1 Kolita 378
Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. There the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Friends, bhikkhus!”
“Friend!” those bhikkhus replied. The Venerable Mahāmoggallāna said this:
“Here, friends, while I was alone in seclusion, a reflection arose in my mind thus: ‘It is said, “noble silence, noble silence.” What now is noble silence?’379
“Then, friends, it occurred to me: ‘Here, with the subsiding of thought and examination, a bhikkhu enters and dwells in the second jhāna, which has internal confidence and unification of mind, is without thought and examination, and has rapture and happiness born of concentration. This is called noble silence.’
“Then, friends, with the subsiding of thought and examination, I entered and dwelt in the second jhāna, which … has rapture and happiness born of concentration. While I dwelt therein, perception and attention accompanied by thought assailed me.
“Then, friends, the Blessed One came to me by means of spiritual power and said this: ‘Moggallāna, Moggallāna, do not be negligent regarding noble silence, brahmin. Steady your mind in noble silence, unify your mind in noble silence, concentrate your mind on noble silence.’ Then, friends, on a later occasion, with the subsiding of thought and examination, I entered and dwelt in the second jhāna, which has internal confidence and unification of mind, is without thought and examination, and has rapture and happiness born of concentration.
“If, [274] friends, one speaking rightly could say of anyone: ‘He is a disciple who attained to greatness of direct knowledge with the assistance of the Teacher,’ it is of me that one could rightly say this.”380
2 Upatissa 381
At Sāvatthī. There the Venerable Sāriputta addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Friends, bhikkhus!”
“Friend!” those bhikkhus replied. The Venerable Sāriputta said this:
“Here, friends, when I was alone in seclusion, a reflection arose in my mind thus: ‘Is there anything in the world through the change and alteration of which sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair might arise in me?’ Then it occurred to me: ‘There is nothing in the world through the change and alteration of which sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair might arise in me.’”
When this was said, the Venerable Ānanda said to the Venerable Sāriputta: “Friend Sāriputta, even if the Teacher himself were to undergo change and alteration, wouldn’t sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair arise in you?”
“Friend,382 even if the Teacher himself were to undergo change and alteration, still sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair would not arise in me. However, it would occur to me: ‘The Teacher, so influential, so powerful and mighty, has passed away. If the Blessed One had lived for a long time, that would have been for the welfare and happiness of the multitude, out of compassion for the world, for the good, welfare, and happiness of devas and humans.’” [275]
“It must be because I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit have been thoroughly uprooted in the Venerable Sāriputta for a long time383 that even if the Teacher himself were to undergo change and alteration, still sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair would not arise in him.”
3 The Barrel
Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. Now on that occasion the Venerable Sāriputta and the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna were dwelling at Rājagaha in a single dwelling in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. Then, in the evening, the Venerable Sāriputta emerged from seclusion and approached the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna. He exchanged greetings with the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna and, when they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to him:
“Friend Moggallāna, your faculties are serene, your facial complexion is pure and bright. Has the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna spent the day in a peaceful dwelling?”
“I spent the day in a gross dwelling, friend, but I did have some Dhamma talk.”384
“With whom did the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna have some Dhamma talk?”
“I had some Dhamma talk with the Blessed One, friend.”
“But the Blessed One is far away, friend. He is now dwelling at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. Did the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna approach the Blessed One by means of spiritual power, or did the Blessed One approach the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna by means of spiritual power?” [276]
“I didn’t approach the Blessed One by means of spiritual power, friend, nor did the Blessed One approach me by means of spiritual power. Rather, the Blessed One cleared his divine eye and divine ear element to communicate with me, and I cleared my divine eye and divine ear element to communicate with the Blessed One.”385
“What kind of Dhamma talk did the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna have with the Blessed One?”
“Here, friend, I said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “one with energy aroused, one with energy aroused.” In what way, venerable sir, does one have energy aroused?’ The Blessed One then said to me: ‘Here, Moggallāna, a bhikkhu with energy aroused dwells thus: “Willingly, let only my skin, sinews, and bones remain, and let the flesh and blood dry up in my body, but I will not relax my energy so long as I have not attained what can be attained by manly strength, by manly energy, by manly exertion.”386 It is in such a way, Moggallāna, that one has aroused energy.’ Such, friend, is the Dhamma talk that I had with the Blessed One.”
“Friend, compared to the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna we are like a few grains of gravel compared to the Himalayas, the king of mountains. For the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna is of such great spiritual power and might that if so he wished he could live on for an aeon.”387
“Friend, compared to the Venerable Sāriputta we are like a few grains of salt compared to a barrel of salt. [277] For the Venerable Sāriputta has been extolled, lauded, and praised in many ways by the Blessed One:
“‘As Sāriputta is supreme
In wisdom, virtue, and peace,
So a bhikkhu who has gone beyond
At best can only equal him.’”
In this manner both these great nāgas rejoiced in what was well stated and well declared by the other.388
4 The Newly Ordained Bhikkhu
At Sāvatthī. Now on that occasion a certain newly ordained bhikkhu, after returning from the alms round, would enter his dwelling after the meal and pass the time living at ease and keeping silent. He did not render service to the bhikkhus at the time of making robes. Then a number of bhikkhus approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and reported this matter to him. Then the Blessed One addressed a certain bhikkhu thus: “Come, bhikkhu, tell that bhikkhu in my name that the Teacher calls him.”
“Yes, venerable sir,” that bhikkhu replied, and he went to that bhikkhu and told him: “The Teacher calls you, friend.”
“Yes, friend,” that bhikkhu replied, and he approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side. [278] The Blessed One then said to him: “Is it true, bhikkhu, that after returning from the alms round you enter your dwelling after the meal and pass the time living at ease and keeping silent, and you do not render service to the bhikkhus at the time of making robes?”
“I am doing my own duty, venerable sir.”
Then the Blessed One, having known with his own mind the reflection in that bhikkhu’s mind, addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Bhikkhus, do not find fault with this bhikkhu. This bhikkhu is one who gains at will, without trouble or difficulty, the four jhānas that constitute the higher mind and provide a pleasant dwelling in this very life. And he is one who, by realizing it for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life enters and dwells in that unsurpassed goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the household life into homelessness.”
This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Fortunate One, the Teacher, further said this:
“Not by means of slack endeavour,
Not by means of feeble effort,
Is this Nibbāna to be achieved,
Release from all suffering.“This young bhikkhu [by my side]
Is a supreme man indeed:
He carries about his final body,
Having conquered Māra and his mount.”389
5 Sujāta
At Sāvatthī. Then the Venerable Sujāta approached the Blessed One. The Blessed One saw him coming in the distance and addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Bhikkhus, this clansman is beautiful in both respects. [279] He is handsome, good-looking, pleasing to behold, possessing supreme beauty of complexion. And he is one who, by realizing it for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life enters and dwells in that unsurpassed goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the household life into homelessness.”
This is what the Blessed One said … [who] further said this:
“This bhikkhu shines with sublime beauty,
Having a mind utterly straight.
Detached is he, free from fetters,
Attained to Nibbāna by nonclinging.
He carries about his final body,
Having conquered Māra and his mount.”
6 Lakuṇṭaka Bhaddiya
At Sāvatthī. Then the Venerable Lakuṇṭaka Bhaddiya approached the Blessed One.390 The Blessed One saw him coming in the distance and addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Bhikkhus, do you see that bhikkhu coming, ugly, unsightly, deformed, despised among the bhikkhus?”
“Yes, venerable sir.”
“That bhikkhu is of great spiritual power and might. It is not easy to find an attainment which that bhikkhu has not already attained. And he is one who, by realizing it for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life enters and dwells in that unsurpassed goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the household life into homelessness.”
This is what the Blessed One said … [who] further said this:
“Geese, herons, and peacocks,
Elephants, and spotted deer,
All are frightened of the lion
Regardless of their bodies’ size.“In the same way among human beings
The small one endowed with wisdom—
He is the one that is truly great,
Not the fool with a well-built body.” [280]
7 Visākha
Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Vesālī in the Great Wood in the Hall with the Peaked Roof. Now on that occasion the Venerable Visākha Pañcāliputta was instructing, exhorting, inspiring, and gladdening the bhikkhus in the assembly hall with a Dhamma talk, [spoken] with speech that was polished, clear, articulate, expressing well the meaning, comprehensive, unattached.391
Then, in the evening, the Blessed One emerged from seclusion and approached the assembly hall. He sat down in the appointed seat and addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Bhikkhus, who has been instructing, exhorting, inspiring, and gladdening the bhikkhus in the assembly hall with a Dhamma talk, [spoken] with speech that is polished, clear, articulate, expressing well the meaning, comprehensive, unattached?”
“It was this Venerable Visākha Pañcāliputta, venerable sir.”
Then the Blessed One addressed the Venerable Visākha Pañcāliputta thus: “Good, good, Visākha! It is good that you thus instruct the bhikkhus with a Dhamma talk.”
This is what the Blessed One said … [who] further said this:
“When the wise man is in the midst of fools
They do not know him if he does not speak,392
But they know him when he speaks,
Pointing out the deathless state.“He should speak and explain the Dhamma,
He should raise high the seers’ banner.
Well-spoken words are the seers’ banner:
For the Dhamma is the banner of seers.” [281]
8 Nanda
At Sāvatthī. Then the Venerable Nanda, the Blessed One’s maternal cousin, put on well-pressed and well-ironed robes, painted his eyes, took a glazed bowl, and approached the Blessed One.393 Having paid homage to the Blessed One, he sat down to one side, and the Blessed One said to him:
“Nanda, this is not proper for you, a clansman who has gone forth out of faith from the household life into homelessness, that you wear well-pressed and well-ironed robes, paint your eyes, and carry a glazed bowl. This is proper for you, Nanda, a clansman who has gone forth out of faith from the household life into homelessness, that you be a forest dweller, an almsfood eater, a rag-robes wearer, and that you dwell indifferent to sensual pleasures.”
This is what the Blessed One said … [who] further said this:
“When shall I see Nanda as a forest dweller,
Wearing robes stitched from rags,
Subsisting on the scraps of strangers,394
Indifferent towards sensual pleasures?”
Then, some time later, the Venerable Nanda became a forest dweller, an almsfood eater, a rag-robes wearer, and he dwelt indifferent to sensual pleasures.
9 Tissa
At Sāvatthī. [282] Then the Venerable Tissa, the Blessed One’s paternal cousin,395 approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side—miserable, sorrowful, with tears streaming down. Then the Blessed One said to him:
“Tissa, why are you sitting there, miserable, sorrowful, with tears streaming down?”
“Because, venerable sir, the bhikkhus have attacked me on all sides with sharp words.”396
“That, Tissa, is because you admonish others but cannot bear being admonished yourself. Tissa, this is not proper for you, a clansman who has gone forth out of faith from the household life into homelessness, that you admonish others but cannot accept admonition in turn. This is proper for you, Tissa, a clansman who has gone forth out of faith from the household life into homelessness, that you admonish others and accept admonition in turn.”
This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Fortunate One, the Teacher, further said this:
“Why are you angry? Don’t be angry!
Nonanger is better for you, Tissa.
It is to remove anger, conceit, and scorn,
That the holy life is lived, O Tissa.”
10 A Bhikkhu Named Elder
On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. Now on that occasion a certain bhikkhu named Elder397 was a lone dweller and spoke in praise of dwelling alone. He entered the village for alms alone, he returned alone, he sat alone in private, he undertook walking meditation alone.
Then a number of bhikkhus approached the Blessed One, [283] paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: “Here, venerable sir, there is a certain bhikkhu named Elder who is a lone dweller and who speaks in praise of dwelling alone.”
Then the Blessed One addressed a certain bhikkhu thus: “Come, bhikkhu, tell the bhikkhu Elder in my name that the Teacher calls him.”
“Yes, venerable sir,” that bhikkhu replied, and he went to the Venerable Elder and told him: “The Teacher calls you, friend Elder.”
“Yes, friend,” the Venerable Elder replied, and he approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side. The Blessed One then said to him: “Is it true, Elder, that you are a lone dweller and speak in praise of dwelling alone?”
“Yes, venerable sir.”
“But how, Elder, are you a lone dweller and how do you speak in praise of dwelling alone?”
“Here, venerable sir, I enter the village for alms alone, I return alone, I sit alone in private, and I undertake walking meditation alone. It is in such a way that I am a lone dweller and speak in praise of dwelling alone.”
“That is a way of dwelling alone, Elder, I do not deny this. But as to how dwelling alone is fulfilled in detail, listen to that and attend closely, I will speak.”
“Yes, venerable sir.”
“And how, Elder, is dwelling alone fulfilled in detail? Here, Elder, what lies in the past has been abandoned, what lies in the future has been relinquished, and desire and lust for present forms of individual existence has been thoroughly removed.398 It is in such a way, Elder, that dwelling alone is fulfilled in detail.” [284]
This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Fortunate One, the Teacher, further said this:
“The wise one, all-conqueror, all-knower,
Among all things unsullied, with all cast off,
Liberated in the destruction of craving:
I call that person ‘one who dwells alone.’”399
11 Mahākappina
At Sāvatthī. Then the Venerable Mahākappina approached the Blessed One.400 The Blessed One saw him coming in the distance and addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Bhikkhus, do you see that bhikkhu coming, fair-skinned, thin, with a prominent nose?”
“Yes, venerable sir.”
“That bhikkhu is of great spiritual power and might. It is not easy to find an attainment which that bhikkhu has not already attained. And he is one who, by realizing it for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life enters and dwells in that unsurpassed goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the household life into homelessness.”
This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Fortunate One, the Teacher, further said this:
“The khattiya is the best among people
For those whose standard is the clan,
But one accomplished in knowledge and conduct
Is best among devas and humans.“The sun shines by day,
The moon glows at night,
The khattiya shines clad in armour,
The meditative brahmin shines.
But all the time, day and night,
The Buddha shines with glory.” [285]
12 Companions
At Sāvatthī. Then two bhikkhus who were companions, pupils of the Venerable Mahākappina, approached the Blessed One. The Blessed One saw them coming in the distance and addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Bhikkhus, do you see those two bhikkhus who are companions coming, pupils of Kappina?”
“Yes, venerable sir.”
“Those bhikkhus are of great spiritual power and might. It is not easy to find an attainment that those bhikkhus have not already attained. And they are ones who, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in that unsurpassed goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the household life into homelessness.”
This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Fortunate One, the Teacher, further said this:
“These [two] companion bhikkhus
Have been united for a very long time.401
The true Dhamma has united them
In the Dhamma proclaimed by the Buddha.“They have been disciplined well by Kappina
In the Dhamma proclaimed by the Noble One.
They carry about their final bodies,
Having conquered Māra and his mount.”
The Book of Causation is finished.
Notes
12. Nidānasaṃyutta
1 Spk: When it is said, “With ignorance as condition, volitional formations,” the meaning should be understood by this method: “It is ignorance and it is a condition, hence ‘ignorance-as-condition’ (avijjā ca sā paccayo cā ti avijjāpaccayo). Through that ignorance-as-condition volitional formations come to be (tasmā avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā sambhavanti).”
This explanation suggests that the verb sambhavanti, which in the text occurs only at the end of the whole formula, should be connected to each proposition, thus establishing that each conditioned state arises through its condition. The twelve terms of the formula are treated analytically in the next sutta.
At the end of the paragraph, Ee reads ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave samuppādo, but this must be an editorial error as both Be and Se have paṭicca-samuppādo.
2 Se adds, at the end of the definition of death, jīvitindriyassa upacchedo, which (according to a note in Be) is also found in the Thai and Cambodian eds. The fact that Spk does not gloss this expression may be taken as evidence that it was not in the text available to the commentator. The expression is found, however, in the definition of death at Vibh 99,23-24 and is commented upon at Vibh-a 101,8-12.
Spk: By the terms from “passing away” through “completion of time” he expounds death in worldly conventional terminology (lokasammutiyā); by the expressions “breakup of the aggregates” and “the laying down of the carcass” he expounds death in the ultimate sense (paramattha ). For in the ultimate sense it is only the aggregates that break up; there is no “being” that dies. When the aggregates are breaking up one says, “A being is dying,” and when they have broken up it is said, “The being has died.”
3 Spk: From “birth” through “production” the teaching is conventional (vohāradesanā); the last two terms are an ultimate teaching (paramatthadesanā). For in the ultimate sense it is only aggregates that become manifest, not a being.
4 On the meaning of bhava, see the General Introduction, pp. 52-53. Spk: In the exposition of existence, sense-sphere existence is both kamma-existence (kammabhava) and rebirth-existence (upapattibhava). Of these, kamma-existence is just kamma that leads to sense-sphere existence; for the kamma, being the cause for rebirth-existence in that realm, is spoken of as “existence” by assigning the name of the result to the cause. Rebirth-existenceis the set of five kammically acquired aggregates produced by that kamma; for this is called “existence” in the sense that “it comes to be there.” The same method of explanation applies to form-sphere and formless-sphere existence (except that in formless-sphere rebirth-existence only the four mental aggregates exist).
It should be noted that in interpreting the expression upādānapaccayā bhavo, the commentaries take bhava as either kammabhava or upapattibhava, since both volitional activity and rebirth are conditioned by clinging; but in the expression bhavapaccayā jāti, they confine bhava to kammabhava , since upapattibhava includes jāti and thus cannot be a condition for it. See Vism 572-73 (Ppn 17:258-60) and Vism 575 (Ppn 17:270).
5 Spk defines clinging as tight grasping (upādānan ti daḷhaggahaṇaṃ vuccati). Definitions of the four kinds of clinging are at Dhs §§1214-17. In brief, clinging to sensual pleasures (kāmupādāna) is identical with sensual desire, sensual lust, sensual delight, sensual craving, etc. Clinging to views (diṭṭhupādāna) is the adoption of any wrong view except those included in the third and fourth types of clinging; Dhs §1215 mentions as an example the nihilist view (see 24:5). The expression sīlabbatupādāna is often translated “clinging to rites and rituals,” but neither the canon nor commentaries supports this. I render sīla as rules and vata as vows, though the intention is actual modes of behaviour prescribed by rules and vows. The laconic definition at Dhs §1222 reads: “Clinging to rules and vows is the view of ascetics and brahmins outside of here (i.e., outside the Buddhist fold) that purification is achieved by rules, by vows, by rules and vows” (condensed). The reference is evidently to the various types of austerities that the Buddha’s contemporaries adopted in the belief that they lead to heaven or to ultimate purification. An example is the “dog rule, dog vow” (kukkurasīla, kukkuravata) at MN I 387,18-20; see too the common phrase, iminā ’haṃ sīlena vā vatena vā tapena vā brahmacariyena vā devo vā bhavissāmi devaññataro vā (e.g., at MN I 102,10-11). Clinging to a doctrine of self (attavādupādāna) is defined by way of the twenty types of identity view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi), on which see 22:7, etc.
6 On the translation of nāmarūpa, see the General Introduction, pp. 47-49. Vism 558,23-28 (Ppn 17:187) explains that nāma denotes the three aggregates—of feeling, perception, and volitional formations—which are called thus because of their “bending” (namana) on to an object (in the act of cognizing it). Volition, contact, and attention belong to the aggregate of volitional formations and, according to Spk, have been selected to represent that aggregate here because they are operative even in the weakest classes of consciousness.
7 On the translation of saṅkhārā, see the General Introduction, pp. 44-47. Spk: Volitional formations have the characteristic of forming (abhisaṅkharaṇa). The bodily volitional formation is a volitional formation that occurs through the body; the term is a designation for the twenty kinds of bodily volition (kāyasañcetanā)—eight sense-sphere wholesome and twelve unwholesome—that motivate activity in the body door (see CMA 1:4-7, 13). The verbal volitional formation is a volitional formation that occurs through speech; the term is a designation for the twenty kinds of verbal volition (vacīsañcetanā) that motivate verbal utterances (i.e., the same twenty kinds as mentioned just above, but expressed through speech rather than bodily action). The mental volitional formation is a volitional formation that occurs through the mind; the term is a designation for the twenty-nine mundane wholesome and unwholesome mental volitions (manosañcetanā) that occur privately in thought without motivating action in the doors of body and speech. (The additional nine volitions are the five of the form-sphere and four of the formless-sphere cittas, states of purely meditative experience; see CMA 1:18, 22.)
This triad of saṅkhārā should not be confused with the triad discussed at 41:6 (IV 293,14-28, also at MN I 301,17-29). I have added “volitional” to the present set to distinguish them from the other, though the Pāli terms are identical. The latter triad is always introduced in relation to the cessation of perception and feeling and is never brought into connection with dependent origination.
8 This definition shows that ignorance, as the most basic cause of saṃsāric existence, is lack of knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. Although in popular accounts ignorance is often identified with the idea of self, the definitions here show that the view of self is an aspect of clinging, which is itself conditioned by craving, while the latter is in turn conditioned by ignorance (see AN V 116,16-21).
9 Spk: By the term “cessation” in all these phrases Nibbāna is being expounded. For all those phenomena cease in dependence on Nibbāna, and therefore the latter is spoken of as their cessation. Thus in this sutta the Blessed One taught the round of existence (vaṭṭa) and the ending of the round (vivaṭṭa) by twelve phrases and brought the discourse to a climax in arahantship.
10 The next seven suttas describe, in identical terms, the enlightenment of the six past Buddhas and the present Buddha Gotama as the discovery of dependent origination and its cessation. The Pāli text is filled out only for Vipassī and Gotama; the others are drastically abridged. I have translated in full only the last sutta, where Gotama speaks of his own attainment of enlightenment.
11 From the explanation of bodhisatta in Spk it appears that the Pāli commentarial tradition recognizes alternative etymologies of the word, as equivalent either to Skt bodhisattva (“an enlightenment being”) or to *bodhisakta (“one devoted to enlightenment”); see PED, s.v. satta(1).
Spk: Bodhi is knowledge; a being endowed with bodhi is a bodhisatta, a knowing one, a wise one, a sagely one. For from the time he forms his aspiration at the feet of former Buddhas, that being is always wise, never a blind fool. Or else, just as a mature lotus that has risen up above the water and is due to blossom when touched by the sun’s rays is called “an awakening lotus,” so a being who has obtained the prediction (to future Buddhahood) from the Buddhas and who will inevitably fulfil the perfections (pāramī) and attain enlightenment is called an awakening being (bujjhanasatta); he is a bodhisatta. One who lives yearning for enlightenment—the knowledge of the four paths—is devoted to, attached to, enlightenment (bodhiyaṃ satto āsatto); he is a bodhisatta.
12 The Buddha Vipassī was the sixth Buddha of antiquity, counting back from the Buddha Gotama. A detailed account of his career is found at DN II 11-51. He arose in the world ninety-one aeons ago. Sikhī and Vessabhū arose thirty-one aeons ago; Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana, Kassapa, and Gotama all arose in this present “excellent aeon” (bhaddakappa ). See DN II 2,15-28.
13 Yoniso manasikārā ahu paññāya abhisamayo. The commentaries consistently gloss yoniso manasikāra as upāyamanasikāra , pathamanasikāra, “attention that is the right means, attention on the (right) course.”
There took place (in me) a breakthrough by wisdom. Spk: There was a breakthrough, a concurrence, a conjunction of the reason for aging-and-death together with wisdom (paññāya saddhiṃ jarāmaraṇakāraṇassa abhisamayo samavāyo samāyogo); the meaning is that it was seen by him, “Agingand-death has birth as its condition.” Or alternatively, the sense can be construed thus: Through careful attention and wisdom there took place a breakthrough (yoniso manasikārena ca paññāya ca abhisamayo ahu). The meaning is that the penetration of aging-and-death occurred thus, “When there is birth, aging-and-death comes to be.”
The first of these explanations is improbable, and even the second is unsatisfactory in construing careful attention and wisdom as joint causes. In general sutta usage yoniso manasikāra is the forerunner of paññā, while paññā is the efficient cause of abhisamaya. As a technical term, abhisamaya appears in the Nikāyas in two main contexts: (i) As signifying the initial breakthrough to the Dhamma, dhammābhisamaya , it is identical with the obtaining of the vision of the Dhamma (dhammacakkhupaṭilābha), and thus with the attainment of stream-entry; see 13:1 (II 134,4-5). (ii) As signifying the complete breaking through of conceit (sammā mānābhisamaya) it is equivalent to the attainment of arahantship; see 36:5 (IV 207,14-15) and I, v. 725c. A third suttanta use is to denote the Buddha’s discovery of the Dhamma, as here and in the verb form abhisameti at 12:20 below. In the commentaries abhisamaya is synonymous with paṭivedha, penetration, both terms being used interchangeably to characterize the four functions of the supramundane path; see Vism 689-91 (Ppn 22:92-97).
