretation (neyyattha) became one of the most intensely debated issues in Buddhist hermeneutics. Starting with the early Indian Buddhist schools, the debate continued in such later Mahāyāna sūtras as the Akṣayamatinirdeśa and the Saṃdhinirmocana. The controversy continued even beyond India, in Sri Lanka, China, and Tibet. The Pāli commentaries decide this issue on the basis of the Abhidhamma distinction between ultimate realities and conventional realities.
Mp: “Those suttas that speak of one person (puggala), two persons, etc., require interpretation, for their meaning has to be interpreted in the light of the fact that in the ultimate sense a person does not exist (paramatthato pana puggalo nāma natthi). One who misconceives the suttas that speak about a person, holding that the person exists in the ultimate sense, explains a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation as one whose meaning is explicit. A sutta whose meaning is explicit is one that explains impermanence, suffering, and non-self; for in this case the meaning is simply impermanence, suffering, and non-self. One who says, ‘This discourse requires interpretation,’ and interprets it in such a way as to affirm that ‘there is the permanent, there is the pleasurable, there is a self,’ explains a sutta of explicit meaning as one requiring interpretation.” The first criticism here is probably directed against the Puggalavādins, who held the person to be ultimately existent. The latter might have been directed against an early form of the tathāgatagarbha theory, which (in the Mahāyāna Parinirvāṇa Sūtra) affirmed a permanent, blissful, pure self.
244 Mp interprets “concealed action” (paṭicchannakamma) simply as a bad deed, explaining that even if a bad deed is not concealed, it is still called a concealed action. However, it seems that confessing one’s bad deed and making amends for it would mitigate its negative force. See Dhp 173: “One who has committed a bad deed but covers it up with good illumines this world like the moon freed from a cloud.”
245 Ee combines this sutta and the next two into one, whereas Ce and Be keep them separate. I suspect that Ee rightly joins 2:27 and 2:28, two complementary discourses, but errs in including 2:29, which has a different theme. Still, I defer to Ce and Be. Note that 2:26 and 2:29 join into one sutta two contrasting statements about the two types of rebirth respectively resulting from bad and good conduct.
246 Paṭiggāhā. An unusual use of this word. Mp says simply that these two states receive (paṭiggaṇhanti) the immoral person.
247 Araññavanapatthānī pantāni senāsanāni. I follow Mp, which explains araññavanapatthānī as a dvanda compound: araññāni ca vanapatthāni ca.
248 Pacchimañca janataṃ anukampamāno. Ps I 129,4–12, commenting on the same expression at MN I 23,35, says: “How does he show compassion for later generations by dwelling in the forest? When young men who have gone forth out of faith see that even the Blessed One—who had nothing more to understand, abandon, develop, and realize—did not neglect dwelling in the forest, they will think that they, too, should dwell in the forest. Thus they will quickly make an end of suffering.”
249 Vijjābhāgiyā. See 1:575.
250 For more on the relationship of serenity (samatha) and insight (vipassanā), see 4:92–94 and 4:170.
251 Mp interprets the mind being developed as the “mind of the path” (maggacitta) and the wisdom being developed as the “wisdom of the path” (maggapaññā). However, it seems to me that the text itself intends “mind” and “wisdom” generically, not specifically as the mind and wisdom of the noble path attainment. The development of the mind through samatha and of wisdom through vipassanā, however, culminate in the “taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom” (anāsavā cetovimutti paññāvimutti), the final goal of the Dhamma. Here, samatha is the condition for liberation of mind and vipassanā for liberation by wisdom.