14 The two statements about the origination of aging-and-death from birth correspond respectively to the two forms of the abstract principle of conditionality. The abstract formula occurs at 12:21, 22, 49, 50, 61, and 62, with a variant at 12:41. See below n. 59. From this it would evidently be a mistake to insist that the formulation in terms of existence (sati … hoti) relates to synchronic conditionality while the formulation in terms of arising (uppādā … uppajjati) relates to diachronic conditionality. Since both apply to every pair of factors, they seem to be alternative ways of expressing the conditioning relationship, either of which subsumes under itself all possible modes of conditionality in their wide variety.
15 In the account of his enlightenment at 12:65 (II 104,13 foll.) the Buddha traces the sequence of conditions back only as far as consciousness, which he then shows to arise in dependence on name-and-form. The same difference in treatment occurs in the corresponding passage on cessation (II 105,20 foll.
16 The five Pāli words are cakkhu, ñāṇa, paññā, vijjā, and āloka. While vijjā is actually derived from vindati, Spk here glosses it as paṭivedha, penetration, as though it derived from vijjhati, to pierce.
17 Bhūtānaṃ vā sattānaṃ ṭhitiyā sambhavesīnaṃ vā anuggahāya. On sambhavesin as a future active participle formed from -esi(n), see Geiger, Pāli Grammar, §193A, EV I, n. to 527, and CPD, s.v. -esi(n) (2). The commentators apparently were not acquainted with this grammatical form (of which only very few instances exist in Pāli) and hence explain sambhavesin as if it was a bahubbīhi compound made up of the noun sambhava and the adjectival termination -esin. Thus Spk comments on the above line: “Beings who have already come to be are those who have been born, been produced. Those about to come to be (or, on Spk’s interpretation, ‘seekers of new existence’) are those seeking, searching for, a new existence, birth, production (sambhavesino ti ye sambhavaṃ jātiṃ nibbattiṃ esanti gavesanti).”
18 Spk: The nutriments are conditions (paccayā), for conditions are called nutriments (āhārā) because they nourish (or bring forth, āharanti) their own effects. Although there are other conditions for beings, these four alone are called nutriments because they serve as special conditions for the personal life-continuity (ajjhattikasantatiyā visesapaccayattā). For edible food (kabaliṅkāra āhāra) is a special condition for the physical body of those beings who subsist on edible food. In the mental body, contact is the special condition for feeling, mental volition for consciousness, and consciousness for name-and-form. As to what they bring forth (or nourish): Edible food, as soon as it is placed in the mouth, brings forth the groups of form with nutritive essence as the eighth (ojaṭṭhamakarūpāni; an Abhidhamma term for the simplest cluster of material phenomena); the nutriment contact brings forth the three kinds of feeling; the nutriment mental volition brings forth the three kinds of existence; and the nutriment consciousness brings forth name-and-form on the occasion of rebirth.
In SN, nutriment is further discussed at 12:12, 31, 63, and 64. For general remarks on the four nutriments, see too Vism 341,7-18 (Ppn 11:1-3). Nyanaponika Thera, The Four Nutriments of Life, offers a collection of relevant suttas with commentaries. Āhāra is also used in a broader sense of “special condition,” without reference to the four nutriments, at 46:51 and 55:31.
19 These four kinds of nutriment have craving as their source. Spk: Beginning with the moment of rebirth, these kinds of nutriment comprised in the individual existence (attabhāva, the sentient organism) should be understood to originate by way of prior craving (purimataṇhā; the craving of the previous life that generated rebirth). How? At the moment of rebirth, firstly, there exists nutritive essence (ojā) produced within the arisen (bodily) form; this is the kammically acquired edible food originating from prior craving. Then the contact and volition associated with the rebirth-consciousness, and that consciousness itself, are respectively the kammically acquired nutriments of contact, mental volition, and consciousness originating from (prior) craving. Thus at rebirth the nutriments have their source in prior craving. And as at rebirth, so those produced subsequently at the moment of the first bhavaṅgacittashould be similarly understood.
On the conditioning role of the nutriments, see CMA 8:23. The commentarial explanation of how craving is the cause of the four nutriments seems roundabout. A simpler explanation, more consonant with the spirit of the suttas, might be that it is craving which impels beings into the perpetual struggle to obtain physical and mental nutriment, both in the present life and in future lives.
20 Spk: The Blessed One stopped the teaching at this point because he knew that a theorist (diṭṭhigatika) was sitting in the assembly and he wanted to give him an opportunity to ask his questions.
21 Spk explains that the name “Moḷiya” was given to him in lay life because he wore his hair in a huge topknot (moḷi), and the nickname stuck with him after he went forth as a monk. At MN I 122-24 he is admonished by the Buddha for his excessively familiar relations with the bhikkhunīs; in 12:32 below it is announced that he has left the Order and returned to lay life.
22 Phagguna’s question, “Who consumes...?” is “pregnant” with an implicit view of self. He sees someone—a self—standing behind consciousness in the role of a substantial subject. The Buddha must therefore reject as invalid the question itself, which is based on an illegitimate assumption. Spk: “I do not say, ‘One consumes’”: “I do not say someone—a being or a person (koci satto vā puggalo vā)—consumes.”
23 In the valid question, the Buddha replaces the personal pronoun ko, fraught with substantialist connotations, with the impersonal form kissa, genitive singular of the stem ki- (see Geiger, Pāli Grammar, §111.1). Although all eds. read here kissa nu kho bhante viññāṇāhāro, the sense seems to require that we add paccayo at the end. Spk glosses: Bhante ayaṃ viññāṇāhāro katamassa dhammassa paccayo? Paccayo does in fact occur in the reply.
24 Spk: The nutriment consciousness: rebirth-consciousness (paṭisandhicitta). The production of future renewed existence (āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti): the name-and-form arisen along with that same consciousness.
At AN I 223-24 it is said: “Kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture, for consciousness ... to become established in a low (middling, superior) realm; thus there is production of future renewed existence (kammaṃ khettaṃ viññāṇaṃ bījaṃ taṇhā sineho ... hīnāya (majjhimāya, paṇitāya) dhātuyā viññāṇaṃ patiṭṭhitaṃ; evaṃ āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti).” This implies that it is the stream of consciousness coming from the preceding existence that functions as the nutriment consciousness by generating, at the moment of conception, the initial rebirth-consciousness, which in turn brings forth (or “nourishes”) the concomitant name-and-form.
25 Tasmiṃ bhūte sati saḷāyatanaṃ. Spk: When that name-and-form called “the production of renewed existence” is generated, when it exists, the six sense bases come to be. The conjunction bhūte sati is unusual and the redundancy can only be avoided if the past participle bhūte is here understood to function as a noun denoting the being that has come to be.
26 Spk: Why didn’t the theorist ask, “Who comes to be?”? Because he held the belief that it is a being that comes to be, and the Buddha’s answer would directly contradict his belief. Further, after being contradicted so many times, he became convinced, and also the Teacher continued the discourse without pause in order to prevent him from asking any more pointless questions.
27Spk: They do not understand aging-and-death by way of the truth of suffering; nor its origin by way of the truth of the origin, i.e., that aging-and-death arises from birth and craving; nor its cessation by way of the truth of cessation; nor the way to its cessation by way of the truth of the path. Similarly, in all the following passages, the meaning should be understood by way of the four truths.
Ignorance is not mentioned in the sequence because it is already implied by reference to the origin of volitional formations.
28 Sāmaññatthaṃ vā brahmaññatthaṃ vā. Spk: Here the noble path is asceticism and brahminhood, and in both cases the goal should be understood as the noble fruit. See 45:35-38.
29 Dvayanissito khvāyaṃ Kaccāna loko yebhuyyena atthitañ c’ eva natthitañ ca. Spk: “For the most part” (yebhuyyena) means: for the great multitude, with the exception of the noble individuals (ariyapuggala). The notion of existence (atthitā) is eternalism (sassata); the notion of nonexistence (natthitā) is annihilationism (uccheda). Spk-pṭ: The notion of existence is eternalism because it maintains that the entire world (of personal existence) exists forever. The notion of nonexistence is annihilationism because it maintains that the entire world does not exist (forever) but is cut off.
In view of these explanations it would be misleading to translate the two terms, atthitā and natthitā, simply as “existence” and “nonexistence” and then to maintain (as is sometimes done) that the Buddha rejects all ontological notions as inherently invalid. The Buddha’s utterances at 22:94, for example, show that he did not hesitate to make pronouncements with a clear ontological import when they were called for. In the present passage atthitā and natthitā are abstract nouns formed from the verbs atthi and natthi. It is thus the metaphysical assumptions implicit in such abstractions that are at fault, not the ascriptions of existence and nonexistence themselves. I have tried to convey this sense of metaphysical abstraction, conveyed in Pāli by the terminal -tā, by rendering the two terms “the notion of existence” and “the notion of nonexistence,” respectively. On the two extremes rejected by the Buddha, see 12:48, and for the Buddha’s teaching on the origin and passing away of the world, 12:44.
Unfortunately, atthitā and bhava both had to be rendered by “existence,” which obscures the fact that in Pāli they are derived from different roots. While atthitā is the notion of existence in the abstract, bhava is concrete individual existence in one or another of the three realms. For the sake of marking the difference, bhava might have been rendered by “being” (as was done in MLDB), but this English word, I feel, is too broad (suggestive of “Being,” the absolute object of philosophical speculation) and does not sufficiently convey the sense of concreteness intrinsic to bhava.
30 Spk: The origin of the world: the production of the world of formations. There is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world: there does not occur in him the annihilationist view that might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding “They do not exist.” Spk-pṭ: The annihilationist view might arise in regard to the world of formations thus: “On account of the annihilation and perishing of beings right where they are, there is no persisting being or phenomenon.” It also includes the wrong view, having those formations as its object, which holds: “There are no beings who are reborn.” That view does not occur in him; for one seeing with right understanding the production and origination of the world of formations in dependence on such diverse conditions as kamma, ignorance, craving, etc., that annihilationist view does not occur, since one sees the uninterrupted production of formations.
Spk: The cessation of the world: the dissolution (bhaṅga) of formations. There is no notion of existence in regard to the world: There does not occur in him the eternalist view which might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding “They exist.” Spk-pṭ: The eternalist view might arise in regard to the world of formations, taking it to exist at all times, owing to the apprehension of identity in the uninterrupted continuum occurring in a cause-effect relationship. But that view does not occur in him; because he sees the cessation of the successively arisen phenomena and the arising of successively new phenomena, the eternalist view does not occur.
Spk: Further, “the origin of the world” is direct-order conditionality (anuloma-paccayākāra); “the cessation of the world,” reverse-order conditionality (paṭiloma-paccayākāra). [Spk-pṭ: “Direct-order conditionality” is the conditioning efficiency of the conditions in relation to their own effects; “reverse-order conditionality” is the cessation of the effects through the cessation of their respective causes.] For in seeing the dependency of the world, when one sees the nontermination of the conditionally arisen phenomena owing to the nontermination of their conditions, the annihilationist view, which might otherwise arise, does not occur. And in seeing the cessation of conditions, when one sees the cessation of the conditionally arisen phenomena owing to the cessation of their conditions, the eternalist view, which might otherwise arise, does not occur.
31 The reading I prefer is a hybrid of Be and Se: upayupādānābhinivesavinibaddho . I take upay- from Be (Se and Ee: upāy-) and -vinibaddho from Se (Be and Ee: -vinibandho). The rendering at KS 2:13, “grasping after systems and imprisoned by dogmas,” echoed by SN-Anth 2:17, is too narrow in emphasis. Spk explains that each of the three nouns—engagement, clinging, and adherence—occurs by way of craving and views (taṇhā, diṭṭhi), for it is through these that one engages, clings to, and adheres to the phenomena of the three planes as “I” and “mine.”
32 Tañ cāyaṃ upayupādānaṃ cetaso adhiṭṭhānaṃ abhinivesānusayaṃ na upeti na upādiyati nādhiṭṭhāti “attā me” ti. I have unravelled the difficult syntax of this sentence with the aid of Spk, which glosses ayaṃ as “this noble disciple” (ayaṃ ariyasāvako). Spk says that craving and views are also called “mental standpoints” (adhiṭṭhāna) because they are the foundation for the (unwholesome) mind, and “adherences and underlying tendencies” (abhinivesānusaya) because they adhere to the mind and lie latent within it. Spk connects the verb adhiṭṭhāti to the following “attā me,” and I conform to this interpretation in the translation.
33 Spk explains dukkha here as “the mere five aggregates subject to clinging” (pañcupādānakkhandhamattam eva). Thus what the noble disciple sees, when he reflects upon his personal existence, is not a self or a substantially existent person but a mere assemblage of conditioned phenomena arising and passing away through the conditioning process governed by dependent origination. In this connection see the verses of the bhikkhunī Vajirā, I, vv. 553-55. Spk: By just this much—the abandonment of the idea of a being (sattasaññā)—there is right seeing.
Aparappaccayā ñāṇaṃ, “knowledge independent of others,” is glossed by Spk as “personal direct knowledge without dependence on another” (aññassa apattiyāyetvā attapaccakkhañāṇaṃ ). This is said because the noble disciple, from the point of stream-entry on, has seen the essential truth of the Dhamma and thus is not dependent on anyone else, not even the Buddha, for his or her insight into the Dhamma. Until arahantship is attained, however, such a disciple might still approach the Buddha (or another enlightened teacher) for practical guidance in meditation.
34 Dhammānudhammapaṭipanno. Spk: Lokuttarassa nibbānadhammassa anudhammabhūtaṃ paṭipadaṃ paṭipanno; “one practising the way that is in accordance with the supramundane Nibbāna-dhamma.” Spk-pṭ glosses nibbānadhamma as “the noble path bringing Nibbāna,” and explains “(the way) that is in accordance with” it as meaning “(the way) whose nature is appropriate for the achievement of Nibbāna” (nibbānādhigamassa anucchavikasabhāvabhūtaṃ). This statement shows the sekha, the trainee. Cp. III, n. 51.
35 Diṭṭhadhammanibbānappatto. This statement shows the arahant, or asekha, who has completed the training.
36 Spk: Why does the Blessed One refuse three times? In order to inspire reverence; for if theorists are answered too quickly they do not show reverence, but they do so if they are refused two or three times. Then they wish to listen and develop faith. Also, the Master refused in order to create an opportunity for the ascetic’s faculty of knowledge to ripen.
37 Of the four alternatives, the first and second, as will be shown, are respectively implicit formulations of eternalism and annihilationism. The third is a syncretic solution, perhaps a form of partial-eternalism (ekaccasassatavāda; see DN I 17-21). The fourth is the doctrine of fortuitous origination (adhiccasamuppannavāda; see DN I 28-29).
38 Spk points out that the change of address, from the familiar bho Gotama to the respectful bhante bhagavā, indicates that he has acquired reverence for the Teacher.
39 Spk glosses ādito sato as ādimhi yeva, and explains it as meaning “(if) at the beginning (one thinks)....” It seems to me more likely that this phrase is part of the eternalist view itself and means “of one existing from the beginning,” i.e., of a being that has always existed. This interpretation can marshal support from the fact that the phrase is omitted just below in the corresponding restatement of the annihilationist view, which is otherwise constructed according to the same logic and thus, if Spk were correct, should include ādito sato. Spk says “it should be brought in,” but the fact that the text replaces it by another phrase is strong evidence that it does not belong there; see n. 40.
Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result),” in such a case the belief (laddhi) afterwards follows, “Suffering is created by oneself.” And here, what is meant by suffering is the suffering of the round (vaṭṭadukkha). Asserting thus, from the beginning one declares eternalism, one grasps hold of eternalism. Why? Because that view of his amounts to this. Eternalism comes upon one who conceives the agent and the experiencer to be one and the same.
Spk-pṭ: Prior to the belief that suffering is created by oneself there are the distortions of perception and of mind (saññācittavipallāsā) in the notion, “The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result),” and then a wrong adherence to these distortions develops, namely, the belief “Suffering is created by oneself” (a distortion of views, diṭṭhivipallāsa).
On the three levels of distortion with their four modes, see AN II 52.
40 In this passage the phrase ādito sato found in the preceding statement of eternalism is replaced by vedanābhitunnassa sato, which countermands Spk’s proposal that ādito sato should be brought in here. Spk interprets the sentence as stating that the annihilationist view is held by one who experiences the feeling associated with the view, but I understand the point to be that the view is held with reference toone “stricken by feeling,” perhaps by painful feeling.
Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The one who acts is one, the one who experiences (the result) is another,” in such a case afterwards there comes the belief, “Suffering is created by another,” held by one stricken by—that is, pierced by—the feeling associated with the annihilationist view that arises thus: “The agent is annihilated right here, and someone else (‘another’) experiences (the results) of his deeds.” Asserting thus, from the beginning one declares annihilationism, one grasps hold of annihilationism. Why? Because the view one holds amounts to this. Annihilationism comes upon him.
41 Spk: The Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle without veering to either of these extremes—eternalism and annihilationism—having abandoned them without reservation. He teaches while being established in the middle way. What is that Dhamma? By the formula of dependent origination, the effect is shown to occur through the cause and to cease with the cessation of the cause, but no agent or experiencer (kāraka, vedaka) is described.
42 The going forth (pabbajjā) is the initial ordination as a novice (sāmaṇera); the higher ordination (upasampadā) admits the novice to full membership in the Saṅgha as a bhikkhu.
43 For details on the ordination of a wanderer formerly belonging to another sect, see Vin I 69-71. Spk: The candidate is actually given the going forth and lives as a novice during the probationary period, after which the bhikkhus give him the higher ordination if they are satisfied with him. The Buddha, however, is entitled to waive the usual procedure when he recognizes that the candidate is sufficiently competent and need not be tested. In Kassapa’s case he had the going forth given to him; then, immediately after, Kassapa was brought back to him and he called an assembly of bhikkhus and administered the higher ordination.
44 See I, n. 376.
45 Spk: In this sutta pleasure and pain as feeling (vedanāsukhadukkha) are being discussed; it is also acceptable to say the subject is resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha).
46 Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The feeling and the one who feels it are the same,” there then comes the belief, “Pleasure and pain are created by oneself.” For in this case feeling is created by feeling itself, and asserting thus one admits the existence of this feeling already in the past. One declares eternalism, grasps hold of eternalism.
47 Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The feeling is one, the one who feels it is another,” there then comes the belief, “Pleasure and pain are created by another,” held by one stricken by the feeling associated with the annihilationist view that arises thus: “The feeling of the agent (kārakavedanā ) in the past has been annihilated, and someone else (‘another’) experiences (the result) of his deeds.” Asserting thus, one declares and grasps the annihilationist view that the agent is annihilated and rebirth is taken by someone else.
48 Spk: This body has thereby originated (evam ayaṃ kāyo samudāgato ): This body has been produced thus because he has been hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving. So there is this body: one’s own conscious body. And external name-and-form (bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṃ): the conscious body of others externally. The meaning should be explained in terms of the five aggregates and six sense bases of oneself and others. This interpretation of bahiddhā nāmarūpa seems dubious. We may have here, rather, a rare example of the term nāmarūpa being employed to represent the entire field of experience available to consciousness, “external name” being the concepts used to designate the objects cognized. See the common expression imasmiṃ saviññāṇake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu, “in regard to this conscious body and all external signs,” at 18:21, 22; 22:71, 72, etc., and explained below in n. 340. Spk interprets this dyad (etaṃ dvayaṃ) as the internal and external sense bases, which it calls “the great dyad” (mahādvaya). However, while the sense bases are usually shown to be the condition for contact (e.g., at 12:43, 44) and are also called a dyad (e.g., at 35:92, 93), it seems that here the text intends the term dyad to denote one’s own conscious body and “external name-and-form.” The six sense bases are introduced only in the next sentence, after contact has already been said to arise from a duality. At DN II 62,12-37 too the Buddha demonstrates that name-and-form can be a direct condition for contact without mention of the six sense bases.
49 Bhagavantaṃ yeva paṭibhātu etassa bhāsitassa. Lit. “Let the meaning of this statement occur to the Blessed One.” I translate this Pāli idiom freely in accordance with the sense. See I, n. 227.
50 In this brief sutta we find clearly adumbrated the later exegetical scheme of “the four groups” (catusaṅkhepa) and “twenty modes” (vīsatākāra), explained at Paṭis I 51-52; Vism 579-81 (Ppn 17:288-98); and CMA 8:7. See Table 4, p. 519. The past causes are the ignorance and craving that brought both the fool and the wise man into the present existence; the present results—the conscious body, name-and-form, the six sense bases, contact, and feeling; the present causes—the ignorance and craving that the fool does not abandon; the future results—the birth, aging, and death to which the fool is subject in the next existence. This should also help establish the validity of the “three-life” interpretation of paṭicca-samuppāda and demonstrate that such an interpretation is not a commentarial innovation.
51 Ṭhitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā . Spk: That element (sā dhātu), the intrinsic nature of the conditions (paccayasabhāva), still persists; never is it the case that birth is not a condition for aging-and-death. By the next two terms too he indicates just the condition. For the dependently arisen phenomena stand because of the condition (paccayena hi paccayuppannā dhammā tiṭṭhanti); therefore the condition itself is called the stableness of the Dhamma (dhammaṭṭhitatā). The condition fixes (or determines) the dependent phenomena (paccayo dhamme niyameti); thus it is called the fixed course of the Dhamma (dhammaniyāmatā). Specific conditionality (idappaccayatā) is the set of specific conditions for aging-and-death, etc.
Spk-pṭ: Whether it is unpenetrated before and after the arising of Tathāgatas, or penetrated when they have arisen, that element still persists; it is not created by the Tathāgatas, but aging-and-death always occurs through birth as its condition. A Tathāgata simply discovers and proclaims this, but he does not invent it.
At AN I 286,8-24 exactly the same statement is made about the three characteristics: “All formations are impermanent /suffering” and “All phenomena are nonself.” The two expressions, dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā, must thus have a meaning that is common to both dependent origination and the three characteristics, and it therefore seems unfitting to explain them here, as Spk does, in a way that is specifically tied to conditionality. Moreover, it is more likely that here dhamma means the principle or law-fulness that holds sway over phenomena, not the phenomena subject to that principle. See too below n. 105, n. 211.
52 Abhisambujjhati abhisameti. The former verb, which is reserved for the Buddha’s enlightenment, is transitive. I thus render it “awakens to (with the object),” though otherwise I generally translate words derived from the verb bujjhati as expressing the sense of “enlightenment.” Abhisameti is the verb corresponding to abhisamaya, on which see n. 13.
53 Se contains a footnote which explains that the statement below, “Thus, bhikkhus, the actuality in this ...” should be inserted at the end of each section on the conditioning relationships; and each following section should begin with the statement, “whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas....”
54 At 56:20, 27 the Four Noble Truths are said to be tatha, avitatha , anaññatha—the adjectives corresponding to the first three abstract nouns here. Spk gives a very specific interpretation (translated just below), though we might suspect the original sense was simply that the teaching of dependent origination is true, not false, and not other than real.
Spk: Actuality (tathatā) is said to indicate the occurrence of each particular phenomenon when its assemblage of appropriate conditions is present. Inerrancy (avitathatā) means that once its conditions have reached completeness there is no nonoccurrence, even for a moment, of the phenomenon due to be produced from those conditions. Nototherwiseness (anaññathatā) means that there is no production of one phenomenon by another’s conditions. The phrase specific conditionality is used to refer to the (individual) conditions for aging-and-death, etc., or to the conditions taken as a group (paccayasamūhato).
55 Sammappaññāya. Spk: With path wisdom together with insight (savipassanāya maggapaññāya).
56 The sixteen cases of doubt are also mentioned at MN I 8,4-15. For a discussion of their abandonment, see Vism 599 (Ppn 19:5-6) and 603-5 (Ppn 19:21-27). Spk explains that the basic division expressed in the doubts—between existing and not existing in the past, etc.—reflects the antinomy of eternalism and annihilationism. The other doubts pertaining to past existence arise within an eternalist framework. Similar distinctions apply among the doubts pertaining to the future and the present.
57 The ten powers, which are powers of knowledge (ñāṇabala), are expounded at MN I 69-71, where they are called Tathāgata powers (tathāgatabala). The ten types of knowledge are also claimed by the Venerable Anuruddha at 52:15-24, but in part only, according to Spk. A detailed analysis is at Vibh 335-44. The four grounds of self-confidence (vesārajja) are explained at MN I 71-72. In brief, they are the confidence: (i) that no one can challenge his claim to be enlightened about all phenomena; (ii) that no one can challenge his claim to have eradicated all the taints; (iii) that no one can challenge him regarding the states he declares to be obstacles; and (iv) that no one can challenge his claim that his teaching leads the one who practises it to liberation from suffering.
Spk glosses brahma as seṭṭha, uttama, “the best, the highest,” and explains the Brahma-wheel as the purified Wheel of the Dhamma (visuddhadhammacakka). This is twofold, the knowledge of penetration (paṭivedhañāṇa) and the knowledge of teaching (desanāñāṇa). The former originates from wisdom and brings the Buddha’s own attainment of the noble fruits; the latter originates from compassion and enables him to teach in such a way that his disciples attain the fruits. The knowledge of penetration is supramundane (lokuttara), the knowledge of teaching mundane (lokiya). Both are self-begotten types of knowledge belonging exclusively to the Buddhas, not held in common with others.
58 This stock meditation formula on the five aggregates is also found in SN at 12:23, 22:78, 89, 101. It occurs too in the two versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta at DN II 301,29-302,13 and MN I 61,3-8. The origin (samudaya) and the passing away (atthaṅgama) of the aggregates are explained from the standpoint of diachronic conditionality at 22:5 and from the standpoint of synchronic conditionality at 22:56, 57. See too n. 123.
59 This is the abstract formula of dependent origination: imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imass’ uppādā idaṃ uppajjati; imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati. Spk-pṭ explains that what is meant by existence in the first part of the formula is not actual presence as such but “the state of not having been brought to cessation by the path”; similarly, what is meant by nonexistence in the second part of the formula is not mere absence as such but “the state of having been brought to cessation by the path.” A long, complex explanation of the formula (abridged in Spk-pṭ) is found at Ud-a 38-42 (translated in Masefield, The Udāna Commentary, 1:66-72). See too n. 14 above. The use of the formula here, immediately following the statement on the aggregates, connects the origin and passing away of the five aggregates to dependent origination, indicating that the former should be understood in terms of the latter.
60 Chinnapilotika. Spk: Patchwork (pilotika) is an old cloth, cut up and torn, that has been sewn and stitched here and there. If one does not wear this, but is clothed in a sheet of uncut cloth, one is said to be “free of patchwork.” This Dhamma is similar, for in no way is it sewn up and stitched together by deceitful means, etc.
This encomium of the Dhamma is also at MN I 141-42. At 16:11 (II 220,1 and 221,5 foll.) there occurs the expression paṭapilotikānaṃ saṅghāti, “an outer robe of patches.”
61 Spk calls this four-factored energy (caturaṅgasamannāgataṃ viriyaṃ); the four factors are to be understood by way of skin, sinews, bones, and flesh-and-blood. The vow recurs below at 21:3 (II 276,12-16) and is also at MN I 481,1-5. At Ja I 71,24-27 the Bodhisatta makes the same resolve when he takes his seat at the foot of the Bodhi Tree.
62 Spk glosses sadatthaṃ: sobhanaṃ vā atthaṃ sakaṃ vā atthaṃ, “beautiful good or own good.” The latter explanation is more likely. The common translation of the expression as “true good,” taking sad to represent sant, does not seem to have the support of the commentaries.
63 Spk: It is not by inferior faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom that the supreme—namely, arahantship—is to be attained. The supreme must be attained by supreme faith and so forth.
64 Spk explains maṇḍapeyya as a compound of maṇḍa in the sense of clear (pasanna) and peyya in the sense of what is to be drunk (pātabba). It seems that maṇḍa originally meant the best part of milk or butter, i.e., the cream, and like the English word came to signify the essence or finest part of anything. At 34:1, etc., we find sappimaṇḍa, “cream-of-ghee,” the finest of dairy products.
Spk: There are three types of cream: (i) the cream of teachings (desanāmaṇḍa), i.e., the Four Noble Truths and the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment; (ii) the cream of recipients (paṭiggahamaṇḍa), i.e., disciples capable of understanding those teachings; and (iii) the cream of holy lives (brahmacariyamaṇḍa ), i.e., the Noble Eightfold Path. The words “while the Teacher is present” (satthā sammukhībhūto) show the reason: since the Teacher is present, having made an energetic effort, you should drink this cream.
This sentence serves as the heading for an entire treatise of Paṭis (No. 10; II 86-91), which applies the metaphor of cream in detail to all the factors of the Buddhist training.
65 We should read, with Be and Se, tesaṃ te kārā amhesu mahapphalā bhavissanti, as against tesaṃ vo kārā in Ee. The sense of this line has been missed by C.Rh.D at KS 2:24, and Walshe follows her at SN-Anth 3:20. Cp. MN I 140,23-24, 31-32: Yaṃ kho idaṃ pubbe pariññātaṃ tattha me (no) evarūpā kārā karīyanti. PED recognizes kāra in the sense of “service, act of mercy or worship,” but does not include these references.
66 Alam eva appamādena sampādetuṃ. These words anticipate the Buddha’s final injunction at 6:15 (I 157,34-158,2).
67 For an essay based on this important sutta, see Bodhi, Transcendental Dependent Arising. The opening paragraph recurs at 22:101, but with a different sequel; see too n. 58. Spk states that the destruction of the taints (āsavakkhaya) is arahantship, which gains this name because it arises at the end of the destruction of the taints (āsavānaṃ khayante jātattā).
68 Spk: Having set up the teaching with its climax in arahantship, the Buddha next shows the preliminary practice along which the arahant has travelled. The knowledge of destruction in regard to destruction (khayasmiṃ khaye ñāṇaṃ) is the reviewing knowledge (paccavekkhaṇañāṇa) which occurs when the destruction of the taints—namely, arahantship—has been obtained (see I, n. 376 and Vism 676; Ppn 22:19-21). Liberation is the liberation of the fruit of arahantship (arahattaphalavimutti), which is a condition for reviewing knowledge by way of decisive-support condition (upanissayapaccaya). First the fruit of arahantship arises, then the knowledge of destruction.
Spk glosses sa-upanisā as sakāraṇa, sappacayya, “with cause, with condition.” Spk-pṭ adds: upanisīdati phalaṃ etthā ti kāraṇaṃ upanisā; “the cause is called the proximate cause because the effect rests upon it.” Thus the commentators take upanisā to be the equivalent of Skt upaniṣad, not a contraction of upanissaya. Although, as CPD points out, “a semantic blend” with the latter takes place, the two words must be kept distinct because not everything that is an upanisā (proximate cause) for other things is an upanissayapaccaya (decisive support condition) for those things. The latter refers solely to something which plays a strong causal role.
69 Spk glosses the terms in the above sequence thus (starting from the end): Suffering is the suffering of the round (vaṭṭadukkha ). Faith is repeatedly arising faith (aparāparaṃ uppajjanasaddhā ; that is, tentative faith, not the unwavering faith of a noble disciple). Gladness (pāmojja) is weak rapture, while rapture proper (pīti) is strong rapture. Tranquillity (passaddhi) is the subsiding of distress, a condition for the happiness preliminary to absorption. Happiness is the happiness in the preliminary phase of meditative absorption, concentration the jhāna used as a basis (for insight; pādakajjhānasamādhi). Knowledge and vision of things as they really are (yathābhūtañāṇadassana) is weak insight, namely, the knowledges of the discernment of formations, of the overcoming of doubt, of exploration, and of what is and what is not the path (see Vism chaps. 18-20). Revulsion (nibbidā ) is strong insight, namely, knowledge of appearance as fearful, of contemplation of danger, of reflection, and of equanimity about formations (Vism 645-57; Ppn 21:29-66). Dispassion (virāga) is the path, which arises expunging defilements.
Note that in the next paragraph suffering replaces aging-and-death of the usual formula.
70 The simile also occurs at 55:38, AN I 243,27-32, and AN V 114,6-14.
71 On the identity of the four views see above n. 37.
72 A stock passage in the Nikāyas, recurring in SN in slightly different forms determined by the context, at 12:25, 12:26, 22:2, 22:86, 35:81, 42:13, 44:2, and 45:5. The readings alternate, even within the same volume, between vādānuvādo and vādānupāto, and it is uncertain which of the two is more original. The passage has stumped previous translators, mainly because of the phrase koci sahadhammiko vādānupāto, which at KS 2:28 is rendered “one who is of his doctrine, a follower of his views.” To avoid such errors two meanings of sahadhammika must be distinguished: (i) a noun meaning a follower of the same doctrine (unambiguously so at MN I 64,13); and (ii) an adjective meaning legitimate, reasonable (unambiguously so at 41:8; IV 299,25 foll.). Here the second meaning is applicable.
Spk explains: “How (should we answer) so that not the slightest consequence or implication (vādānupāto vādappavatti) of the ascetic Gotama’s assertion—(a consequence) which is reasonable because of the reason stated (vutta-kāraṇena sakāraṇo hutvā)—might give ground for criticism?” This is meant: “How can there be no ground for criticism in any way of the ascetic Gotama’s assertion?” I dissent from Spk on what is to be safeguarded against criticism: Spk takes it to be the Buddha’s assertion, while I understand it to be the inquirer’s account of the Buddha’s assertion. In other words, the inquirer wants to be sure he is representing the Buddha’s position correctly, whether or not he agrees with it.
At AN III 4,10, 19 sahadhammikā vādānuvādā gārayhā ṭhānā āgacchanti occurs in a context where it means simply “reasonable rebukes, grounds for criticism, come up,” and is contrasted with sahadhammikā pāsaṃsā ṭhānā āgacchanti, “reasonable grounds for praise come up.”
73 On the expression tadapi phassapaccayā, “that (too) is conditioned by contact,” Spk says that this may be known from the fact that there is no experience of suffering without contact. It seems to me, however, that the point being made here is not that suffering does not arise without contact (though this is true), but that the adoption of a view does not occur without contact. The Brahmajāla Sutta states the same point in relation to the sixty-two speculative views—that the proclamation of each of these views is conditioned by contact and the views cannot be experienced without contact. See DN I 41-43, translated in Bodhi, All-Embracing Net of Views, pp. 85-87, with the commentary at pp. 197-98.
74 Gambhīro c’ eva assa gambhīrāvabhāso ca. The same two terms are used at 12:60 and at DN II 55,9-10 to describe paṭiccasamuppāda . For the explanation of Sv, see Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 64-67. Spk explains “that same meaning” (es’ ev’ attho) to be the meaning of dependent origination implicit in the proposition, “Suffering is dependent on contact.”
75 He gives his name to the Bhūmija Sutta (MN No. 126), where he answers some questions of Prince Jayasena and then engages in conversation with the Buddha. The first part of the present sutta repeats the first part of the preceding one except that it is phrased in terms of “pleasure and pain.”
76 It is difficult to understand how these ascetics could be “proponents of kamma” (kammavādā) when they hold that pleasure and pain arise fortuitously. Neither Spk nor Spkpṭ offers any clarification.
77 This passage is also at AN II 157-59. Spk says that the Buddha added this section to show that pleasure and pain do not arise with contact alone as condition, but with other conditions as well. In this case the bodily, verbal, and mental volitions (kāya-, vacī-, manosañcetanā) are the kammically effective volitions that function as conditions for the resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha). I follow Be and Se in reading avijjāpaccayā ca and in taking this clause to belong to the end of the present paragraph. This has the support of Spk, which explains that this is said to show that these volitions are conditioned by ignorance. Ee reads va for ca and places the clause at the beginning of the next paragraph.
78 Spk identifies the three volitional formations—kāyasaṅkhāra, vacīsaṅkhāra, manosaṅkhāra—with the three types of volition mentioned just above. One generates them “on one’s own initiative” (sāmaṅ) when one acts without inducement by others, with an unprompted mind (asaṅkhārikacitta); one generates them “prompted by others” when one acts with a prompted mind (sasaṅkhārikacitta). One acts deliberately (sampajāno) when one acts with knowledge of kamma and its fruit; undeliberately (asampajāno), when one acts without such knowledge. This text may be the original basis for the Abhidhamma distinction between sasaṅkhārikacitta and asaṅkhārikacitta, on which see CMA 1:4.
79 The term used here is manosaṅkhāra, but from the context this is clearly synonymous with cittasaṅkhāra at 12:2. There is no textual justification for identifying the latter with the cittasaṅkhāra at 41:6 (IV 293,17) and MN I 301,28-29, defined as saññā and vedanā.
80 I read with Be and Se, imesu Ānanda dhammesu avijjā anupatitā . The chasuin Ee appears superfluous.
Spk: Ignorance is included among these states under the heading of decisive support (upanissaya); for they are all comprehended under this phrase, “With ignorance as condition, volitional formations.” (On the interpretation of paṭicca-samuppāda by way of the twenty-four conditional relations of the Paṭṭhāna, see Vism, chap. 17, concisely explained in Nyanatiloka Thera, Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, pp. 159-73.)
81 Spk: That body does not exist which, if it existed, would enable pleasure and pain to arise conditioned by bodily volition; the same method of explanation applies to speech and mind. (Query:) But an arahant acts, speaks, and thinks, so how is it that his body, etc., do not exist? (Reply:) In the sense that they do not generate kammic results. For the deeds done by an arahant are neither wholesome nor unwholesome kamma, but merely functional (kiriyamatta); thus for him it is said, “that body, etc., do not exist.”
On the functional consciousness of the arahant, see CMA 1:15. An alternative explanation might be simply that with the elimination of ignorance there will be no further arising of the five aggregates, the basis of all experience, and thus no further experiencing of pleasure and pain.
82 Spk: There is no field (khetta) in the sense of a place of growth; no site (vatthu) in the sense of a support; no base (āyatana) in the sense of a condition; no foundation (adhikaraṇa) in the sense of a cause.
83 Upavāṇa is the Buddha’s attendant at 7:13. The present sutta is almost identical with the first part of 12:24 except that it omits the qualifying expression kammavādā in the description of the ascetics and brahmins.
84 Spk: He understands the condition by way of the truth of suffering, and the origin of the condition, etc., by way of the truth of the origin, etc.
85 This whole passage is repeated at 12:28, 33, 49, and 50. Spk: He is endowed with the view of the path (maggadiṭṭhi), the vision of the path, etc.
Sekha is used here as an adjective to qualify ñāṇa and vijjā. The sekha or trainee is one who has arrived at the supramundane path and is training in it but has not yet reached arahantship, i.e., a stream-enterer, once-returner, or nonreturner; on reaching arahantship he becomes an asekha, “one beyond training.”
The rendering of amatadvāraṃ āhacca tiṭṭhati at KS 2:33 as “who stands knocking at the door of the Deathless,” if intended literally, shows a misunderstanding of the idiom āhacca tiṭṭhati. In both canon and commentaries the expression is often used to mean “reaching right up to, standing up against,” and does not imply knocking on a door, which in Pāli is expressed by the verb ākoṭeti (e.g., at Vin I 248,5). The idiom is also at 17:28, 29 (II 238,5, 16-17). For other instances, see CPD, s.v. āhacca. The Deathless, of course, is Nibbāna. Spk identifies the door to the Deathless as the noble path.
86 This sutta is almost identical with 12:13; the only difference is in the operative verb, there pajānāti and here parijānāti. Spk says this sutta was spoken in accordance with the inclination (ajjhāsaya) of the bhikkhus who recite the words, for they are able to penetrate (the sense) when the prefix pari- is used.
87 The Pārāyana, the “Going to the Far Shore,” is the last chapter of Sn. It consists of sixteen sections (plus prologue and epilogue), in each of which the Buddha replies to questions posed by one of sixteen brahmin students. “The Questions of Ajita” is the first of the sixteen sections.
88 Spk-pṭ: Those who have comprehended the Dhamma (saṅkhātadhammā ) are the arahants, who have penetrated the (four) truths. The trainees (sekhā) are the seven types of persons—those on the four paths and the lower three fruits.
Saṅkhātadhammā could be understood to mean either “those who have comprehended the Dhamma,” i.e., the teaching, or “those who have comprehended things,” i.e., phenomena and their principles. Nidd II 34-35 (Be) glosses in both ways: as those who have known the Dhamma (ñātadhammā), by knowing all formations as impermanent, etc.; and as those who have comprehended the aggregates, elements, sense bases, etc. The trainees (sekhā) are so called because they train in the higher virtue, the higher mind (the jhānas), and the higher wisdom. Though Norman says that Pj II and Nidd II do not take sekhā and puthū as going together (GD, p. 367, n. to 1038), read correctly both these texts do place the two words in apposition. The trainees are manifold (puthū) because they fall into the seven types.
89 Spk: Why did he remain silent up to the third time? He was not puzzled by the question but by the Buddha’s intention (ajjhāsaya). For it was possible to answer in many ways—by way of the aggregates, elements, sense bases, or conditionality—and he wanted to catch the Teacher’s intention. Then the Teacher, aware of the reason for his silence, gave him the method with the words, “Do you see...?”
90 Spk: This has come to be (bhūtam idaṃ): this is said of the five aggregates. Thus the Teacher gave the elder the method, implying, “Answer my question by way of the five aggregates.” Then, just as the great ocean appears as one open expanse to a man standing on the shore, so as soon as he was given the method the answer to the question appeared to the elder with a hundred and a thousand methods. With correct wisdom (sammā paññāya): one sees it with path-wisdom together with insight. One is practising: from the stage of virtue as far as the path of arahantship one is said to be practising for the purpose of revulsion, etc. This section shows the practice of the trainee.
91 Tadāhārasambhavaṃ. On nutriment see 12:11, 12, and n. 18above. No doubt it is the dependence of the five aggregates on nutriment that accounts for the inclusion of this sutta in the Nidānasaṃyutta. A similar treatment of nutriment, in catechism form, is at MN I 260,7-32.
Spk resolves tadāhārasambhavaṃ as taṃ āhārasambhavaṃ, apparently taking tad to represent the five aggregates. I see the whole expression as qualifying an implicit subject (“its”) and take tad (“that”) as a specification of āhāra. Such an interpretation seems required by the parallel statement on cessation. See too the use of the expression tadāhāra at SN II 85,6, 86,12, 87,6, etc., which supports this interpretation.
92 Anupādā vimutto. Spk: One is liberated by not grasping anything at all with the four kinds of clinging (upādāna). This section shows the arahant.
93 The bhikkhu Kaḷāra the Khattiya is met only here. Moḷiyaphagguna appears in 12:12; see n. 21. “Returned to the lower life” (hīnāyāvatto) means that he reverted to the state of a layman.
Spk and Spk-pṭ together help to illuminate this cryptic exchange thus: “He did not find solace (assāsa)” means that he had not attained the three (lower) paths; for if he had attained them he would not have reverted to the lower life since then he would not have been tempted by sensual pleasures (his reason for disrobing). Sāriputta says “I have no perplexity” (na kaṅkhāmi) about having attained solace since his support is the knowledge of a disciple’s perfection (sāvakapāramīñāṇa). “As to the future” (āyatiṃ) refers to future rebirth; the question is an indirect way of asking if he has attained arahantship.
94 Spk remarks that Sāriputta did not declare final knowledge in such words, but the elder Kaḷāra Khattiya had ascribed this statement to him because he was happy and pleased. Final knowledge (aññā) is arahantship.
95 Spk: The Blessed One asked him this question to get him to declare final knowledge, thinking: “He will not declare final knowledge of his own accord, but he will do so when answering my question.”
96 Spk: Here too (as in 12:31) the elder was puzzled not by the question but by the Buddha’s intention; he was unsure how the Teacher wanted him to declare arahantship. But he started to speak in terms of conditionality, which was what the Teacher wanted. When he realized that he had grasped the Teacher’s intention, the answer appeared to him with a hundred and a thousand methods.
I have translated the first part of Sāriputta’s reply in accordance with the gloss of Spk thus: “With the destruction of the specific condition for birth, I have understood, ‘As the condition for birth is destroyed, the effect, namely birth, is destroyed.’”
97 Spk: The Buddha asks this to get Sāriputta to roar a lion’s roar in his own proper domain. For Sāriputta attained the knowledge of a disciple’s perfection after he had discerned the three feelings while the Buddha taught the wanderer Dīghanakha “The Discourse on the Discernment of Feelings” and this became his own domain (savisaya).
Spk refers here to the Dīghanakha Sutta (MN No. 74; see esp. MN I 500,9-501,6), and seems to be using “Vedanāpariggaha Sutta” as an alternative title for that text. Ee (S II 53,8-9, 12) should be amended to read vedanāsu nandī.
98 Yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmiṃ. See 36:11 (IV 216,20-217,3).
99 Spk: Internal deliverance (ajjhattaṃ vimokkho): he attained arahantship while comprehending the internal formations. Spk refers here to a fourfold distinction in how the path emerges, found also at Vism 661-62 (Ppn 21:84-85).
Spk: The taints do not flow within me (āsavā nānussavanti): The three taints, the taint of sensuality, etc., do not flow through the six sense doors towards the six sense objects, i.e., they do not arise in me. And I do not despise myself (attānañ ca nāvajānāmi): by this the abandoning of self-contempt (omāna) is indicated. C.Rh.D, at KS 2:40, has misunderstood this expression, rendering it “and I admit no (immutable) soul.”
100 Pubbe appaṭisaṃviditaṃ. Spk: “I had not previously known or understood, ‘He will ask me this.’ His hesitancy was for the purpose of finding out the Teacher’s intention.”
The past participle appaṭisaṃvidita suggests the Skt noun pratisaṃvid, counterpart of Pāli paṭisambhidā, the analytical knowledges in which Sāriputta excelled.
101 Spk: That element of the Dhamma (sā dhammadhātu): Here, “element of the Dhamma” is the knowledge of a disciple’s perfection, which is capable of seeing the principle of conditionality without obscuration (paccayākārassa vivaṭabhāvadassanasamatthaṃ sāvakapāramīñāṇaṃ).
102 Dhamme ñāṇa. Spk explains the Dhamma here as the Four Noble Truths (catusaccadhamma) or path knowledge (maggañāṇadhamma ).
103 Iminā dhammena diṭṭhena viditena akālikena pattena pariyogāḷhena. Note that the string of participles here corresponds exactly to the terms used in the standard description of one who has gained “the vision of the Dhamma” (dhammacakkhu): diṭṭhadhammo, pattadhammo, viditadhammo, pariyogāḷhadhammo(“seen the Dhamma, attained the Dhamma, understood the Dhamma, fathomed the Dhamma,” e.g., at DN I 110,14-15). This implies that the Dhamma which the stream-enterer has seen is dependent origination, an inference additionally confirmed by the closing passage of the present sutta.
Spk here treats akālikena as an independent adjective qualifying dhammena and explains it to mean that the path yields its fruit immediately after it is penetrated, without passage of time (kiñci kālaṃ anatikkamitvā paṭivedhānantaraṃ yeva phaladāyakena). However, in commenting on 42:11 (IV 328,21-22), where the same statement is found, Spk explains akālikena as an adverb of manner used in apposition to pattena (see IV, n. 352). I understand akālikena in the present passage in exactly the same way; otherwise it is difficult to see why it should be included amidst a string of past participles. Moreover, since the word here characterizes the relationship between temporal events like birth and aging, the common rendering of it as “timeless” is not entirely satisfactory. The desired sense in this context is “not involving the passage of time,” i.e., immediate, which qualifies the knowledge of the conditional relationship between the factors, not the factors themselves. The point is that this knowledge is a matter of direct “ocular” experience rather than of reasoning and inference.
104 Anvaye ñāṇa. Spk: The knowledge (that follows) as a consequence of the knowledge of the principle; this is a name for reviewing knowledge (see n. 68). It is not possible to apply the method to the past and future by means of the dhamma of the four truths or the dhammaof path knowledge, but when the four paths have been penetrated by path knowledge, reviewing knowledge subsequently occurs, and one applies the method by means of that.
This explanation is difficult to square with the account of reviewing knowledge at Vism 676 and elsewhere as knowledge of the path and fruit attained, the defilements abandoned, those remaining, and Nibbāna. What is meant here, rather, is an inference extended to past and future, based on the immediate discernment of the conditionality operative between any given pair of factors.
The following paragraph is also at 12:27, 28. Spk says that the arahant’s (prior) plane of traineeship (khīṇāsavassa sekhabhūmi) is being discussed, on which Spk-pṭ remarks: the moment of the supreme path (aggamaggakhaṇa).
105 Spk: The knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma (dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇa ) is the knowledge of the principle of conditionality. For the principle of conditionality is called “the stability of the Dhamma” because it is the cause for the continued occurrence of phenomena (pavattiṭṭhitikāraṇattā); the knowledge of it is “the knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma.” This is a designation for just this sixfold knowledge.
I render dhammaṭṭhitatā (at 12:20; n. 51) “stableness of the Dhamma” and dhammaṭṭhiti “stability of the Dhamma.” The latter also occurs at 12:70 (II 124,10). The two seem to be effectively synonymous.
The knowledge that this knowledge too is subject to destruction is called by Spk “counter-insight into insight” (vipassanā-paṭivipassanā), i.e., insight into the dissolution of the very act of insight knowledge that had just cognized the dissolution of the primary object. See Vism 641-42 (Ppn 21:11-13), where, however, the expression vipassanāpaṭivipassanā does not occur.
106 Kassa ca pan’ idaṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ. This question, and the following ones moulded on the same pattern, presuppose the reality of a self and thus, like the questions at 12:12, must be rejected by the Buddha as invalid.
Spk: Even though the question, “What is aging-and-death?” is properly formulated, because it is combined with the question, “For whom is there aging-and-death?” —which implicitly affirms belief in a being (sattūpaladdhi-vāda )—the entire question becomes wrongly formulated. This is like a dish of delicious food served on a golden platter, on top of which a small lump of excrement is placed: all the food becomes inedible and must be discarded.
107 Spk: The living of the holy life (brahmacariyavāsa) is the living of the noble path. One who holds the view “the soul and the body are the same” (taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ) holds that the soul and the body are annihilated together (at death). For one who holds this, the annihilationist view follows, for he holds that “a being is annihilated.” Now this noble path arises to stop and eradicate the round of existence. But on the annihilationist view the round ceases even without the development of the path, and thus the development of the path becomes purposeless. In the second case, one holding the view “the soul is one thing, the body another” (aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ) holds that the body alone is annihilated here, while the soul goes about freely like a bird released from a cage. This view is eternalism. But if there were even one formation that is permanent, stable, and eternal, the noble path would not be able to bring the round to an end; thus again the development of the path would be purposeless.
108 I read with Be: yāni ’ssa tāni visūkāyikāni visevitāni vipphanditāni kānici kānici. Se is almost the same, but the orthography in Ee is very unsatisfactory. Spk explains that the three nouns are all synonyms for wrong view. This is called a contortion (visūkāyika) because it is an obstruction to oneself, being like a spike (visūkam iva; Spk-pṭ: = kaṇṭaka, a thorn) in the sense that it punctures right view (sammādiṭṭhiyā vinivijjhanaṭṭhena). It is a manoeuvre (visevita) because it fails to conform to right view but instead runs contrary to it; and a vacillation (vipphandita) because of grasping now annihilationism, now eternalism.
Spk takes visūkāyika to be related to sūci, needle, but it would be difficult to justify this derivation by the actual use of the term. The three synonyms also occur at 4:24 (I 123,30-31) and MN I 234,19-20; at MN I 446,12-13 they describe the behaviour of an untrained horse.
109 Spk glosses tālāvatthukatāni as tālavatthu viya katāni, “made like a palm-base,” and explains: “Made like a palm with cut-off head (i.e., a palm stump) in the sense of never growing again; and made like a place for the support of a palm after it has been extricated along with its root” (puna aviruhaṇaṭṭhena matthakacchinnatālo viya samūlaṃ tālaṃ uddharitvā tassa patiṭṭhitaṭṭhānaṃ viya ca katāni). Spk-pṭ first accepts the original reading tālāvatthu (lit. “palm-nonbase”) as it stands and explains: “The palm itself is the ‘palm-non-base’ because it is not a base for leaves, flowers, fruit, and sprouts. But some read tālavatthukatāni, which means: ‘made like a palm because of being without a base.’”
110 Spk: Since there actually is no self, there is nothing belonging to self; thus he says, “It is not yours” (na tumhākaṃ). And since there is no self of others, he says, “Neither does it belong to others” (na pi aññesaṃ). See too 22:33 and 35:101.
111 Spk: It is old kamma (purāṇam idaṃ kammaṃ): This body is not actually old kamma, but because it is produced by old kamma it is spoken of in terms of its condition. It should be seen as generated (abhisaṅkhata), in that it is made by conditions; as fashioned by volition (abhisañcetayita), in that it is based on volition, rooted in volition; and as something to be felt (vedaniya), in that it is a basis for what is to be felt [Spkpṭ: because it is a basis and object of feeling].
See too 35:146, where the same idea is extended to the six internal sense bases. To reflect upon the body in terms of dependent origination, one considers that this body can be subsumed under “form” in the compound “name-and-form.” One then reflects that name-and-form comes into being with consciousness, i.e., the rebirth-consciousness, as a conascent condition, and that both consciousness and name-and-form originate from the volitional formations, i.e., the kammic activities of the preceding existence. Thus the theme of this sutta ties up with the three that immediately follow.
112 Spk: Here, the phrase one intends (ceteti) includes all wholesome and unwholesome volition of the three planes; one plans (pakappeti), the mental fabrications of craving and views (taṇhādiṭṭhikappā) in the eight cittas accompanied by greed [Spk-pṭ: the fabrications of views occur only in the four cittas associated with views]; and whatever one has a tendency towards (anuseti) implies the underlying tendencies (anusaya) under the headings of conascence and decisive-support conditions for the twelve (unwholesome) volitions. (On the twelve unwholesome cittas, see CMA 1:4-7.)
This becomes a basis (ārammaṇam etaṃ hoti): These various states such as volition become a condition; for here the word ārammaṇa is intended as condition (paccaya; that is, here ārammaṇa does not signify an object of consciousness, the usual meaning in the Abhidhamma). For the maintenance of consciousness (viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā): for the purpose of maintaining the kammic consciousness. When there is this condition, there is a support for the establishing of consciousness (patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti), i.e., for the establishing of that kammic consciousness [Spk-pṭ: it has a capacity to yield fruit in one’s mental continuum]. When that (kammic) consciousness is established and has come to growth (tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe ... virūḷhe): when, having impelled kamma, it has grown, produced roots, through its ability to precipitate rebirth, there is the production of future renewed existence, i.e., production consisting in renewed existence.
Cp. 12:64 and 22:53-54 below. AN I 223-24 explains the process of renewed existence in similar terms (see n. 24). I see the verbs ceteti and pakappeti as allusions to saṅkhārā (which, as kammic activities, are expressive of cetanā—see AN III 415,7-8). Anuseti clearly refers to the anusaya or underlying tendencies, which include avijjānusaya, the underlying tendency to ignorance (= ignorance in the usual formula of dependent origination) and rāgānusaya, the underlying tendency to lust (= craving in the usual formula). The way they maintain consciousness is thus no different from the way the volitional formations, fueled by ignorance and craving, serve as the condition for consciousness: together, they underlie the flow of consciousness, infuse it with kammic potentials for renewed existence, and project it into a new existence, thereby initiating the process that will culminate in birth. I am not in full agreement with Spk in taking the viññāṇa that is “maintained” and “established” as the kammic consciousness. I interpret it simply as the ongoing process of consciousness, including both the kammically active and resultant phases. At 22:53-54 the other four aggregates are spoken of as the ārammaṇa and patiṭṭhā of viññāṇa, but I am doubtful that this application will work here. To use the categories of the Abhidhamma, it seems that in this sutta the terms ārammaṇa and patiṭṭhā denote the decisive-support condition (upanissayapaccaya) for consciousness, while in the two suttas in the Khandhasaṃyutta they denote the conascence and support conditions (sahajātapaccaya, nissayapaccaya).
I use “volition” as a rendering for cetanā but “intends” for the corresponding verb ceteti; I use “intention” for the unrelated noun saṅkappa. I justify this apparent inconsistency on the ground that in Pāli the verb saṅkappeti (corresponding to saṅkappa) occurs very rarely (if at all), while English lacks a simple verb corresponding to “volition.” “A support for the establishing of consciousness” renders patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa. I find that “established” works consistently better as a rendering for the participle patiṭṭhita, but “support” for the noun patiṭṭhā, so to bridge the participle and the noun in the present passage (and at 22:53, 54) I have coined this compound expression.
113 Spk: This refers to a moment when there is no occurrence of [wholesome and unwholesome] volition of the three planes, and no occurrence of the mental fabrications of craving and views. But one still has a tendency: by this the underlying tendencies are included because they have not been abandoned here in the resultants of the three planes, in the limited functional states (the five-door adverting and mind-door adverting cittas), and in form. As long as the underlying tendencies exist, they become a condition for the kammic consciousness, for there is no way to prevent its arising.
Spk-pṭ: This second section is stated to show that wholesome and unwholesome kamma capable of producing rebirth is accumulated in the preliminary portion (of the path of practice), and that even without planning (through craving and views), the volitions of insight meditation in a meditator who has seen the dangers in existence are still conditioned by the underlying tendencies and are capable of generating rebirth. It is also stated to show that even when wholesome and unwholesome states are not occurring there is still an establishing of kammic consciousness with underlying defilements as condition; for so long as these have not been abandoned they lie latent in the existing resultants of the three planes, etc.
114 Spk: When one does not intend, etc.: By the first phrase (“does not intend”) he shows that the wholesome and unwholesome volitions pertaining to the three planes have ceased; by the second (“does not plan”), that the craving and views in the eight cittas (accompanied by greed) have ceased; by the third (“does not have a tendency”), that the underlying tendencies lying latent in the aforesaid states have ceased. What is being discussed here? The function of the path of arahantship (arahattamaggassa kiccaṃ). It can also be interpreted as the arahant’s doing of his task (khīṇāsavassa kiccakaraṇaṃ) and the nine supramundane states (navalokuttaradhammā; i.e., the four paths, their fruits, and Nibbāna).
Spk-pṭ: In this third section the function of the path of arahantship is discussed because that path completely stops the production of the underlying tendencies. The “arahant’s doing of his task” can be said because of the exclusion of feeling, etc. (meaning unclear). The nine supramundane states can be said because the underlying tendencies are extirpated by the series of paths, and the fruits follow immediately upon the paths, and Nibbāna is the object of both.
I understand the “unestablished consciousness” (appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa) here to mean a consciousness without the prospect of a future rebirth through the propulsive power of ignorance, craving, and the volitional formations. The arahant is said to expire with consciousness “unestablished,” as at 4:23 and 22:87.
115 Nāmarūpassa avakkanti. See 12:12, where the production of future renewed existence is placed between consciousness and the six sense bases. Taken in conjunction, the two suttas imply that the “descent of name-and-form” and the “production of future renewed existence” are interchangeable (this in spite of the commentarial predilection for always seeing the latter as kammically active existence). Spk states that there is a “link” (sandhi) between consciousness and name-and-form; thus on this interpretation consciousness denotes the kammically generative consciousness of the previous existence, name-and-form the beginning of the present existence. It seems to me, however, more likely that viññāṇa straddles both the past life and the present life, as the principle of personal continuity.
116 Spk: Inclination (nati) is craving, called “inclination” in the sense of inclining (namanaṭṭhena) towards pleasant forms, etc. There is coming and going (āgatigati): there is a going of consciousness by way of rebirth towards what has come up (at death), presenting itself as kamma or the sign of kamma or the sign of future destiny. (The allusion is to the three objects of the last conscious process preceding death; see CMA 5:35-37.) There is passing away, passing from here, and being reborn, rebirth there.
117 Cp. the “teaching of the Blessed One” recited by Mahācunda at 35:87 (IV 59,10-14).
118 The sutta is also at 55:28 and at AN V 182-84. Spk glosses bhayāni verāni as volitions (bringing) fear and enmity (bhayaveracetanāyo). Spk-pṭ: The destruction of life and so forth are fearful and dreadful both for the perpetrator and for the victim; they are productive of fear and enmity, which are to be feared.
The self-assured declaration of stream-entry is also at 55:8-10. The stream-enterer is exempt from the prospect of rebirth in the lower realms; he is fixed in destiny (niyata), as he cannot take more than seven rebirths, all in the human or celestial realms; and he has enlightenment as his destination (sambodhiparāyaṇa), as he will necessarily attain the enlightenment of arahantship.
119 The version at AN V 183 includes another line here: “But one who abstains from the destruction of life (etc.) does not engender fearful animosity pertaining to the present life and fearful animosity pertaining to the future life, and he does not experience mental pain and displeasure” pāṇātipātā paṭivirato n’ eva diṭṭhadhammikaṃ bhayaṃ veraṃ pasavati, na samparāyikaṃ bhayaṃ veraṃ pasavati, na cetasikaṃ dukkhaṃ domanassaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti). It seems that the logic of the discourse requires this addition; its omission from the present text could be an early scribal error.
120 Spk: The factors of stream-entry (sotāpattiyaṅga) are of two kinds: (i) the factors for stream-entry, the preliminary practices that lead to the attainment of stream-entry, namely, associating with superior persons, hearing the true Dhamma, careful attention, and practice in accordance with the Dhamma (see 55:55); (ii) the factors of one who abides having attained stream-entry. The latter are intended here. Confirmed confidence is unshakable confidence (gained) through what has been achieved [Spk-pṭ: namely, the path] (aveccappasādenā ti adhigatena [maggena] acalappasādena).
Aveccappasāda is a syntactical compound (see I, n. 68), with avecca (Skt avetya) absolutive of *aveti, to undergo, to know, to experience. The formulas for recollection of the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha are analysed in detail at Vism 197-221 (Ppn 7:1-100).
121 Spk: The virtues dear to the noble ones (ariyakantāni sīlāni) are the five precepts, which the noble ones do not forsake even when they pass on to a new existence.
The terms are explained at Vism 222 (Ppn 7:104). These virtues are “ungrasped” (aparāmaṭṭha) in the sense that they are not adhered to with craving and wrong view.
122 Spk: The method (ñāya) is both dependent origination and the stable knowledge after one has known the dependently arisen. As he says: “It is dependent origination that is called the method; the method is also the Noble Eightfold Path” (untraced). Wisdom here is repeatedly arisen insight-wisdom (aparāparaṃ uppannā vipassanāpaññā).
Spk-pṭ: Dependent origination is called “the method” because, with the application of the right means, it is what is known (ñāyati) as it actually is in the dependently arisen. But knowledge (ñāṇa) is called “the method” because it is by this that the latter is known.
Despite the commentators, ñāya has no relation to ñāṇa but is derived from ni + i.
123 Spk: Suffering here is the suffering of the round (vaṭṭadukkha ). There are two kinds of origin, momentary origin (khaṇikasamudaya) and origin through conditions (paccaya-samudaya ). A bhikkhu who sees the one sees the other. Passing away is also twofold, final passing away (accantatthaṅgama; Spk-pṭ: nonoccurrence, cessation, Nibbāna) and dissolutional passing away (bhedatthaṅgama; Spk-pṭ: the momentary cessation of formations). One who sees the one sees the other.
124 Spk: The world here is the world of formations (saṅkhāraloka ). On the nature of the world in the Buddha’s teaching, see I, n. 182.
125 Dhammapariyāya, a method of presenting the teaching. This sutta recurs at 35:113, where it is called Upassuti, “Listening In.” On Ñātika, see V, n. 330.
126 See 12:17, 18, and n. 39, n. 40.
127 A brahmin Jāṇussoṇi is mentioned at 45:4 and elsewhere in the Nikāyas. Spk says that he was a great chaplain (mahāpurohita) of much wealth who had gained his name by reason of his position. On the theme of this sutta see 12:15.
128 Lokāyatika. Spk says that he was versed in lokāyata, the science of debate (vitaṇḍasatthe lokāyate kataparicayo). Spk-pṭ explains the etymology of the word thus: “Lokāyata is so called because by means of this the world does not strive for, does not advance towards, future welfare (āyatiṃ hitaṃ tena loko na yatati na īhatī ti lokāyataṃ). For on account of this belief, beings do not arouse even the thought of doing deeds of merit, much less do they make the effort.”
Spk-pṭ’s explanation seems to reflect the understanding of lokāyata held at the time of the commentaries, as seen in MW’s definition of the word as “materialism, the system of atheistical philosophy (taught by Cārvāka).” There is cogent evidence, however, that the word acquired these connotations only in a later period. As Rhys Davids points out in a detailed discussion (at Dialogues of the Buddha, 1:166-72), lokāyata is used in the Nikāyas in a complimentary sense to designate a branch of brahmanical learning (as at DN I 88,7, 114,3, etc.). He suggests that the word originally meant nature-lore and only gradually acquired the negative meaning of sophistry and materialism. Jayatilleke has proposed that since the word is always used with reference to loka, the world, or sabba, the all, it originally signified, not nature-lore in general, but cosmology, and that the arrangement of lokāyata theses in opposing pairs indicates that the brahmins used the rival cosmological theories as topics of debate (Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp. 48-57).
129 Jeṭṭhaṃ etaṃ lokāyataṃ. Spk glosses jeṭṭhaṃ with paṭhamaṃ and explains: “Lokāyata is an inferior, tainted speculative view that appears great and deep” (mahantaṃ gambhīran ti upaṭṭhitaṃ parittaṃ sāsavaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ; reading as in Se, which seems more reliable here than Be).
130 Ekattaṃ. Spk: He asks whether it has a permanent nature (niccasabhāva); the first and third views are forms of the eternalist view (sassatadiṭṭhi).
131 Puthuttaṃ. Spk: This means a nature different from the previous nature; the second and fourth views are forms of the annihilationist view (ucchedadiṭṭhi).
132 The bracketed passages here and below are enclosed in brackets in all three eds., with notes to the effect that they are not found in certain eds. (Se says they are not found in the Thai ed. or in Sinhalese mss). It is really necessary to exclude them, for if they are included nothing would distinguish this sutta from the following one. Spk confirms this with its comment on 12:50 that this sutta differs from the preceding one only by stating the two methods together (dve nayā ekato vuttā), on which Spk-pṭ remarks: “This is said because the method stated in the ninth sutta, beginning ‘When there is consciousness, name-and-form comes to be,’ is included by the method stated in the tenth sutta, beginning ‘When there is ignorance, volitional formations come to be.’”
133 This vagga is entitled Dukkhavagga in Be and Se, but Rukkhavagga in Ee.
134 Kittāvatā ... bhikkhu parivīmaṃsamāno parivīmaṃseyya sabbaso sammā dukkhakkhayāya. Spk glosses parivīmaṃsamāno with upaparikkhamāno.
135 Jarāmaraṇanirodhasāruppagāminī paṭipadā. Spk: The way leading on that is in conformity with the cessation of aging-and-deathmeans the way leading on by its conformation with the cessation of aging-and-death, being similar (to cessation) by reason of its undefiled nature, its purity.
In the repetition series just below, Ee omits jāti panāyaṃ kinnidānā, no doubt an editorial oversight.
136 Spk: A meritorious volitional formation (puññaṃ saṅkhāraṃ) is the thirteen kinds of volition (i.e., the volitions of the eight wholesome sense-sphere cittas and the five wholesome cittas of the form sphere; see n. 7). Consciousness fares on to the meritorious (puññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ): the kammic consciousness becomes associated with a meritorious kamma, the resultant consciousness with the fruits of merit. A demeritorious volitional formation (apuññaṃ saṅkhāraṃ) is the twelve kinds of volition (i.e., in the twelve unwholesome cittas; see n. 7). An imperturbable volitional formation (āneñjaṃ saṅkhāraṃ): the four kinds of volition (i.e., in the four wholesome cittas of the formless sphere). And here by mentioning the three kinds of kammic formations, the twelve-factored principle of conditionality is implied. To this extent the round of existence is shown.
An analysis of these three types of volitional formations is at Vibh 135. At MN II 262-63 the Buddha explains in detail how viññāṇa becomes āneñjūpaga.
137 Paritassati clearly represents Skt paritṛṣyati, “to crave, to thirst for,” and is connected etymologically with taṇhā. However, in Pāli (and perhaps in MIA dialects generally) the verbal stem has become conflated with tasati = to fear, to tremble, and thus its noun derivatives such as paritassanā and paritasita acquire the sense of nouns derived from tasati. This convergence of meanings, already evident in the Nikāyas, is made explicit in the commentaries. I have tried to capture both nuances by rendering the verb “to be agitated” and the noun “agitation.”
Here Spk glosses na paritassati: “He is not agitated with the agitation of craving (taṇhāparitassanā) or the agitation of fear (bhayaparitassanā); the meaning is, he does not crave and does not fear.” Neither Spk nor Spk-pṭ comment on parinibbāyati, but what is meant is obviously the attainment of kilesaparinibbāna, the full quenching of defilements, on which see the General Introduction, pp. 49-50. On the arahant’s reviewing knowledge, see I, n. 376.
138 Spk: After the arahant’s reviewing knowledge has been shown, this passage is stated to show his constant dwelling (satatavihāra). The passage recurs, but with a different simile, at 22:88, 36:7, 8, and 54:8.
139 Spk: A feeling terminating with the body (kāyapariyantikaṃ vedanaṃ) is one delimited by the body (kāyaparicchinnaṃ); a feeling terminating with life (jīvitapariyantikaṃ vedanaṃ) is one delimited by life. As long as the body with its five sense doors continues, the feelings occurring at the five sense doors continue; as long as life continues, the feelings occurring at the mind door continue.
140 Spk: Will become cool right here (idh’ eva ... sītibhavissanti): Right here, without having gone elsewhere by way of rebirth, they will become cool, subject to no further occurrence, devoid of the palpitation and disturbance of their occurrence.
141 The unusual use of the plural sarīrāni here mirrors the unusual use of the plural kapillāni to mean potsherds. Spk glosses sarīrāni as dhātusarīrāni, bodily elements, which Spk-pṭ identifies as the bones (aṭṭhikakaṅkala). Kapillausually means a pot or a bowl, but Spk says the plural here denotes potsherds bound together along with the rim.
Spk elaborates the simile: The blazing potter’s oven represents the three realms of existence, the potter the meditator, and his rod the knowledge of the path of arahantship. The smooth piece of ground represents Nibbāna. The time when the potter removes the hot clay pot from the oven and places it on the ground is like the time when the meditator, having attained the supreme fruit of arahantship, removes his individual form from the four realms of misery and places it on the surface of Nibbāna by way of fruition attainment. Just as the hot clay pot (does not break up at once), so the arahant does not attain parinibbāna on the same day he reaches arahantship. He lives on for fifty or sixty years, striving to sustain the Buddha’s dispensation. When he reaches his last thought-moment, with the breakup of the aggregates he attains parinibbāna by the Nibbāna element without residue. Then, as with the potsherds of the pot, only inanimate bodily remains are left behind.
142 Spk: “Would a rebirth-consciousness (paṭisandhiviññāṇa) be discerned?”
143 Spk: “Just this is the end of the suffering of the round, its termination, that is, Nibbāna.”
144 Upādāniyesu dhammesu. Spk: In the phenomena of the three planes, which are the conditions for the four kinds of clinging. On upādāniyā dhammā, see 22:121, 35:110, 123, where clinging (upādāna) is explained simply as desire and lust (chandarāga) for the things that can be clung to.
145 Spk: The great bonfire represents the three realms of existence; the man tending the fire, the blind worldling attached to the round. His casting of fuel into the fire is like the worldling who contemplates gratification, creating wholesome and unwholesome kamma through the six sense doors on account of craving. The increase of the bonfire is like the blind worldling’s repeated production of the suffering of the round by the accumulation of kamma.
146 Spk: A benefactor might come along and teach the man how to extinguish the fire, and the man would follow his advice. The benefactor represents the Buddha; his advice, the explanation of a meditation subject and an exhortation to gain release from suffering. The time the man follows the instructions is like the time the meditator is sitting in an empty hut applying insight to the phenomena of the three planes. The time when the man has bathed and adorned himself and is sitting tranquil and happy represents the time when the meditator, having cleansed himself of defilements by the noble path, sits absorbed in the attainment of fruition having Nibbāna as object. The time when the great bonfire is extinguished represents the time when the arahant’s aggregates break up and he passes away into the Nibbāna element without residue.
147 Saṃyojaniyesu dhammesu. Spk: The conditions for the ten fetters. On “things that can fetter,” see 22:120, 35:109, 122. Here too “the fetter” is explained simply as desire and lust.
148 Spk: The great tree represents the round of existence with its three planes; the roots, the sense bases; the sending up of the sap through the roots, the building up of kamma through the six sense doors; the stability of the tree, the blind worldling’s long continuation in saṃsāra as he repeatedly sustains the round by building up kamma.
149 Spk: The man wishing to destroy the great tree represents the meditator, his shovel (or axe) knowledge, the basket concentration. The time the tree is cut down at its root is like the occasion when wisdom arises in the meditator as he attends to his meditation subject. The cutting of the tree into pieces is like attending to the body in brief by way of the four great elements; the splitting of the pieces is like attending to the body in detail in forty-two aspects (Vism 348-51; Ppn 11:31-38); reducing the pieces to slivers is like the discernment of name-and-form by way of derived form and consciousness; cutting up the roots is like the search for the conditions of name-and-form. The time of burning the slivers is like the time when the meditator attains the supreme fruit (of arahantship). The collecting of the ashes is like the arahant’s life up to the time of his parinibbāna. The winnowing of the ashes, or their being carried away by the river, is like the stilling of the round when the arahant attains parinibbāna by the Nibbāna element without residue.
150 Nāmarūpassa avakkanti. Spk does not comment, but in the light of other suttas we might assume the statement to mean that the craving that underlies “contemplating gratification in things that can fetter” is the principal sustaining cause for the process of rebirth, which begins with “the descent of name-and-form.” See in this connection 12:39, 12:64, and n. 115.
151 Viññāṇassa avakkanti. At DN II 63,2-4 it is said that if consciousness were not to descend into the mother’s womb, name-and-form would not take shape in the womb. The “descent of the embryo” (gabbhassāvakkanti)—spoken of at MN I 265,35-266,6, II 156,29-157,3, and AN I 176,31—presumably refers to the descent of the consciousness that initiates conception.
152 The opening of this sutta as far as “the nether world, saṃsāra” is nearly identical with the opening of the Mahānidāna Suttanta (DN No. 15), which differs only in including the aorist avaca. The present sutta is a composite, made up of the opening of the Mahānidāna grafted on to the body of 12:55. Spk here incorporates the long opening of the commentary to the Mahānidāna, for which see Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 58-73. Spk, however, does not attempt to explain how the same opening could have such a different sequel.
153 Spk: Uninstructed (assutavā): devoid of learning, interrogation, and discrimination regarding the aggregates, elements, sense bases, conditionality, the establishments of mindfulness, etc. Worldling (puthujjana) is a “many-being,” so called because of generating many diverse defilements, etc. (puthūnaṃ nānappakārānaṃ kilesādīnaṃ jananādikāraṇehi puthujjano); and also because he is included among the many people (puthūnaṃ janānaṃ antogadhattā), in number beyond reckoning, who are engaged in a low Dhamma contrary to the Dhamma of the noble ones. Or else puthu means “reckoned as separate”; the worldling is a person separated from the noble ones, who possess such qualities as virtue, learning, etc. (puthu vā ayaṃ visuṃ yeva saṅkhaṃ gato; visaṃsaṭṭho sīlasutādiguṇayuttehi ariyehi jano ti puthujjano).
This twofold etymology stems from a twofold understanding of Pāli puthu: as representing either Vedic pṛthu = numerous, many; or pṛthak = separate, distinct. The BHS form pṛthagjana indicates a preference for the latter derivation, though the Pāli commentators tend to take the former as primary.
154 Cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇaṃ iti pi. Cp. DN I 21,21: Yaṃ ... idaṃ vuccati cittan ti vā mano ti vā viññāṇan ti vā. Spk says these are all names for the mind base (manāyatana). Normally I render both citta and mano as “mind,” but since English has only two words of common usage to denote the faculty of cognition—“mind” and “consciousness”—here I am compelled to use “mentality” as a makeshift for mano. While technically the three terms have the same denotation, in the Nikāyas they are generally used in distinct contexts. As a rough generalization, viññāṇa signifies the particularizing awareness through a sense faculty (as in the standard sixfold division of viññāṇa into eye-consciousness, etc.) as well as the underlying stream of consciousness, which sustains personal continuity through a single life and threads together successive lives (emphasized at 12:38-40). Mano serves as the third door of action (along with body and speech) and as the sixth internal sense base (along with the five physical sense bases); as the mind base it coordinates the data of the other five senses and also cognizes mental phenomena (dhammā), its own special class of objects. Citta signifies mind as the centre of personal experience, as the subject of thought, volition, and emotion. It is citta that needs to be understood, trained, and liberated. For a more detailed discussion, see Hamilton, Identity and Experience, chap. 5.
155 Spk: It is held to (ajjhosita) by being swallowed up by craving; appropriated (mamāyita) by being appropriated by craving; and grasped (parāmaṭṭha) by being grasped through views. “This is mine” (etaṃ mama): the grip of craving (taṇhāgāha); by this the 108 thoughts of craving are included (see AN II 212,31-213,2). “This I am” (eso ’ham asmi): the grip of conceit (mānagāha); by this the nine kinds of conceit are included (see I, n. 37). “This is my self” (eso me attā): the grip of views (diṭṭhigāha); by this the sixty-two views are included (see DN I 12-38).
156 Because this body ... is seen standing for a hundred years, or even longer. Spk: (Query:) Why does the Blessed One say this? Isn’t it true that the physical form present in the first period of life does not last through to the middle period, and the form present in the middle period does not last through to the last period?... Isn’t it true that formations break up right on the spot, stage by stage, section by section, just as sesamum seeds pop when thrown on a hot pan? (Reply:) This is true, but the body is said to endure for a long time in continuous sequence (paveṇivasena), just as a lamp is said to burn all night as a connected continuity (paveṇisambandhavasena) even though the flame ceases right where it burns without passing over to the next section of the wick.
157 Spk: By day and by night (rattiyā ca divasassa ca): This is a genitive in the locative sense, i.e., during the night and during the day. Arises as one thing and ceases as another (aññadeva uppajjati, aññaṃ nirujjhati): The meaning is that (the mind) that arises and ceases during the day is other than (the mind) that arises and ceases during the night. The statement should not be taken to mean that one thing arises and something altogether different, which had not arisen, ceases. “Day and night” is said by way of continuity, taking a continuity of lesser duration than the previous one (i.e., the one stated for the body). But one citta is not able to endure for a whole day or a whole night. Even in the time of a fingersnap many hundred thousand of koṭis of cittas arise and cease (1 koṭi= 10 million). The simile of the monkey should be understood thus: The “grove of objects” is like the forest grove. The mind arising in the grove of objects is like the monkey wandering in the forest grove. The mind’s taking hold of an object is like the monkey grabbing hold of a branch. Just as the monkey, roaming through the forest, leaves behind one branch and grabs hold of another, so the mind, roaming through the grove of objects, arises sometimes grasping hold of a visible object, sometimes a sound, sometimes the past, sometimes the present or future, sometimes an internal object, sometimes an external object. When the monkey does not find a (new) branch it does not descend and sit on the ground, but sits holding to a single leafy branch. So too, when the mind is roaming through the grove of objects, it cannot be said that it arises without holding to an object; rather, it arises holding to an object of a single kind.
It should be noted that neither the sutta nor the commentary interprets the monkey simile here as saying that the untrained mind is as restless as a monkey; the point, rather, is that the mind is always dependent on an object.
158 Spk explains the order of this discourse thus: First, because these bhikkhus were excessively obsessed with form, the Buddha spoke as if it were improper to grasp form (because its growth and decline are seen) but not improper to grasp mind. Next (in the passage beginning, “It would be better to take as self the body”) he speaks as if it were proper to grasp the body but improper to grasp the mind (because of its incessant change). Now, in the present passage, he speaks with the aim of removing their obsession with both body and mind.
159 I read with Se and Ee nānābhāvā vinikkhepā, as against Be nānākatavinibbhogā. The simile recurs at 36:10 (IV 215,22-25) and 48:39 (V 212,21-24); in both places Be has the same reading as Se and Ee here. Spk: The sense base is like the lower firestick, the object is like the upper firestick, contact is like the friction of the two, and feeling is like the heat element.
160 A translation of the long commentary to this sutta is included in Nyanaponika, The Four Nutriments of Life. Spk explains that the Buddha spoke this discourse because the Bhikkhu Saṅgha was receiving abundant almsfood and other requisites, and the Buddha wanted to place before the bhikkhus “a mirror of the Dhamma for their self-control and restraint, so that, contemplating on it again and again, the bhikkhus of the future will make use of the four requisites only after due reflection.” The opening paragraph is identical with that of 12:11.
161 Spk: Edible food should be considered as similar to son’s flesh by way of the ninefold repulsiveness: the repulsiveness of having to go out for it, of having to seek it, of eating it, of the bodily secretions, of the receptacle for the food (i.e., the stomach), of digestion and indigestion, of smearing, and of excretion. (For details see Vism 342-46; Ppn 11:5-26; there ten aspects are mentioned, the additional one being “fruit,” i.e., the repulsive parts of the body produced by food.) A bhikkhu should use his almsfood in the way the couple eat their son’s flesh: without greed and desire, without pickiness, without gorging themselves, without selfishness, without delusion about what they are eating, without longing to eat such food again, without hoarding, without pride, without disdain, and without quarreling.
162 Spk: When the nutriment edible food is fully understood: It is fully understood by these three kinds of full understanding: (i) the full understanding of the known (ñātapariññā); (ii) the full understanding by scrutinization (tīraṇapariññā); and (iii) the full understanding as abandonment (pahānapariññā ). Therein, (i) a bhikkhu understands: “This nutriment edible food is ‘form with nutritive essence as the eighth’ (see n. 18) together with its base. This impinges on the tongue-sensitivity, which is dependent on the four great elements. Thus nutriment, tongue-sensitivity, and the four elements—these things are the form aggregate. The contact pentad (contact, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness) arisen in one who discerns this—these are the four mental aggregates. All these five aggregates are, in brief, name-and-form.” Next he searches out the conditions for these phenomena and sees dependent origination in direct and reverse order. By thus seeing name-and-form with its conditions as it actually is, the nutriment of edible food is fully understood by the full understanding of the known. (ii) Next he ascribes the three characteristics to that same name-and-form and explores it by way of the seven contemplations (of impermanence, suffering, nonself, revulsion, dispassion, cessation, and relinquishment—see Vism 607; Ppn 20:4). Thus it is fully understood by the full understanding by scrutinization. (iii) It is fully understood by the full understanding as abandonmentwhen it is fully understood by the path of nonreturning, which cuts off desire and lust for that same name-and-form.
Lust for the five cords of sensual pleasure is fully understood: It is fully understood by (i) the singlefold full understanding (ekapariññā), namely, that the craving for tastes arisen at the tongue door is the same craving that arises at all five sense doors; (ii) the comprehensive full understanding (sabbapariññā ), namely, that lust for all five cords of sensual pleasure arises even in regard to a single morsel of food placed in the bowl (for food stimulates desire in all five senses); (iii) the root full understanding (mūlapariññā), namely, that nutriment is the root for all five types of sensual lust, since sensual desire thrives when people are well fed.
163 Spk: There is no fetter bound by which: This teaching is taken only as far as the path of nonreturning; but if one develops insight into the five aggregates by way of these same forms, etc., it is possible to explain it as far as arahantship.
164 Spk: Just as a cow, seeing the danger of being eaten by the creatures living in the places she might be exposed to, would not wish to be honoured and venerated, or to be massaged, rubbed, given hot baths, etc., so a bhikkhu, seeing the danger of being eaten by the defilement-creatures rooted in the nutriment contact, becomes desireless towards contact in the three planes of existence.
165 Spk explains the full understanding of contact in the same way as for edible food, except that contact is taken as the starting point for the discernment of the five aggregates. When contact is fully understood the three feelings are fully understood because they are rooted in contact and associated with it. The teaching by way of the nutriment contact is carried as far as arahantship.
166 Spk: The charcoal pit represents the round of existence with its three planes; the man wanting to live, the foolish worldling attached to the round; the two strong men, wholesome and unwholesome kamma. When they grab the man by both arms and drag him towards the pit, this is like the worldling’s accumulation of kamma; for the accumulated kamma drags along a rebirth. The pain from falling into the charcoal pit is like the suffering of the round.
167 Spk: The three kinds of craving are fully understood: The three kinds of craving are craving for sensual pleasures, craving for existence, and craving for extermination. They are fully understood because craving is the root of mental volition. Here too the teaching is carried as far as arahantship by way of mental volition.
168 Spk: The king represents kamma; the criminal, the worldling; the three hundred spears, the rebirth-consciousness. The time the king gives his command is like the time the worldling is driven towards rebirth by King Kamma. The pain from being struck by the spears is like the resultant suffering in the course of existence once rebirth has taken place.
169 Spk: Name-and-form is fully understood when consciousness is fully understood because it is rooted in consciousness and arises along with it. By way of consciousness too the teaching is carried as far as arahantship.
170 Spk explains lust (rāga), delight (nandī), and craving (taṇhā) as synonyms for greed (lobha). Consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth (patiṭṭhitaṃ tattha viññāṇaṃ virūḷhaṃ): having impelled a kamma, it “becomes established and comes to growth” through its ability to drag along a rebirth. On the establishing of consciousness, see 12:38 and n. 112, and on the descent of name-and-form, 12:39 and n. 115.
171 Spk: Wherever (yattha) is a locative referring to the round of existence with its three planes. Or else, in all instances, this locative is used with reference to the correlative term in the preceding phrase. [Spk-pṭ: This locative expression yattha ... tattha is used with reference to each preceding phrase, which is its sphere of application.]
172 Atthi tattha saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi. Spk: This is said with reference to the volitional formations that are the cause of a future round of existence for one abiding in the present round of results.
The variation here on the usual sequence is very interesting. When “the growth of volitional formations” is placed between name-and-form and future existence, this implies that the expression corresponds to three critical terms of the standard formula—craving, clinging, and (kamma-)existence—with āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti signifying the process of entering the new existence.
173 Spk: The painter represents kamma with its adjuncts [Spkpṭ: craving and ignorance, and time and destination, etc.]; the panel, wall, or canvas represents the round with its three realms. As the painter creates a figure on the panel, so kamma with its adjuncts creates a form in the realms of existence. As the figure created by an unskilled painter is ugly, deformed, and disagreeable, so the kamma performed with a mind dissociated from knowledge gives rise to an ugly, deformed, disagreeable figure. But as the figure created by a skilled painter is beautiful and well shaped, so the kamma performed with a mind associated with knowledge gives rise to a beautiful and comely figure.
174 Spk: The kamma of the arahant is similar to the sunbeam. However, the sunbeam does exist, but because there is no place for it to settle it is said to be unestablished (appatiṭṭhitā). But the arahant’s kamma is said to be unestablished because it is nonexistent. Although he has a body, etc., no wholesome or unwholesome kamma is thereby created. His deeds are merely functional, not productive of results (kiriyamatte ṭhatvā avipākaṃ hoti). In this connection, see 12:25 and n. 81.
It should be noted that Spk explains the statement that the arahant’s consciousness is unestablished to mean that his kamma is unestablished. This seems too free an interpretation. Nevertheless, I think it would be wrong to interpret the sutta as saying that after his parinibbāna the arahant’s consciousness persists in some mode that can only be described as unestablished. The present passage is clearly speaking of the arahant’s consciousness while he is alive. Its purport is not that an “unestablished consciousness” remains after the arahant’s parinibbāna, but that his consciousness, being devoid of lust, does not “become established in” the four nutriments in any way that might generate a future existence.
175 Opening as at 12:10.
176 Dependent origination is formulated in identical terms in the account of the Buddha Vipassī’s enlightenment at DN II 32,22-30. For the Buddha’s explanation of the mutual dependency of consciousness and name-and-form, see DN II 62,38-63,26. A translation of the detailed explanation at Sv II 501-3 with excerpts from Sv-pṭ can be found in Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 84-89. See too below 12:67.
Spk: When there is name-and-form, consciousness comes to be: Here it should be said, “When there are volitional formations, consciousness comes to be,” and “When there is ignorance, volitional formations come to be.” But neither is mentioned. Why not? Because ignorance and volitional formations belong to a third existence and this insight is not connected with them (avijjāsaṅkhārā hi tatiyo bhavo, tehi saddhiṃ ayaṃ vipassanā na ghaṭīyati). For the Great Man (the Bodhisatta) undertakes insight by way of the present five-constituent existence (pañcavokārabhava, i.e., existence where all five aggregates are present).
(Query:) Isn’t it true that one cannot become enlightened as long as ignorance and volitional formations are unseen? (Reply:) True, one cannot. But these are seen by way of craving, clinging, and existence. If a man pursuing a lizard has seen it enter a pit, he would descend, dig up the place where it entered, catch it, and depart; he wouldn’t dig up some other place where the lizard can’t be found. Similarly, when the Great Man was sitting on the seat of enlightenment, he searched for the conditions beginning with aging-and-death. Having traced the conditions for the phenomena back to name-and-form, he searched for its condition too and saw it to be consciousness. Then, realizing “So much is the range of exploration by way of five-constituent existence,” he reversed his insight (vipassanaṃ paṭinivattesi). Beyond this there is still the pair, ignorance and volitional formations, which are like the unbroken region of the empty pit. But because they have been included by insight earlier (under craving, etc.?), they do not undergo exploration separately; hence he does not mention them.
177 This consciousness turns back (paccudāvattati kho idaṃ viññāṇāṃ). Spk: What is the consciousness that turns back here? The rebirth-consciousness and the insight-consciousness. Rebirth-consciousness turns back from its condition, insight-consciousness from its object. Neither overcomes name-and-form, goes further than name-and-form.
Spk-pṭ: From its condition: Rebirth-consciousness turns back from volitional formations—the special cause for consciousness—which has not been mentioned; it does not turn back from all conditions, as name-and-form is stated as the condition for consciousness. From its object: from ignorance and volitional formations as object, or from the past existence as object.
It it possible the Bodhisatta had been seeking a self of the Upaniṣadic type, a self-subsistent subject consisting of pure consciousness that requires nothing but itself in order to exist. His discovery that consciousness is invariably dependent on name-and-form would have disclosed to him the futility of such a quest and thereby shown that even consciousness, the subtlest basis for the sense of self (see 12:61), is conditioned and thus marked by impermanence, suffering, and selflessness.
178 Spk: To this extent one may be born (ettāvatā jāyetha vā), etc.: With consciousness as a condition for name-and-form, and with name-and-form as a condition for consciousness, to this extent one may be born and undergo rebirth. What is there beyond this that can be born or undergo rebirth? Isn’t it just this that is born and undergoes rebirth?
Spk-pṭ: To this extent: that is, by the occurrence of consciousness and name-and-form mutually supporting one another. One may be born and undergo rebirth: Though the expression “A being is born and undergoes rebirth” is used, there is nothing that serves as the referent of the designation “a being” apart from consciousness and name-and-form. Hence the commentator says, “What is there beyond this?” Just this (etadeva): namely, the pair consciousness and name-and-form.
It might be noted that jāyetha, jīyetha, etc., are middle-voice optatives in the third person singular. At KS 2:73, C.Rh.D seems to have mistaken them for second person plural optatives in the active voice, while at LDB, pp. 211, 226, Walshe has used a roundabout rendering, presumably to avoid having to identify the forms. For a detailed discussion of the mutual conditionality of consciousness and name-and-form, see Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 18-22.
179 The mutual cessation of consciousness and name-and-form is also found in the version at DN II 34,21-35,13. Spk does not comment on the expression “I have discovered the path to enlightenment” (adhigato kho myāyaṃ maggo bodhāya), but the corresponding passage of DN is commented upon at Sv II 461,5-8 thus: “Path: the path of insight. To enlightenment: for the awakening to the Four Noble Truths, or for the awakening to Nibbāna. Further, enlightenment is so called because it becomes enlightened (bujjhatī ti bodhi); this is a name for the noble path. What is meant is (that he has discovered the path) for the sake of that. For the noble path is rooted in the path of insight. Now, making that path explicit, he says, ‘With the cessation of name-and-form,’ and so forth.”
This explanation hinges upon the distinction (only implicit in the Nikāyas) between the mundane preliminary portion of the path (pubbabhāgapaṭipadā), which is the “path of insight,” and the noble supramundane path (lokuttaramagga ), which directly realizes Nibbāna. Since the supramundane path is identical with enlightenment, the commentary holds that “the path to enlightenment” the Bodhisatta discovered must be the mundane path of insight. In the DN version, having discovered the path to enlightenment, the Bodhisatta Vipassī continues to contemplate the rise and fall of the five aggregates, as a result of which “his mind was liberated from the taints by not clinging.”
180 Spk elaborates minutely upon the parable of the ancient city and then draws extensive correspondences between the elements of the parable and their counterparts in the Dhamma.
181 At this point saṅkhārā, omitted earlier, are finally introduced, and avijjā, their condition, is implied by the mention of “their origin.”
182 This passage is also at 51:10 (V 262,9-14). I follow Spk in its explanation of yāva devamanussehi suppakāsitaṃ. The point is that, despite the use of the instrumental form -ehi, the Dhamma is not proclaimed by devas and humans, but “throughout the region (inhabited) by devas and humans in the ten-thousandfold galaxy, within this extent it is well proclaimed, well taught, by the Tathāgata” (yāva dasasahassacakkavāḷe devamanussehi paricchedo atthi, etasmiṃ antare suppakāsitaṃ sudesitaṃ tathāgatena). It is possible -ehi here is a vestigial Eastern locative plural; see Geiger, Pāli Grammar, §80.3.
183 Spk: Why did he address the bhikkhus? Because a subtle Dhamma discourse, one stamped with the three characteristics, had presented itself to him. In this country (the Kuru country), it is said, the people had good roots [Spk-pṭ: supporting conditions for achievement of the noble Dhamma] and were wise [Spk-pṭ: with the wisdom of a three-rooted rebirth-consciousness and pragmatic wisdom]. They were capable of penetrating a deep Dhamma talk stamped with the three characteristics. Therefore the Buddha taught here the two Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas (DN No. 22, MN No. 10), the Mahānidāna Sutta (DN No. 15), the Āneñjasappāya Sutta (MN No. 106), the Cūḷanidāna Sutta (12:60), and other deep suttas.
184 Sammasatha no tumhe bhikkhave antaraṃ sammasan ti. Spk explains “inward exploration” as internal exploration of conditions (abbhantaraṃ paccayasammasanaṃ). In the exegetical literature, sammasana-ñāṇa is a technical term for the comprehension of the five aggregates by way of the three characteristics (see Paṭis I 53-54, quoted at Vism 607-8; Ppn 20:6-20). Here, however, sammasana is used in a sense that comes closer to the exegetical notion of paccayapariggaha , “discernment of conditions,” as at Vism 598-600; Ppn 19:1-13.
185 Spk: The Blessed One wanted him to answer by way of conditionality, but he could not grasp the Master’s intention and answered by way of the thirty-two aspects (of bodily foulness).
186 As at 12:51, but with a different sequel. I read with Be idaṃ kho dukkhaṃ kiṃnidānaṃ. Ee here is unsatisfactory.
187 Idaṃ kho dukkhaṃ upadhinidānaṃ, etc. Spk: It has its source in “acquisition as the aggregates” (khandhupadhinidānaṃ); for here the five aggregates are intended by “acquisition.” On upadhi, see I, n. 21. The standard exegetical analysis of upadhi is fourfold: as defilements, aggregates, sensual pleasures, and volitional formations. As upadhi is conditioned by taṇhā, one might contend that here upadhi is synonymous with upādāna. Spk, however, does not endorse this interpretation, and the fact that upadhi is declared the basis for aging-and-death and the other types of suffering supports Spk’s gloss khandhupadhi. Possibly a double meaning is intended: upadhi as the aggregates is the immediate condition for aging-and-death, while upadhi as equivalent to upādāna is the remote condition for existence and birth, which in turn is the remote condition for aging-and-death. On upadhi as the origin of suffering, see Sn p. 141,7-8: yaṃ kiñci dukkhaṃ sambhoti sabbaṃ upadhipaccayā.
188 Upadhinirodhasāruppagāminī paṭipadā. As at 12:51; see n. 135.
189 For a more elaborate treatment, see the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta, DN II 308,6-309,11.
190 The same simile, but with slight differences in wording, is at MN I 316,10-23.
191 Spk: The bronze cup of beverage represents worldly objects of a pleasant and agreeable nature. The man oppressed by the heat represents the worldling attached to the round; the man who invites him to drink, the people who invite the worldling to enjoy objects in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature. The man in charge of the drink, who explains its virtues and dangers, is like a spiritual friend, one’s preceptor, teacher, etc., who explains the gratification and danger in the five cords of sensual pleasure. Just as the man in the simile suddenly, without reflection, drinks the beverage and meets death or deadly suffering, so the worldling, eager to enjoy sensual pleasures, spurns the advice of his preceptor and teacher, gives up the training, and reverts to the lower life. There he commits a crime and is punished by the king, and in the next life he experiences great suffering in the four realms of misery.
192 Spk: In the counterpart, the man oppressed by the heat represents the meditator at the time he is still attached to the round. When he reflects, rejects the beverage, and dispels his thirst with some other drink, this is like the bhikkhu’s abiding by the advice of his preceptor and teacher, guarding the sense doors, gradually developing insight, and attaining the fruit of arahantship. The other four beverages are like the four paths. As the man dispels his thirst with the other four beverages and goes happily wherever he wants, so the arahant, having drunk of the four paths, dispels craving and goes to the region of Nibbāna.
193 Mahākoṭṭhita was the foremost disciple in the analytical knowledges (paṭisambhidā). He often appears in dialogue with Sāriputta. As C.Rh.D remarks (KS 2:79, n. 1), since both elders were arahants it is likely these dialogues were intended as “lessons” for their students rather than as genuine inquiries.
194 The underlying presuppositions of the four alternatives are eternalism, annihilationism, partial-eternalism, and fortuitous origination; see n. 37.
195 On the reciprocal conditionality of consciousness and name-and-form, see 12:65.
196 Cp. 12:16. Spk: On thirty-six grounds: for thirty-six reasons, obtained by taking three cases in relation to each of the twelve terms. The first is the quality of being a speaker on the Dhamma, the second the practice, the third the fruit of the practice. By the first method the excellence of the teaching is discussed, by the second the plane of the trainee (sekha), by the third the plane of the arahant (asekha, one beyond training).
197 Spk does not identify these elders. Saviṭṭha appears at AN I 118-19, Nārada at AN III 57-62.
198 These five grounds for the acceptance of a thesis recur at 35:153 and are examined critically by the Buddha at MN II 170,26-171,25; see too MN II 218,15-21. Here they are being contrasted with personal knowledge (paccattameva ñāṇa). For a detailed discussion, see Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp. 182-88, 274-76.
Spk: One person accepts something through faith (saddhā) by placing faith in another and accepting what he says as true. Another accepts something through personal preference (ruci) when he approves of some thesis by reflecting on it and then takes it to be true. One accepts a thesis by oral tradition (anussava) when one thinks: “This has come down from ancient times by oral tradition, so it must be true.” For another, as he thinks, a certain thesis appears valid, and he concludes, “So it is”: he accepts it by reasoned reflection (ākāraparivitakka). (Jayatilleke discusses ākāra as meaning “reason” at p. 274.) In the fifth case, as one reflects, a view arises by pondering some hypothesis; this is acceptance of a view after pondering it (diṭṭhinijjhānakkhanti).
199 Bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ. Spk: Nibbāna is the cessation of the five aggregates.
200 Spk: The elder Musīla was an arahant, but without saying whether or not it was so he just kept silent.
201 Spk: Why did he speak up? It is said that he reflected thus: “This proposition—‘Nibbāna is the cessation of existence’—can be understood even by trainees. But this elder (Saviṭṭha) places that one (Musīla) on the plane of the arahant. I will make him understand this matter correctly.”
202 Spk: Clearly seen ... with correct wisdom: clearly seen with path wisdom together with insight. I am not an arahant: he indicates this because he stands on the path of nonreturning. But his knowledge that “Nibbāna is the cessation of existence” is a type of reviewing knowledge (paccavekkhaṇañāṇa ) apart from the nineteen (regular) types of reviewing knowledge (see Vism 676; Ppn 22:19-21).
203 Na ca kāyena phusitvā vihareyya, lit. “but he would not dwell having contacted it with the body.” Spk glosses: “He would not be able to draw out the water.”
204 Spk: The seeing of water in the well represents the seeing of Nibbāna by the nonreturner. The man afflicted by heat represents the nonreturner; the water bucket, the path of arahantship. As the man oppressed by heat sees water in the well, the nonreturner knows by reviewing knowledge, “There exists a breakthrough to the path of arahantship” (reading with Se arahattaphalābhisamaya). But as the man lacking the bucket cannot draw out the water and touch it with the body, so the nonreturner, lacking the path of arahantship, cannot sit down and become absorbed in the attainment of the fruit of arahantship, which has Nibbāna as its object.
It would be a misunderstanding of Nārada’s reply to take it as a rejoinder to Musīla’s tacit claim that he is an arahant (the interpretation adopted by Gombrich, How Buddhism Began, pp. 128-29). The point is not that Musīla was unjustified in consenting to that title, but that Saviṭṭha drew an incorrect inference, for he held the wrong belief that the defining mark of an arahant is the understanding of dependent origination and the nature of Nibbāna. This understanding, rather, is common property of the trainee and the arahant. What distinguishes the arahant from the trainee is not his insight into dependent origination (and other principles of the Dhamma) but the fact that he has used this insight to eradicate all defilements and has thereby gained access to a unique meditative state (called in the commentaries arahattaphalasamāpatti, the fruition attainment of arahantship) in which he can dwell “touching the deathless element with his body.” At 48:53, too, the expression kāyena phusitvā viharati highlights the essential difference between the sekha and the asekha; see V, n. 238. For parallel texts on the difference between the stream-enterer and the arahant, see 22:109-110 (stated in terms of the five aggregates) and 48:2-5, 26-27, 32-33 (in terms of the faculties).
205 In all three eds. the question begins with evaṃvādī tvaṃ and the reply with evaṃvādāhaṃ. However, since it was Nārada who just spoke, it seems we should read the question portion as evaṃvādiṃ tvaṃ and resolve evaṃvādāhaṃ in the reply into evaṃvādiṃ ahaṃ. Neither Spk nor Spk-pṭ offers any help here, but a note in Be of the text suggests this amendation. The Ee reading of a parallel passage at 55:23 (V 374,24-27) has the reading I prefer, though there Be and Se have the same reading as here. At MN II 214,14 foll. we find evaṃvādāhaṃ in a context where it would have to be resolved as an accusative plural, evaṃvādino (nigaṇṭhe) ahaṃ, which further supports my proposal regarding the present passage.
206 This sutta is discussed in relation to its Chinese counterpart by Gombrich, How Buddhism Began, pp. 123-27.
Spk: Susīma had approached the Venerable Ānanda, thinking, “He is the most learned disciple, and also the Teacher frequently reports to him the Dhamma he has spoken on various occasions; under him I will be able to learn the Dhamma quickly.” Ānanda brought him to the Buddha because he knew that Susīma had been a teacher in his own right and he was apprehensive that after going forth he might try to bring discredit to the Dispensation. The Buddha understood that Susīma’s motive in taking ordination was “theft of the Dhamma,” which made his entry into the Dispensation impure, but he foresaw that Susīma would shortly undergo a change of heart and attain arahantship. Hence he instructed Ānanda to give him the going forth.
It is puzzling that here, when it was most necessary to do so, the Buddha makes no mention of the probationary period normally imposed on wanderers of other sects who wish to enter the Buddhist order; perhaps the Buddha had foreseen that Susīma would have been discouraged by such a stipulation and would not have applied for admission, thus losing the chance to gain liberation.
207 Spk: Those bhikkhus, having received a meditation subject from the Teacher, entered upon the three-month rains residence, and during the rains, striving and struggling, they attained arahantship. At the end of the rains they went to the Teacher and informed him of their attainment. When Susīma heard about this he thought: “Final knowledge (aññā) must be the supreme standard in this Dispensation, the essential personal transmission of the teacher (paramappamāṇaṃ sārabhūtā ācariyamuṭṭhi, lit. ‘teacher’s fist’). Let me inquire and find out about it.” Therefore he approached those bhikkhus.
The stock description of the five abhiññās that follows is commented upon in detail in Vism, chaps. 12 and 13.
208 Spk-pṭ: The formless jhānas and deliverance from perception (āruppajjhāna-saññāvimokkhā).
209 The text enclosed in brackets in Ee should be deleted and the question read as in Be and Se thus: Ettha dāni āyasmanto idañ ca veyyākaraṇaṃ imesañ ca dhammānaṃ asamāpatti, idaṃ no āvuso kathan ti. I take the no to be merely an interrogative particle (= nu).
210 Paññāvimuttā kho mayaṃ āvuso Susīma. Spk: He shows: “Friend, we are without jhāna, dry-insighters, liberated simply by wisdom” (āvuso mayaṃ nijjhānakā sukkhavipassakā paññāmatten’ eva vimuttā). Spk-pṭ: Liberated simply by wisdom: not both-ways-liberated (na ubhatobhāgavimuttā).
While Spk seems to be saying that those bhikkhus did not have any jhānas, the sutta itself establishes only that they lacked the abhiññās and āruppas; nothing is said about whether or not they had achieved the four jhānas. It is significant that Susīma’s questions do not extend to the jhānas, and it is even possible (though contrary to the commentaries) that nijjhānaka should be understood, not as the deprivative “without jhāna,” but as an agent noun from nijjhāna, pondering, hence “ponderers.” In any case, the sutta goes no further than to distinguish the paññāvimutta arahant from other arahants who have the six abhiññās and the formless attainments, and thus it offers nothing radically different from the Nikāyas as a whole.
The commentaries explain the paññāvimutta arahant to be of five kinds: those who attain one or another of the four jhānas, and the “dry-insighter” (sukkhavipassaka) who lacks mundane jhāna but still has the supramundane jhāna inseparable from the noble path (see Sv II 512,19-28). On the contrast between paññāvimutta and ubhatobhāgavimutta arahants, see MN I 477-78; Pp 14, 190-91.
211 Pubbe kho Susīma dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇaṃ, pacchā nibbāne ñāṇaṃ. Spk: Insight knowledge is “knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma,” which arises first. At the end of the course of insight, path knowledge arises; that is “knowledge of Nibbāna,” which arises later. Spk-pṭ: The “stability of the Dhamma” is the stableness of phenomena, their intrinsic nature (dhammānaṃ ṭhitatā taṃsabhāvatā): namely, impermanence, suffering, nonself. Knowledge of that is “knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma.” See too n. 51, n. 105. A chapter on dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇa is at Paṭis I 50-52, where it is explained as the knowledge of the relations between each pair of factors in paṭicca-samuppāda.
212 Spk: Why is this said? For the purpose of showing the arising of knowledge thus even without concentration. This is what is meant: “Susīma, the path and fruit are not the issue of concentration (samādhinissanda), nor the advantage brought about by concentration (samādhi-ānisaṃsā), nor the outcome of concentration (samādhinipphatti). They are the issue of insight (vipassanā), the advantage brought about by insight, the outcome of insight. Therefore, whether you understand or not, first comes knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma, afterwards knowledge of Nibbāna.”
Spk-pṭ: Even without concentration (vinā pi samādhiṃ): even without previously established (concentration) that has acquired the characteristic of serenity (samathalakkhaṇappattaṃ ); this is said referring to one who takes the vehicle of insight (vipassanāyānika).
If understood on its own terms, the text establishes only that arahantship can be attained without the supernormal powers and the formless attainments. Read in the light of Spk and Spk-pṭ, it may be seen to affirm the existence of a “vehicle of bare insight” which begins directly with mindful contemplation of mental and physical phenomena, without depending on a base of concentration by means of the jhānas or access concentration (upacārasamādhi). Though the suttas themselves say nothing about a system of bare insight meditation, some contemporary teachers regard the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta as propounding such a method and appeal to Spk and Spk-pṭ for additional support.
213 Spk: Having known him to be capable of penetration, the Buddha speaks thus giving a Dhamma teaching with three turns, at the conclusion of which the elder attained arahantship. Spk-pṭ: The “three turns” (teparivaṭṭaṃ) are by way of the turning over of the three characteristics in relation to the five aggregates.
The catechism on the three characteristics recurs throughout the Khandha-saṃyutta, as at 22:49, 59, 79, 80, 82, etc.
214 Spk: This query is started in order to make it evident that those bhikkhus were dry-insighters without jhāna (or: “dry-insight ponderers”). This is the purport here: “You are not the only dry-insighter without jhāna; those bhikkhus were also such.”
215 Dhammatthenaka. The formula for confession and pardon is also at 16:6 (II 205,10-16).
216 Antarapeyyāla. As the preceding section contains twelve suttas by way of the twelve factors of the formula, so each of the following suttas can be divided into twelve. Spk says these were all spoken by way of the inclinations of the persons to be guided and enlightened according to their different inclinations (sabbe pi tathā tathā bujjhanakānaṃ veneyyapuggalānaṃ ajjhāsayavasena vuttā).
217 Spk: Whether it be the Buddha or a disciple, the one in dependence upon whom one gains path knowledge is called a teacher (satthā, a word usually reserved for the Buddha); he should be sought for.
13 Abhisamayasaṃyutta
218 The expression diṭṭhisampanna denotes one who has seen the truth of the Dhamma, beginning with the sotāpanna. See the closing paragraph of 12:27, etc. MN III 64,16-65,12, and AN III 438-40 list various qualities of the diṭṭhisampanna, e.g., being incapable of regarding any formation as permanent, etc., being incapable of parricide and matricide, etc. Spk glosses abhisametāvino: “for one who abides having made the breakthrough to the noble truths by means of wisdom” (paññāya ariyasaccāni abhisametvā ṭhitassa). On abhisamaya, see n. 13.
Spk: What is the suffering that has been destroyed? That which might have arisen if the first path had not been developed. The suffering that might have arisen in the plane of misery during the next seven existences, and that which might have arisen anywhere at all beginning with the eighth rebirth—all that has been destroyed.
219 Both dhammābhisamaya and dhammacakkhupaṭilābha signify the attainment of stream-entry. On the benefit of stream-entry, see Dhp 178.
220 The yojana is a measure of distance roughly equal to ten kilometers. Spk explains kākapeyya (lit. “crow-drinkable”) thus: “So that it is possible for a crow, standing on the bank, to drink from it naturally by inserting its beak.”
221 According to early Buddhist cosmology, Sineru is the mountain at the centre of our world-sphere; the word is the Pāli counterpart of the better known Skt Meru. For a fuller picture of Buddhist cosmology, see Vism 205-7 (Ppn 7:40-44), and Ppn 7: n. 15.
222Note that the ending here is different from the stock ending in the preceding suttas.
14. Dhātusaṃyutta
223 Spk: Diversity of elements: the diversified intrinsic nature of phenomena, which gain the name “elements” in the sense that they have an intrinsic nature consisting in their emptiness and absence of a being (nissattaṭṭha-suññataṭṭhasaṅkhātena sabhāvaṭṭhena dhātū ti laddhanāmānaṃ dhammānaṃ nānāsabhāvo dhātunānattaṃ).
224 Spk: The eye element is eye-sensitivity (cakkhupasāda), the form element is the form object; the eye-consciousness element is the mind based on eye-sensitivity (cakkhupasādavatthukaṃ cittaṃ). The other four sense elements, their objects, and states of consciousness are explained in the same way, with the appropriate changes. The mind element (manodhātu) is the threefold mind element [Spk-pṭ: the two receiving (sampaṭicchana) mind elements and the functional mind element [= the five-door adverting citta]. The mental-phenomena element (dhammadhātu) is the three aggregates—feeling, (perception, and volitional formations)—subtle form, and Nibbāna. The mind-consciousness elementis all mind-consciousness [Spk-pṭ: of seventy-six types].
Precise formal definitions of the elements are not to be found in the Nikāyas. Perhaps the oldest canonical source for the definitions of the eighteen elements is Vibh 87-90. This comes in the Abhidhamma-bhājaniya only, which implies that the compilers of Vibh considered the eighteen elements a proper Abhidhamma category rather than one pertaining to the suttas. Discussion from the commentarial standpoint is at Vism 484-90 (Ppn 15:17-43) and Vibh-a 76-82.
The “sensitivities” (pasāda) are types of material phenomena, located in the gross sense organs, that are especially receptive to the appropriate types of sense objects. Both Vibh-a and Vism frame their explanations on the basis of the Abhidhamma theory of the cognitive process, which, though articulated as such only in the commentaries, already seems to underlie the classification of cittas in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. This scheme, however, is clearly later than the Nikāyas, and Spk’s attempts to reconcile the two standpoints sometimes seems contrived.
The five types of sense consciousness are the cittas that exercise the rudimentary function of bare cognition of the sense object. Of the three mind elements, the “functional” (kiriya) is the first citta in the process, which merely adverts to the object, and hence is called the five-door adverting consciousness (pañcadvārāvajjana-citta). This is followed by the appropriate sense consciousness (eye-consciousness, etc.), a kammically resultant citta which may be either wholesome-resultant or unwholesome-resultant; hence the fivefold sense consciousness becomes tenfold. Next comes the receiving consciousness (sampaṭicchana-citta), which “picks up” the object for further scrutiny; this is a “mind element” and is either wholesome-resultant or unwholesome-resultant. Following this, an investigating consciousness (santīraṇa-citta) arises, a wholesome-resultant or unwholesome-resultant citta which investigates the object; then a determining consciousness (votthapana-citta), a functional citta which defines the object; and then comes a string of cittas called javana, which constitute either a wholesome or an unwholesome response to the object (or, in the case of the arahant, a merely “functional” response). This may be followed by a registration consciousness (tadārammaṇa), a resultant citta which records the impression of the object on the mental continuum. All the cittas from the investigating consciousness onwards are mind-consciousness element, which is of seventy-six types. In the mind door the process is somewhat different: it begins with a mind-door adverting consciousness (manodvārāvajjana-citta ), followed immediately by the string of javanas. For details, see CMA 1:8-10, 4:1-23.
The mental-phenomena element (dhammadhātu) is not necessarily the object of mind-consciousness element, as one might suppose it to be by analogy with the other senses. Along with the object of mind-consciousness it includes all feeling, perception, and volitional factors that accompany consciousness in the process of cognition. Thus it belongs as much to the subjective pole of the cognitive act as to the objective pole. See particularly CMA, Table 7.4.
225 Spk: Eye-contact, etc., are associated with eye-consciousness, etc. Mind-contact is that associated with the first javana in the mind door; therefore when it is said, in dependence on the mind element there arises mind contact, this means that the contact of the first javanaarises in dependence on the functional mind-consciousness element, i.e., the mind-door adverting citta.
On javana, see CMA 3:9, 4:12-16, and on the mind-door adverting citta, see CMA 1:10, 3:9.
226 Since, according to the Abhidhamma scheme of conditional relations, the mind element and its concomitant contact are mutually dependent, Spk is compelled to explain these terms in a way that does not place the sutta in contradiction with the Abhidhamma. Hence Spk says: “The functional mind-consciousness element with the function of adverting (i.e., the mind-door adverting citta) does not arise in dependence on the contact associated with the first javana in the mind door (which occurs subsequent to it).”
227 Spk: Perception of form (rūpasaññā): the perception associated with eye-consciousness. Intention regarding form (rūpasaṅkappa ): the intention associated with three cittas—the receiving, (investigating, and determining cittas). Desire for form (rūpacchanda): desire in the sense of desirousness for form. Passion for form (rūpapariḷāha): passion (lit. “fever”) in the sense of a burning in regard to form [Spk-pṭ: for the fire of lust, etc., has the function of “burning up” its own support]. The quest for form (rūpapariyesanā): searching in order to obtain that form, having taken along one’s friends and comrades. Passion and the quest are found in different javana processes (so that passion can become an antecedent condition for the quest).
228 Ee should be corrected to read: no saṅkappanānattaṃ paṭicca uppajjati saññānānattaṃ; no saññānānattaṃ paṭicca uppajjati dhātunānattaṃ.
229 Text enclosed in brackets is found in Ee and Se, but without the elision. Se further develops the pattern for the sound element, while Be proceeds directly from rūpadhātuṃ bhikkhave paṭicca uppajjati rūpasaññā to dhammadhātuṃ paṭicca uppajjati dhammasaññā and develops the pattern for the mental-phenomena element alone.
230 This attempt to combine into one series the discrete sequences beginning with contact and perception leads to some strange incongruities, which become even more bizarre among the negations of the following sutta. Elsewhere contact is said to be the condition for the manifestation of the aggregates of feeling, perception, and volitional formations (e.g., at 22:82 (III 101,33-102,2), and see 35:93(IV 68,15-16)); yet here contact and feeling are said to be dependent on perception and intention. Neither Spk nor Spk-pṭ shows any signs of uneasiness over the discrepancies nor tries to justify them.
At MN I 111,35-112,13 a sequence of mental phenomena is given as follows: contact > feeling > perception > thought > conceptual proliferation > obsession by perceptions and notions arisen from proliferation. The texts often treat thought (vitakka) as identical with intention (saṅkappa ); proliferation (papañca) includes craving (taṇhā), which is synonymous with desire (chanda); and obsession (samudācāra) may comprise passions and quests, etc. This would then give us a more cogent version of the series. Spk does in fact refer to one elder, Uruvelāyavāsī Cūḷatissa Thera, who said: “Although the Blessed One inserted contact and feeling in the middle of the text, having turned the text back (pāḷiṃ pana parivaṭṭetvā) we get: perception, intention, desire, passion, quest, and gain in regard to the stated object (form, etc.), ‘gain of form’ being the object gained together with craving; then there is contact as the (mental) contact with the object gained and feeling as the experiencing of the object. In such a way this pair—contact with form and feeling—is found.”
Spk continues on its own: “And here, perception, intention, contact, feeling, and desire are found both in the same javana process and in different javana processes, while passion, quest, and gain are found only in different javana processes.”
231 Spk: The light element (ābhādhātu) is a name for the jhāna together with its object, that is, light (āloka) and the jhāna arisen after doing the preparatory work on the light-kasiṇa. The beauty element (subhadhātu) is just the jhāna together with its object, namely, the jhāna arisen on the basis of a beautiful kasiṇa. The others are self-explanatory.
232 Spk: The light element is discerned in dependence on darkness: for darkness is delimited by (contrasted with) light, and light by darkness. Similarly, foulness is delimited by (contrasted with) beauty, and beauty by foulness. In dependence on form: in dependence on a form-sphere meditative attainment. For when one has a form-sphere attainment one can overcome form or attain the base of the infinity of space. In dependence on cessation (nirodhaṃ paṭicca): in dependence on the reflectively induced nonoccurrence (paṭisaṅkhā-appavatti) of the four (mental) aggregates. For the attainment of cessation is discerned in dependence on the cessation of the aggregates, not on their occurrence. And here it is just the cessation of the four aggregates that should be understood as “the attainment of cessation.”
233 Spk: An attainment with a residue of formations (saṅkhārā-vasesasamāpatti ): because of a residue of subtle formations. According to Vism 337-38 (Ppn 10:47-54), in this attainment perception and the other mental factors are present merely in a subtle residual mode and thus cannot perform their decisive functions; hence the ambivalence in the name.
234 Spk: The sensuality element (kāmadhātu) is sensual thought, all sense-sphere phenomena in general, and in particular everything unwholesome except the ill-will element and the harmfulness element, which are mentioned separately here. Sensual perception arises in dependence on the sensuality element either by taking it as an object or by way of association (i.e., when sensual perception is associated with sensual thought in the same citta).
All these elements are defined at Vibh 86-87, quoted by Spk. Vibh-a 74 correlates sensual thought with sensuality as defilement (kilesakāma) and sense-sphere phenomena with sensuality as sensual objects (vatthukāma). Sensual intention arises in dependence on sensual perception by way either of association or decisive support. (Association condition (sampayutta-paccaya) is a relation between simultaneous mental phenomena; decisive-support condition (upanissaya-paccaya) is a relation between a cause and effect separated in time.)
235 Spk: The ill will element (byāpādadhātu) is thought of ill will or ill will itself [Spk-pṭ: i.e., hatred (dosa)]. Note that the commentaries, following the Abhidhamma’s systematic treatment of the Buddha’s teaching, differentiate between ill will and thought of ill will. The two are distinct mental constituents (cetasikā dhammā), the former being a mode of the unwholesome mental factor hatred (dosa), the latter the thought (vitakka) associated with that mental factor. Similarly with harmfulness, etc.
236 Spk: The harmfulness element (vihiṃsādhātu) is thought of harmfulness and harmfulness itself. Vibh 86 explains the harmfulness element as injuring beings in various ways.
237 Spk: The renunciation element (nekkhammadhātu) is thought of renunciation and all wholesome states except the other two elements, which are to be explained separately. Perception of renunciation arises in dependence on the renunciation element by way of such conditions as conascence (sahajātapaccaya), etc.
238 Spk: The non-ill will element (abyāpādadhātu) is thought of non-ill will and non-ill will itself, i.e., lovingkindness towards beings.
239 Spk: The harmlessness element (avihiṃsādhātu) is thought of harmlessness and compassion.
240 Spk: From this point on the word “element” means inclination (ajjhāsaya).
241 The name of the bhikkhu is given as in Ee. Be and Se cite it simply as Kaccāna, and Se notes a v.l., Sandha Kaccāyana. At 44:11a Sabhiya Kaccāna is mentioned, also at the Brick Hall in Ñātika, and the two may be the same person.
Spk explains his question in two ways: (i) “Why does the view arise in the six (rival) teachers who are not perfectly enlightened, ‘We are Perfectly Enlightened Ones’?” (ii) “Why does the view arise in their disciples in regard to (their teachers) who are not perfectly enlightened, ‘They are Perfectly Enlightened Ones’?” Ee sammāsambuddho ti should be amended to sammāsambuddhā ti.
242 The contrast is between hīnādhimuttikā and kalyāṇādhimuttikā. Spk glosses adhimuttikā with ajjhāsayā, “inclination.”
243 Sāriputta, as the bhikkhu disciple foremost in wisdom, attracted bhikkhus who were likewise of great wisdom. All the other disciples mentioned below attract pupils who share their specialty.
244 This sutta, including the verses, is at It 70-71. The verses alone, excluding the first two pādas, are at Th 147-48.
245 Saṃsaggā vanatho jāto. On vanatha, see I, n. 474. Spk: From association—from craving and affection based upon association through seeing and hearing—the woods is born, the woods of the defilements is born. By nonassociation it is cut: it is cut by nonassociation, by not-seeing, by avoiding standing and sitting privately (with a person of the opposite sex).
246 Spk: Those of wrong knowledge: those endowed with wrong reviewing (micchāpaccavekkhaṇena samannāgatā). Those of wrong liberation: those who abide in an unemancipating liberation, which they assume to be wholesome liberation. Those of right knowledge: those with right reviewing. Those of right liberation: those endowed with the emancipating liberation of the fruit.
Right knowledge and right liberation supplement the eight factors of the Noble Eightfold Path. They are said to be factors of the arahant (e.g., at MN III 76,8), but at 55:26 (V 384,1-12) they are also ascribed to Anāthapiṇḍika, a stream-enterer. Spk’s gloss of right knowledge as right reviewing knowledge is difficult to accept. More likely the expression refers to the full knowledge of the Four Noble Truths by means of which arahantship is gained.
247 Spk interprets each element by way of its physical characteristic or function: the earth element is the foundational element (patiṭṭhādhātu); the water element, the cohesive element (ābandhanadhātu); the fire element, the maturing element (paripācanadhātu); and the air element, the distensive element (vitthambhanadhātu). For a more detailed treatment according to the commentarial method, see Vism 364-70 (Ppn 11:85-117).
248 Spk: Since it is contingent upon Nibbāna (nibbānaṃ āgamma) that desire and lust are removed and abandoned, Nibbāna is the escape from it.
249 Spk: In this sutta the Four Noble Truths are discussed. The gratification (assāda) in the four elements is the truth of the origin; the danger (ādīnava) is the truth of suffering; the escape (nissaraṇa) is the truth of cessation; the path that understands the escape is the truth of the path.
250 Throughout I read with Se and Ee cetovimutti as against Be vimutti. Spk: The knowledge arose, “This liberation of mine by the fruit of arahantship is unshakable.” Its unshakable-ness can be understood through the cause and through the object. It is unshakable through the cause because there can be no return of the defilements eradicated by the four paths. It is unshakable through the object because it occurs taking the unshakable state, Nibbāna, as object.
251 Vimariyādikatena cetasā. Spk: The barriers (mariyādā) are twofold: the barriers of defilements and the barriers of the round of existence. Here, because of the abandoning of both, it is said that they dwell with a mind rid of barriers.
252 Spk: It is pleasurable in that it is a condition for pleasant feeling.
253 There is a lack of symmetry between the two clauses in this statement: the first strings together four terms: uppādo ṭhiti abhinibbatti pātubhāvo, but the sequel exemplifies only three, omitting abhinibbatti. This is done consistently whenever this “template” is applied, as at 22:30 and 35:21-22.
15. Anamataggasaṃyutta
254 Anamataggo ’yaṃ bhikkhave saṃsāro. Spk resolves anamatagga into anu amatagga, explaining: “Even if it should be pursued by knowledge for a hundred or a thousand years, it would be with unthought-of beginning, with unknown beginning (vassasataṃ vassasahassaṃ ñāṇena anugantvā pi amataggo aviditaggo). It wouldn’t be possible to know its beginning from here or from there; the meaning is that it is without a delimiting first or last point. Saṃsāra is the uninterruptedly occurring succession of the aggregates, etc. (khandhādīnaṃ avicchinnappavattā paṭipāṭi).”
The BHS equivalent of anamatagga is anavarāgra (e.g., at Mvu I 34,7), “without lower or upper limit.” For various explanations, see CPD, s.v. an-amat’-agga.
255 Spk: The four great oceans delimited by the rays of Mount Sineru. For Sineru’s eastern slope is made of silver, its southern slope of jewels, its western slope of crystal, and its northern slope of gold. From the eastern and southern slopes rays of silver and jewels come forth, merge, traverse the surface of the ocean, and reach right up to the mountains that encircle the world-sphere; and so too with the rays coming forth from the other slopes. The four great oceans are situated between those rays.
256 Kappa. Apparently a mahākappa is intended, the length of time needed for a world system to arise, develop, and perish. Each mahākappa consists of four asaṅkheyyakappas, periods of expansion, stabilization, contraction, and dissolution: see AN II 142,15-28.
257 Kāsikena vatthena. Although this is often understood to be silk, Spk explains it to be an extremely delicate cloth made of thread spun from three fibres of cotton.
258 Reading, with Be and Se, ananussaritā va. Ee anussaritā va should be amended.
259 The simile is also at 56:33.
260 The sutta, including the verses, is also at It 17-18.
261 Spk: For these beings, the times when they are born as invertebrates is greater than the times when they are born as vertebrates; for when they become creatures such as worms, etc., they have no bones. But when they become fish and tortoises, etc., their bones are numerous. Therefore, skipping over the time when they are invertebrates and the time when they have extremely numerous bones, only the time when they have a moderate number of bones (samaṭṭhikakālo va) should be taken.
262 The same group of bhikkhus provided the occasion for the Buddha to institute the offering of the kaṭhina robe at the end of the Vassa, the annual rains residence; see Vin I 253-54. Forest dwelling, etc., are four of the ascetic practices (dhutaṅga). Spk: Yet all were still with fetters (sabbe sasaṃyojanā): Some were stream-enterers, some oncereturners, some nonreturners, but among them there were no worldlings or arahants.
263 On the variations in the human life span during the epochs of the different Buddhas, see DN II 3,28-4,5. DN III 68-76 explains how the life span of humans will decline still further as a result of moral degeneration until it reaches a low of ten years, after which it will increase until it reaches 80,000 years in the time of the future Buddha Metteyya.
264 Spk says that the text should not be interpreted to mean that the life span gradually decreased from Kakusandha’s age directly to that of Koṇāgamana’s. Rather, the life span after Kakusandha’s parinibbāna continually decreased until it reached the minimum of ten years, then it increased to an incalculable (asaṅkheyya), and then decreased again until it reached 30,000 years, at which time Koṇāgamana arose in the world. The same pattern applies to the subsequent cases, including that of Metteyya (see n. 263).
266 Spk discusses a threefold typology of contentment (santosa ): (i) contentment that accords with one’s gains (yathālābhasantosa), i.e., remaining content with any gains, whether fine or coarse; (ii) contentment that accords with one’s ability (yathābalasantosa), i.e., remaining content with whatever one needs to sustain one’s health; and (iii) contentment that accords with suitability (yathāsāruppasantosa ), i.e., disposing of any luxury items received and retaining only the simplest and most basic requisites. A translation of the full passage—from the parallel commentary to the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (Sv I 206-8)—may be found in Bodhi, Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship, pp. 134-37. Various types of wrong search (anesanā) are discussed at Vism 22-30 (Ppn 1:60-84).
267 Spk: If he does not get a robe: If he does not get a robe he does not become agitated (na paritassati) like one who, failing to get a robe, becomes frightened and agitated and associates with meritorious bhikkhus, thinking “How can I get a robe?” Seeing the danger (ādīnavadassāvī): the danger of an offence in improper search and of use while being tied to it. Understanding the escape (nissaraṇapañña): he uses it knowing the escape stated in the formula, “Only for warding off cold,” etc. (On the formulas for the four requisites, see MN I 10,4-20, with detailed analysis at Vism 30-35; Ppn 1:85-97) This passage (and the parallels in regard to the other requisites excluding medicines) is found in the Ariyavaṃsa Sutta in a description of the ideal ascetic monk (AN II 27-29).
268 Kassapena vā hi vo bhikkhave ovadissāmi yo vā pan’ assa Kassapasadiso. Spk makes it clear that yo … Kassapasadiso should be construed as instrumental in force, parallel to Kassapena: “He exhorts by the example of Kassapa when he says, ‘As the Elder Mahākassapa is content with the four requisites, so too should you be.’ He exhorts by one who is similar to Kassapa when he says, ‘If there should be anyone else here who is similar to Kassapa—that is, like the Elder Mahākassapa—in being content with the four requisites, you should be so too.’”
269 Tathattāya paṭipajjitabbaṃ. Spk: (He says:) “‘In this sutta on contentment the Perfectly Enlightened One’s responsibility (bhāra) is explaining the practice of effacement (sallekhācāra ), while our responsibility is to fulfil it by the fulfilment of the practice. Let us accept the responsibility entrusted to us’—having reflected thus, you should practise accordingly, as explained by me.”
270 Spk explains not ardent (anātāpī) as devoid of the energy that burns up (ātapati) defilements, and unafraid of wrongdoing (anottappī) as devoid of fear over the arising of defilements and the nonarising of wholesome qualities. Both words are derived from the same root, tap, to burn. Spk explains anuttara yogakkhema as arahantship, so called because it is secure from the four bonds (yoga; see 45:172). See too I, n. 463.
271 The four parts of this reflection correspond to the four aspects of right effort (see 45:8) or the four right kinds of striving (see 49:1-12).
272Spk: “As the moon, gliding across the sky, does not form intimacy, affection, or attachment with anyone, nor give rise to fondness, longing, and obsession, yet remains dear and agreeable to the multitude, so you too should not form intimacy, etc., with anyone; then, by doing so, you will approach families like the moon, dear and agreeable to the multitude. Further, as the moon dispels darkness and emits light, so you will dispel the darkness of defilements and emit the light of knowledge.”
Spk explains apakassa as an absolutive, equivalent to apakassitvā and glossed apanetvā, “having pulled away.” A bhikkhu draws back the body when he lives in a forest abode (rather than a village temple) and draws back the mind when he refrains from sensual thoughts and other harmful mental states.
273 Spk: This is a unique phrase (asambhinnapada) in the Word of the Buddha preserved in the Tipiṭaka. Spk-pṭ: For nowhere else has this phrase, “The Blessed One waved his hand in space,” been recorded.
274 This is a self-serving thought. The bhikkhu wants to see the bhikkhus receive offerings and the lay followers “make merit” by offering gifts to them. The bhikkhu who is elated over the gains of others has the virtue of altruistic joy (muditā); he does not become envious when others are chosen to receive gifts rather than himself.
275 Pasannākāraṃ kareyyuṃ. This idiom also occurs below at 20:9 (II 269,24, 33) and at MN III 131,30-31 and III 144,18-19. A pasannākāraṃ (lit. “a mode of the confident”) is a gift given as an expression of appreciation. The hiatus in Ee should be closed up. Spk: “May they give the requisites, a robe and so forth!”
276 Kāruññaṃ paṭicca anudayaṃ paṭicca anukampaṃ upādāya. I generally translate both karuṇā (of which kāruññaṃ is a cognate) and anukampā as “compassion.” This is usually successful as the two seldom occur together, but the present passage is a rare exception; thus I use “tender concern” as a makeshift for anukampā. Spk glosses anudaya with rakkhaṇabhāva (the protective state) and anukampā with muducittatā (tender-heartedness), and says that both terms are synonymous with kāruññaṃ. In the next paragraph, where the same statement is applied to Kassapa, Ee has omitted a line (at II 200,3), apparently by oversight: … paresaṃ dhammaṃ deseti; kāruññaṃ paṭicca.…
277 Kulūpaka. Spk: One who goes to the homes of families. As will be seen at 20:9, 10, this could be dangerous for monks who were not inwardly strong enough to resist the temptations posed by intimate association with lay people.
278 Spk: Kassapa’s robes are said to be worn-out (nibbasana) because the Blessed One, having worn them, had discarded them. (See below 16:11; II 221,15-25.)
The Buddha is apparently requesting Mahākassapa to abandon three of the ascetic practices—wearing rag-robes, eating only food collected on alms round, and living in the forest. The Buddha himself wore robes offered by householders, accepted invitations to meals, and dwelt in town monasteries; see MN II 7-8. According to Spk, the Buddha did not really intend to make Kassapa give up his ascetic practices, but rather “just as a drum does not give off a sound unless it is struck, so such persons do not roar their lion’s roar unless they are ‘struck.’ Thus he spoke to him in this way intending to make him roar his lion’s roar.”
279 This is Mahākassapa’s lion’s roar; see too MN I 214,1-17, where Kassapa describes the ideal monk in the same terms. The first four items are ascetic practices; the next five, virtues nurtured by observance of these practices. At AN I 23,20 the Buddha declares Mahākassapa the foremost among his bhikkhu disciples who are proponents of the ascetic practices, as is clear too from 14:15 above.
280 Reading with Se: App’ eva nāma pacchimā janatā diṭṭhānugatiṃ āpajjeyya. Be and Ee have the plural āpajjeyyuṃ. At KS 2:136 this is rendered: “For surely these [those who will come after us] may fall into error.” The translator here evidently understands diṭṭhānugati as resolvable into diṭṭhi + anugati, with diṭṭhi meaning wrong view. Spk and Spk-pṭ are silent, but I find it more plausible to take the first part of the compound as the past participle diṭṭha, “the seen” in the sense of an example or role model. This interpretation can claim support from the use of the idiom at AN I 126,19-20, 127,22-23; III 108,5-6, 251,8, and 422,10, 19. See too MLDB, n. 57.
281 Spk: He says this in order to appoint Mahākassapa to his own position. But weren’t Sāriputta and Mahāmoggallāna around? They were, but he thought: “They will not live much longer, but Kassapa will live until the age of 120. After my parinibbāna he will hold a recital of the Dhamma and the Vinaya in the Sattapaṇṇī Cave, and he will enable my Dispensation to endure for a full 5,000 years. Let me appoint him to my own position; then the bhikkhus will think he should be heeded.” Despite this remark of Spk, it should be noted that the Buddha expressly refused to appoint a personal successor; instead he instructed the Saṅgha that the Dhamma and the Vinaya should represent him after his passing (DN II 154,4-8).
282 Dovacassakaraṇehi dhammehi samannāgatā: for a list of such qualities, see MN I 95,18-96,16.
283 The following, slightly expanded and including the simile of the moon, is also at AN V 123,10-124,19, ascribed to Sāriputta. There too the Buddha approves of the disciple’s statement and repeats it in full.
284 I read with Ee: evaṃ hi taṃ Kassapa sammā vadamāno vadeyya upaddutā brahmacārī brahmacārūpaddavena abhibhavanā brahmacārī brahmacārabhibhavanenā ti. Se differs only in reading vadanto for vadamāno. Be, however, has etarahi taṃ Kassapa sammā vadamāno vadeyya upaddutā brahmacārī brahmacārūpaddavena abhipatthanā brahmacārī brahmacāri-abhipatthanenā ti. This version, I suspect, arose by substituting the commentarial gloss for the original. It seems that in Se and Ee the sense requires, in place of the first abhibhavanā, the past participle abhibhūtā (or adhibhūta), though no edition available to me has this reading. On how gain and honour ruin those who live the holy life, see MN III 116,22-117,13.
Spk (Se): They are ruined by the ruination of those who lead the holy life, namely, excessive desire and lust for the four requisites. Vanquishment is excessive longing (abhibhavanā ti adhimattapatthanā). By the vanquishing of those who lead the holy life: by the state of the four requisites that consists in the excessive longing of those who lead the holy life (brahmacārabhibhavanenā ti brahmacārīnaṃ adhimattapatthanāsaṅkhātena catupaccayabhāvena). Se has a note here to the gloss: Evaṃ sabbattha. Catupaccayābhibhavena iti bhavitabbaṃ .
285 In MLDB cetovimutti pañnāvimutti is translated “deliverance of mind and deliverance by wisdom,” as if the two terms were separate items standing in conjunction. I now think it better to omit the conjunctive particle (which is not in the Pāli) and to treat the two terms as a dual designation for what is essentially the same state. Spk explains cetovimutti as the concentration of the fruit of arahantship (arahattaphalasamādhi), paññāvimutti as the wisdom of the fruit of arahantship (arahattaphalapaññā).
286 From the absence of any reference to the Blessed One in the introduction it is likely that this sutta takes place after his parinibbāna. Spk supports this supposition (see following note), as does Ānanda’s use of the vocative bhante when addressing Mahākassapa. Before the Buddha expired the monks used to address one another as āvuso, “friend” (see DN II 154,9-15).
Spk: Ānanda asked him to come to the bhikkhunīs’ quarters in order to inspire them and to explain a meditation subject, thinking they would place faith in the talk of the disciple who was the Buddha’s counterpart (buddhapaṭibhāga-sāvaka ).
287 Spk: He was not involved with building work, etc., but the four assemblies would come to the Elder Ānanda lamenting over the Buddha’s demise and he would be obliged to console them (see 9:5 and I, n. 541).
288 Her name means “Fat Tissā.” Spk glosses vedehimuni with paṇḍitamuni, “wise sage,” explaining: “A wise person endeavours with erudition consisting in knowledge—that is, he does all his tasks—therefore he is called Videhan (paṇḍito hi ñāṇasaṅkhā-tena vedena īhati … tasmā vedeho ti vuccati). He was Videhan and a sage, hence ‘the Videhan sage.’” Ap-a 128,12, however, offers a more plausible explanation: “Ānanda was called vedehimuni because he was a sage and the son of a mother from the Vedeha country [= Videha] (Vedeharaṭṭhe jātattā Vedehiyā putto).” See I, n. 233.
289 Khamatha bhante Kassapa bālo mātugāmo. I have translated this sentence with complete fidelity to the text, aware that some readers might find the rendering provocative. One consultant told me, “You’ve just lost half your readership,” and suggested I avoid drawing criticism to the translation by rendering bālo mātugāmo as “she is a foolish woman.” To my mind, this would distort the meaning of the Pāli in subservience to current views of gender. I do not see how the sentence could be construed in any other way than I have rendered it. I leave it to the reader to decide whether Ānanda himself could actually have made such a statement or whether it was put into his mouth by the compilers of the canon.
290 Spk: This is what is meant: “Do not let the Saṅgha think, ‘Ānanda restrained the disciple who was the Buddha’s counterpart, but he did not restrain the bhikkhunī. Could there be some intimacy or affection between them?’” He utters the following passage (on his meditative attainments) to demonstrate how he is the Buddha’s counterpart.
291 Spk glosses sattaratana (seven cubits) as sattahatthappamāṇa (the measurement of seven hands); a hattha (lit. “hand”), which extends from the elbow to the fingertip, is approximately two feet. This is one of the rare texts in the Nikāyas where the word abhiññā is used collectively to designate the six higher knowledges.
292 Spk: After she had censured the disciple who was the Buddha’s counterpart, even while Mahākassapa was roaring his lion’s roar about the six abhiññās, her saffron robes began to irritate her body like thorny branches or a prickly plant. As soon as she removed them and put on the white clothes (of a lay woman) she felt at ease.
293 A BHS parallel of this sutta is at Mvu III 47-56. Spk: Dakkhiṇāgiri was a country in the southern region of the hills surrounding Rājagaha. After the Buddha’s parinibbāna Ānanda had gone to Sāvatthī to inform the multitude; then he left for Rājagaha and along the way was walking on tour in Dakkhiṇāgiri.
294 This is said with reference to Pācittiya 32. See Vin IV 71-75.
295 See Vin II 196, which relates the original background story to the rule, namely, Devadatta’s attempt to create a schism in the Saṅgha (also at Vin IV 71). Spk alludes to this in its gloss of the expression mā pāpicchā pakkhaṃ nissāya saṅghaṃ bhindeyyuṃ: “It was laid down for this reason: ‘As Devadatta along with his retinue ate after informing families and, by relying on those of evil wishes, divided the Saṅgha, so let it not come to pass that others of evil wishes—by collecting a group, eating among families after informing them, and enlarging their group—divide the Saṅgha in reliance on their faction.’”
Spk seems to interpret dummaṅkūnaṃ puggalānaṃ niggahāya and pesalānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ phāsuvihārāya as complementary sides of a single reason, a view explicitly endorsed by Spk-pṭ: dummaṅkūnaṃ niggaho eva pesalānaṃ phāsuvihāro ti idaṃ ekaṃ aṅgaṃ. Thus on this interpretation “mā pāpicchā …” would become a second, independent reason. But I follow Horner (at BD 5:275) and C.Rh.D (at KS 2:147), both of whom take the restraint of ill-behaved persons and the comforting of well-behaved bhikkhus as two distinct reasons, to which “mā pāpicchā …” is subordinate. This seems to be corroborated by the list of ten reasons for the laying down of the training rules (at Vin III 21, etc.), where these two factors are counted as separate reasons. As to the third reason, “out of sympathy for families” (kulānuddayatāya), Spk says: “When the Bhikkhu Saṅgha is living in harmony and performing the Uposatha and Pavāraṇā, people who give ticket-meals, etc., become destined for heaven.” A more plausible explanation is that families are spared the burden of having to support too many bhikkhus at one time. In the Mvu version (at III 48) only two reasons are mentioned, “the protection, safeguarding, and comfort of families” and “the breaking up of cliques of wicked men.”
296 Kumārakavādā na muccāma. Commentarial tradition holds that Ānanda was born on the same day as the Bodhisatta (see Sv II 425, Ap-a 58, 358, Ja I 63 (Be, but not in the Se or Ee versions)). If this were true, however, he would now be over eighty years of age and thus would hardly have to point to a few grey hairs to prove he is no longer a youngster. Other facts recorded in the canon suggest that Ānanda must have been considerably younger than the Buddha, perhaps by as much as thirty years. On the different opinions about his age held by the early Buddhist schools, see C. Witanachchi’s article “Ānanda,” in the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Vol. I, fasc. 4, p. 529.
Spk paraphrases in a way that supports the traditional view: “Since you wander around with newly ordained bhikkhus devoid of sense restraint, you wander around with youngsters and thus you yourself deserve to be called a youngster.”
297 The name means “Fat Nandā.” She is frequently mentioned in the Bhikkhunī Vibhaṅga as a troublemaker in the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha; see e.g. Vin IV 216, 218, 223-24, etc. KS 2:148 mistakenly calls this nun “Fat Tissā,” confusing her with the petulant nun of the preceding sutta.
298 Aññatitthiyapubbo samāno. Spk: Since the elder was not known to have any teacher or preceptor in this Dispensation, and he had put on the saffron robes himself when he renounced the world, out of indignation she depicts him as having been formerly a member of another sect. On Ānanda as the “Videhan sage” see above n. 288.
299 Paṭapilotikānaṃ. See n. 60 above.
300 Spk relates here the entire biographical background of Mahākassapa, including several past lives, culminating in his meeting with the Buddha. For a paraphrase, see Hecker, “Mahākassapa: Father of the Saṅgha,” in Nyanaponika and Hecker, Great Disciples of the Buddha, pp. 109-19.
301 I translate Kassapa’s thought just above following Spk, which paraphrases each sentence as a conditional: “‘If I should see the Teacher, it is just the Blessed One that I would see; there cannot be any other Teacher than him. If I should see the Fortunate One—called sugatabecause he has gone well by the right practice—it is just this Blessed One that I would see; there cannot be any other Fortunate One than him. If I should see the Perfectly Enlightened One—so called because he awakened fully to the truths by himself—it is just the Blessed One that I would see; there cannot be any other Perfectly Enlightened One than him.’ By this he shows, ‘Merely by seeing him, I had no doubt that this is the Teacher, this is the Fortunate One, this is the Perfectly Enlightened One.’”
The repetition of Kassapa’s declaration of discipleship is in Be and Se though not in Ee. Spk confirms the repetition, explaining that although the utterance is recorded twice we should understand that it was actually spoken three times.
302 Spk: If a disciple so single-minded (evaṃ sabbacetasā samannāgato)—so confident in mind (pasannacitto)—should perform such an act of supreme humility towards an outside teacher who, without knowing, claims to know (i.e., to be enlightened), that teacher’s head would fall off from the neck like a palm fruit broken at the stalk; the meaning is, it would split into seven pieces. But when such an act of humility is done at the Master’s golden feet, it cannot stir even a hair on his body. The following “Therefore” implies: “Since knowing, I say ‘I know,’ therefore you should train thus.”
303 Here Spk explains sabbacetasā differently than above: “attending with a completely attentive mind (sabbena samannāhāracittena), without allowing the mind to stray even a little.”
304 Sātasahagatā ca me kāyagatā sati. Spk: This is mindfulness of the body associated with pleasure by way of the first jhāna in the foulness meditation and mindfulness of breathing. This threefold exhortation was itself the elder’s going forth and higher ordination.
305 Spk (Se): Sāṇo ti sakileso sa-iṇo hutvā. Be (text and Spk) reads saraṇo instead of sāṇo, which is less satisfactory. The line is also at MN III 127, 7-8, with sāṇo.
Spk: There are four modes of using the requisites: (i) by theft (theyyaparibhoga), the use made by a morally depraved monk; (ii) as a debtor (iṇaparibhoga), the unreflective use made by a virtuous monk; (iii) as an heir (dāyajjaparibhoga), the use made by the seven trainees; (iv) as an owner (sāmiparibhoga), the use made by an arahant. Thus only an arahant uses the requisites as an owner, without debt. The elder speaks of his use of the requisites when he was still a worldling as use by a debtor.
306 Spk: This took place on the day of their first meeting. The attainment of arahantship was mentioned beforehand because of the sequence of the teaching, but it actually took place afterwards. The Buddha descended from the road with the intention of making Kassapa a forest dweller, a rag-robe wearer, and a one-meal eater from his very birth (as a monk).
307 Spk: The Blessed One wanted to exchange robes with Kassapa because he wished to appoint the elder to his own position (theraṃ attano ṭhāne ṭhapetukāmatāya). When he asked whether the elder could wear his rag-robes he was not referring to his bodily strength but to the fulfilment of the practice (paṭipattipūraṇa). The Buddha had made this robe from a shroud that had covered a slave woman named Puṇṇā, which had been cast away in a cremation ground. When he picked it up, brushed away the creatures crawling over it, and established himself in the great lineage of the nobles ones, the earth quaked and sounded a roar and the devas applauded. In offering the robe, the Buddha implied: “This robe should be worn by a bhikkhu who is from birth an observer of the ascetic practices. Will you be able to make proper use of it?” And Kassapa’s assent signifies, “I will fulfil this practice.” At the moment they exchanged robes the great earth resounded and shook to its ocean boundaries.
308 Cp. the Buddha’s praise of Sāriputta at MN III 29,8-13. Spk: By this statement the elder has absolved his going forth from the charge of Thullanandā. This is the purport: “Does one without teacher or preceptor, who takes the saffron robe himself, and who leaves another sect, receive the honour of having the Buddha go out to welcome him, or take ordination by a triple exhortation, or get to exchange robes with the Buddha in person? See how offensive the bhikkhunī Thullanandā’s utterance was!”
309 As at 16:10.
310 Spk glosses “Tathāgata” here as satta, a being, on which Spk-pṭ comments: “As in past aeons, in past births, one has come into being by way of kamma and defilements, so one has also come now (tathā etarahi pi āgato); hence it is said ‘tathāgata.’ Or else, according to the kamma one has done and accumulated, just so has one come, arrived, been reborn in this or that form of individual existence (tathā taṃ taṃ attabhāvaṃ āgato upagato upapanno).”
This explanation seems implausible, especially when other texts clearly show that the philosophical problem over the Tathāgata’s post-mortem state concerns “the Tathāgata, the highest type of person, the supreme person, the one who has attained the supreme attainment (tathāgato uttamapuriso paramapuriso paramapattipatto)” (22:86 (III 116,13-14) = 44:2 (IV 380,14-15)).
311 The same question, but with a different reply, is at MN I 444,36-445,25. Possibly Mahākassapa’s concern with the preservation of the true Dhamma, demonstrated in this sutta, presages his role as the convener of the First Buddhist Council soon after the Buddha’s parinibbāna (described at Vin II 284-85). There we see, in the ebullient reaction of the old bhikkhu Subhadda to the report of the Buddha’s death, the first stirring towards the emergence of a “counterfeit” Dhamma. Mahākassapa convenes the First Council precisely to ensure that the true Dhamma and Discipline will endure long and will not be driven out by counterfeit versions devised by unscrupulous monks.
312 Spk: There are two counterfeits of the true Dhamma (saddhammapaṭirūpaka ): one with respect to attainment (adhigama ), the other with respect to learning (pariyatti). The former is the ten corruptions of insight knowledge (see Vism 633-38; Ppn 20:105-28). The latter consists of texts other than the authentic Word of the Buddha authorized at the three Buddhist councils, exception made of these five topics of discussion (kathāvatthu): discussion of elements, discussion of objects, discussion of foulness, discussion of the bases of knowledge, the casket of true knowledge. [The counterfeit texts include] the Secret Vinaya (guḷhavinaya), the Secret Vessantara, the Secret Mahosadha, the Vaṇṇa Piṭaka, the Aṅgulimāla Piṭaka, the Raṭṭhapāla-gajjita, the Āḷavaka-gajjita, and the Vedalla Piṭaka.
Spk-pṭ: The “Vedalla Piṭaka” is the Vetulla Piṭaka, which they say had been brought from the abode of the nāgas; others say it consists of what was spoken in debates (vādabhāsita). “Other than the authentic Word of the Buddha” (abuddhavacana), because of contradicting the Word of the Buddha; for the Enlightened One does not speak anything internally inconsistent (pubbāparaviruddha). They apply a dart to it; the removal of defilements is not seen there, so it is inevitably a condition for the arising of defilements.
An attempt to identify the texts cited by Spk is made in the fourteenth century work, Nikāyasaṅgraha, discussed by Adikaram, Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon, pp. 99-100. The Nikāyasaṅgraha assigns each text to a different non-Theravādin school. The late date of this work casts doubt on its reliability, and its method of identification is just too neat to be convincing. Spk-pṭ’s comment on the Vedalla Piṭaka suggests it may be a collection of Mahāyāna sūtras. The Mahāyāna is referred to in the Sri Lankan chronicles as the Vetullavāda (Skt Vaitulyavāda); see Rahula, History of Buddhism in Ceylon, pp. 87-90. Spk-pṭ is apparently alluding to the belief that Nāgārjuna had brought the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras from the nāga realm. The five types of “topics of discussion” (kathāvatthu), accepted by the Theravādins though not authorized as canonical, were probably philosophical treatises recording the opinions of famous teachers on important points of doctrine. Spk describes at length the gradual disappearance of the Buddha’s Dispensation as a threefold disappearance of achievement, practice, and learning (adhigama-, paṭipatti-, pariyatti-saddhamma).
313 Spk glosses: ādikenā ti ādānena gahaṇena; opilavatī ti nimujjati . Spk-pṭ: ādānaṃ ādi, ādi eva ādikaṃ. Spk explains the simile thus: “Unlike a ship crossing the water, which sinks when receiving goods, there is no disappearance of the true Dhamma by being filled up with learning, etc. For when learning declines the practice declines, and when the practice declines achievement declines. But when learning becomes full, persons rich in learning fill up the practice, and those filling up the practice fill up achievement. Thus when learning, etc., are increasing, my Dispensation increases, just like the new moon.”
C.Rh.D, following this explanation, renders the line: “Take the sinking of a ship, Kassapa, by overloading” (KS 2:152). I find dubious, however, Spk’s understanding of ādikena as meaning “taking, grasping.” Elsewhere ādikena has the sense of “all at once, suddenly,” contrasted with anupubbena, “gradually” (see MN I 395,4, 479,35; II 213,4; Ja VI 567,6, 14). This is clearly the meaning required here.
314 Pañca okkamaniyā dhammā. Spk glosses: okkamaniyā ti heṭṭhāgamanīya, “leading downwards.” A parallel passage at AN III 247 repeats the first four causes but replaces the fifth by “lack of mutual respect and deference.”
315 Spk: One dwells without reverence for concentration when one does not attain the eight attainments (aṭṭha samāpattiyo) or make any effort to attain them.
17. Lābhasakkārasaṃyutta
316 Spk: Gain (lābha) is the gain of the four requisites; honour (sakkāra), the gain of (requisites) that are well made and well produced; praise (siloka), acclamation (vaṇṇaghosa).
317 Pāli indiscriminately uses two words, kumma and kacchapa, for both turtle and tortoise. Here kumma refers to the lake-dwelling variety, but at 35:240 kumma kacchapa jointly denote what seems to be a land-dwelling creature, while at 56:47 kacchapa alone refers to the sea-dwelling variety. Spk glosses mahākummakula with mahantaṃ aṭṭhikacchapakula, which further confirms the interchangeability of the two words. I have rendered both terms “turtle” when they denote a predominantly aquatic creature (here and at 56:47), “tortoise” when they refer to a land-dwelling creature.
318 Papatā. Spk explains this as an iron spear shaped like a hooked dart, kept in an iron case. When it is dropped on its target with a certain force, the spear comes out from the case and the rope follows along, still attached to it.
319 Although all three eds. read giddho papatāya, it seems we should read viddho papatāya, proposed by a note in Be.
320 In all three eds. the text as it stands is unintelligible and is likely to be corrupt. Spk does not offer enough help to reconstruct an original reading, while Be appends a long note with a circuitous explanation intended to resolve the difficulties. I would prefer to amend the final verb in Be and Se (and SS) from anupāpuṇātu to anupāpuṇāti so that we read: Kaṃ bhikkhave asanivicakkaṃ āgacchatu? Sekhaṃ appattamānasaṃ lābhasakkārasiloko anupāpuṇāti. Ee does have anupāpuṇāti, and it is possible anupāpuṇātu entered the other eds. under the influence of the preceding āgacchatu and the corresponding sentences in 17:23, 24.
Spk paraphrases the question: “Which person should a bright thunderbolt strike, hitting him on the head and crushing him?” and comments on the reply: “The Blessed One does not speak thus because he desires suffering for beings, but in order to show the danger. For a lightning bolt, striking one on the head, destroys only a single individual existence, but one with a mind obsessed by gain, honour, and praise experiences endless suffering in hell, etc.” While he has not yet reached his mind’s ideal (appattamānasa ): while he has not achieved arahantship.
321 Be and Se read: Kaṃ bhikkhave diddhagatena visallena sallena vijjhatu? The reading in Ee is less satisfactory. Spk: Diddhagatenā ti gatadiddhena [Spk-pṭ: acchavisayuttā ti vā diddhe gatena]; visallenā ti visamakkhitena; sallenā ti sattiyā.
The rhetorical construction parallels that in the preceding sutta. Visallena is problematic, and we might accept C.Rh.D’s suggestion visa-sallena, though diddha (= Skt digdha) already conveys the idea of poisoned. See Ja IV 435,26: Saro diddho kalāpaṃ va/Alittaṃ upalimpati.
322 Ukkaṇṭaka (so Be and Se; Ee: ukkaṇṇaka). Spk: This is the name of a disease, said to arise in the cold season. The hairs fall off from the entire body, and the entire body, fully exposed, breaks open all over. Struck by the wind, the wounds ooze. Just as a man, bitten by a rabid dog, runs around in circles, so does the jackal when it has contracted this disease, and there is no place where it finds safety.
323 Verambhavātā. Spk: A strong type of wind, discerned at a height from which the four continents appear the size of lotus leaves.
324 This verse and the next are at Th 1011-12 and It 74,22-75,3. Here I read with Be and Se appamāṇavihārino, as against Ee appamādavihārino. The latter, however, is found in all three eds. of Th 1011d; readings of It 74,25 are divided. Spk supports appamāṇa- with its gloss: appamāṇena phalasamādhinā viharantassa; “as he is dwelling in the measureless fruition concentration.” Th-a does not comment on the pāda at Th 1011, and the comment in It-a reads appamāda- in Be and appamāṇa- in Se.
325 We should read pāda b with Se sukhumadiṭṭhivipassakaṃ as against sukhumaṃ diṭṭhivipassakaṃ in Be and Ee. The former is also the reading at Th 1012b and It 75,1. Spk: It is a subtle view because (it is reached) through the view of the path of arahantship, and he is an insight-seer (vipassaka) because he has arrived there after having set up insight for the sake of fruition attainment. Delighting in the destruction of clinging: Delighted with Nibbāna, called the destruction of clinging.
326 The suvaṇṇanikkha and the siṅginikkha seem to be two different types of golden coin, the latter presumably of greater value than the former, or made from a superior species of gold. Spk glosses suvaṇṇanikkhassa as ekassa kañcananikkhassa , and siṅginikkhassa as siṅgisuvaṇṇanikkhassa.
327 Janapadakalyāṇī. See below 17:22 and 47:20, and the famous simile at MN II 33,6-22.
328 Cp. AN I 88,13-89,3. This sutta and the next seem to be quoting from AN II 164,4-22, where the Buddha names the “standards and criteria” for the four classes of his followers. Citta the householder was the foremost male lay disciple among the speakers on the Dhamma; see the Cittasaṃyutta (41:1-10). Hatthaka Āḷavaka was the foremost of those who propitiate an assembly with the four means of beneficence; see AN I 26,5-9 and AN IV 217-20, and I, n. 604.
329 Khujjuttarā was the foremost female lay disciple among those who have learned much, Veḷukaṇḍakiyā (or Uttarā) Nandamātā the foremost of the meditators; see AN I 26,19, 21. Khemā and Uppalavaṇṇā, mentioned just below, were the foremost bhikkhunīs in regard to wisdom and spiritual power, respectively. Uppalavaṇṇā has appeared at 5:5, and Khemā gives a discourse at 44:1.
330 See above n. 249.
331 Spk: Its origin (samudaya): an individual form of existence together with past kamma, status as a son of good family, beauty of complexion, eloquence as a speaker, the display of ascetic virtues, the wearing of the robe, possession of a retinue, etc., are called the origin of gain and honour. They do not understand this by way of the truth of the origin, and so cessation and the path should be understood by way of the truths of cessation and the path.
332 Spk: The pleasant dwellings in this very life (diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārā) are the pleasant dwellings in fruition attainment. For when a meritorious arahant receives conjee, sweets, etc., he must give thanks to those who come, teach them the Dhamma, answer questions, etc., and thus he does not get a chance to sit down and enter fruition attainment.
Spk’s identification of the “pleasant dwellings” with fruition attainment is certainly too narrow. The term usually means the jhānas, as at II 278,10-11.
333 The three wholesome roots are nongreed, nonhatred, and nondelusion. Spk explains this to mean that the wholesome roots have been cut off to such an extent that Devadatta is incapable of taking rebirth in heaven or of achieving the path and fruit; it does not mean that his wholesome roots have been permanently eradicated. The next two suttas state the same meaning using different terms.
334 This sutta and the following one also occur at Vin II 187-88 in inverted order, without the homily on gains, honour, and fame, and with the verse at the end. See too AN II 73. The verse = I, v. 597, also spoken with reference to Devadatta. On the simile of the mule just below, Spk says that they mate her with a horse. If she becomes pregnant, when her time for delivery arrives she is unable to give birth. She stands striking the ground with her feet. Then they tie her feet to four stakes, split open her belly, and remove the foal. She dies right there.
335 Pittaṃ bhindeyyuṃ. PED, s.v. pittaṃ, says the passage is unclear and refers to an alternative interpretation proposed by Morris, JPTS 1893, 4. My rendering accords with Spk’s comment: “They throw (pakhippeyyuṃ) bear bile or fish bile over its nostrils.” Spk-pṭ glosses pakhippeyyuṃ here with osiñceyyuṃ, “they sprinkle.” Horner renders “as if they were to throw a bladder at a fierce dog’s nose” (BD 5:263).
336Spk: When bandits grab hold of his mother in the wilderness and say they will release her only if he tells a deliberate lie, even then he won’t tell a deliberate lie. The same method in the other cases.
18. Rāhulasaṃyutta
337 Rāhula was the Buddha’s son. He became a novice (sāmaṇera) at the age of seven, during the Buddha’s first visit to his native city of Kapilavatthu after his enlightenment. Other discourses spoken to him are: MN Nos. 61, 62, and 147 (the latter = 35:121) and Sn II, 11 (pp. 58-59).
338 Spk explains the three “grips” (gāha) of “mine, I, and my self” exactly as in n. 155. It takes dispassion (virāga) to denote the four paths, liberation (vimutti) the four fruits. Spk does not comment on nibbindati, “experiences revulsion,” but the commentaries consistently identify the corresponding noun nibbidā with strong insight knowledge (see above n. 69).
339 To the four primary elements of the form aggregate (cattāro mahābhūtā) the suttas sometimes add the space element (ākāsadhātu)—which (according to the commentaries) represents derived form (upādāya rūpa)—and the consciousness element (viññāṇadhātu), which represents the entire mental side of existence. For a detailed analysis of all six elements, see MN III 240,17-243,10.
340 Spk: In regard to this body with consciousness (imasmiṃ saviññāṇake kāye): he shows his own conscious body. And in regard to all external signs (bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu): the conscious body of others and insentient objects. Or alternatively: by the former expression he shows his own sentient organism and that of others (reading with Se attano ca parassa ca saviññāṇakam eva); by the latter, external form not bound up with sense faculties (bahiddhā anindriyabaddharūpaṃ ). (The compound) ahaṅkāramamaṅkāramānānusayā is to be resolved thus: I-making (ahaṅkāra), mine-making (mamaṅkāra), and the underlying tendency to conceit (mānānusayā). (So the text in Be and Se, but if, as seems likely, the plural termination derives from the asamāhāra compound, after resolution the last member should be mānānusayo.) “I-making” is regarded as the function of wrong view (the view of self), “mine-making” of craving. The root conceit is the conceit “I am” (asmimāna), so conceit is also responsible for “I-making.”
341 This elevenfold classification of each of the five aggregates is analysed in detail at Vibh 1-12.
342 Spk: Has transcended discrimination (vidhā samatikkantaṃ): has fully gone beyond the different kinds of conceit; is peaceful (santaṃ): by the appeasement of defilements; and well liberated (suvimuttaṃ): fully liberated from defilements.
19. Lakkhaṇasaṃyutta
343 The series of suttas included in this saṃyutta also occurs at Vin III 104-8. Spk: The Venerable Lakkhaṇa, a great disciple, had been one of the thousand jaṭila ascetics who received higher ordination by the “Come, bhikkhu” utterance (see Vin I 32-34). He attained arahantship at the end of the Discourse on Burning (35:28). Since he possessed a Brahmā-like body that was endowed with auspicious marks (lakkhaṇasampanna), perfect in all respects, he was called “Lakkhaṇa.”
344 Spk: The reason for Moggallāna’s smile, as is mentioned in the text below, is that he saw a being reborn in the world of ghosts whose body was a skeleton. Having seen such a form of individual existence, he should have felt compassion, so why did he display a smile? Because he recollected his own success in gaining release from the prospect of such forms of rebirth and the success of the Buddha-knowledge; for the Buddhas teach such things through their own direct cognition (paccakkhaṃ katvā) and have thoroughly penetrated the element of phenomena (suppaṭividdhā buddhānaṃ dhammadhātu).
345 I follow Be: vitudenti vitacchenti virājenti. Se reads vitudanti only, while Ee has vitacchenti vibhajenti. Spk comments only on vitudenti: “They ran and moved here and there, piercing him again and again with their metal beaks as sharp as sword blades.” According to Spk, the vultures, etc., were actually yakkhas (yakkhagijjhā, yakkhakākā, yakkhakulalā); for such a form does not come into the visual range of natural vultures, etc.
346 Evarūpo pi nāma satto bhavissati evarūpo pi nāma yakkho bhavissati evarūpo pi nāma attabhāvapaṭilābho bhavissati. Spk: In saying this Moggallāna shows his sense of urgency in the Dhamma, arisen out of compassion for such beings.
The expression attabhāvapaṭilābho, which literally means “acquisition of selfhood,” is used idiomatically to denote a concrete form of individual identity. Attabhāva sometimes occurs in a more restricted sense with reference to the physical body, for instance at Ud 54,17-19.
347 Spk: As a residual result of that same kamma (tass’ eva kammassa vipākāvasesena): of that “kamma (to be experienced) in subsequent lives” (aparāpariyakamma) accumulated by different volitions. For the rebirth in hell is produced by a certain volition, and when its result is exhausted rebirth is produced among the ghosts, etc., having as its object the residue of that kamma or the sign of the kamma (see CMA 5:35-38). Therefore, because that rebirth comes about through correspondence of kamma or correspondence of object (kammasabhāgatāya ārammaṇasabhāgatāya vā), it is called “a residual result of that same kamma.” It is said that at the time he passed away from hell, a heap of flesh-less cows’ bones became the sign (i.e., the object of the last conscious process, which then becomes the object of the rebirth-consciousness). Thus he became a ghost (in the form of) a skeleton, as if making manifest to the wise the hidden kamma.
348 Spk: He had earned his living for many years as a cattle butcher who seasoned pieces of beef, dried them, and sold the dried meat. When he passed away from hell, a piece of meat became the sign and he became a ghost (in the form of) a piece of meat.
349 Spk: He was an executioner who inflicted many punishments on state criminals and then finally shot them with arrows. After arising in hell, when he was subsequently reborn through the residual result of that kamma the state of being pierced by an arrow became the sign and therefore he became a ghost with body-hairs of arrows.
350 In Be and Se, this sutta is entitled Sūciloma and the following sutta Dutiya-sūciloma, while in Ee the former is entitled Sūci-sārathi and the latter Sūcako. In Be and Se, the miserable spirit in the former sutta is said to have been a sūta, glossed by Spk as assadamaka, a horse trainer, while in Ee he is said to have been a sūcaka. In all three eds., the spirit in the following sutta is said to have been a sūcaka, glossed by Spk as pesuññakāraka, a slanderer. I follow Be and Se both with respect to the titles of the two suttas and the former identities of the tormented spirits.
351 Spk: He was a slanderer who divided people from each other and brought them to ruin and misery by his insinuations. Therefore, as people were divided by him through his insinuations (tena sūcetvā manussā bhinnā), to experience the pain of being pierced by needles (sūcīhi bhedanadukkhaṃ paccanubhotuṃ), he took that kamma itself as the sign and became a needle-haired ghost (sūcilomapeta). (The aptness of the retribution is established by the similarity between the Pāli word sūci, needle, and the verb sūceti, to insinuate, to indicate.)
352 Gāmakūṭa, lit. “village cheat.” Spk: He secretly accepted bribes and, committing an evident wrong by his skewed judgements, misallocated the belongings of others. Hence his private parts were exposed. Since he caused an unbearable burden for others by imposing harsh penalties, his private parts became an unbearable burden for him. And since he was unrighteous (visama) when he should have been righteous, his private parts became uneven (visama) and he had to sit on them.
Interestingly, Ee (apparently based on SS) here reads dhaṅkā for crows in place of kākā in the other eds. See I, v. 808d and I, n. 566.
353 Spk: Having experienced contact with another man’s wife, having enjoyed vile pleasure, sensual pleasure, he has been reborn in circumstances where, as a counterpart of that kamma, he experiences contact with filth and undergoes pain.
354 I read the first word of this sentence with Se and SS as ato, as against the exclamation aho in Be and Ee.
355 Spk: She cheated on her husband and enjoyed contact with other men. Thus she fell away from pleasant contact and, as a counterpart of that kamma, was reborn as a flayed woman to experience painful contact.
356 Maṅgulitthi. Spk glosses: maṅgulin ti virūpaṃ duddasikaṃ bībhacchaṃ. She deceived people, accepting scents and flowers, telling them they could become rich by performing certain rites. She caused the multitude to accept a bad view, a wrong view. Thus she herself became foul-smelling because of taking scents and flowers, and ugly because of making them accept a bad view.
357 Spk explains uppakkaṃ okiliniṃ okirinaṃ thus: She was lying on a bed of coals, trembling and turning around as she was cooked, therefore she was roasting (uppakkā), i.e., with body cooked by the hot fire. She was sweltering (okilinī ), with a sweating body; and sooty (okirinī), completely covered with soot.
358Spk: While using the four requisites provided by the people out of faith, being unrestrained in bodily and verbal conduct and corrupt in his means of livelihood, he went about playfully to his heart’s content. The same method of explanation applies in the following cases too.
20. Opammasaṃyutta
359 The simile of the peaked house, common in the Nikāyas, recurs in SN at 22:102 (III 156,3-5), 45:141, 46:7, 48:52. Spk glosses “diligent” as “constantly yoked with mindfulness” (appamattā ti satiyā avippavāse ṭhitā hutvā).
360 This theme is treated in greater detail at 56:102-31. Spk says that the devas are included here along with humans, so that the statement should be understood to mean that few are reborn among humans and devas.
361 The simile is also at Vin II 256,16-18 and AN IV 278,22-25, but with a different application. Corehi kumbhatthenakehi is lit. “pot-thief bandits.” Spk explains: Having entered the houses of others, having surveyed the scene by the light of a lamp, desiring to steal the belongings of others, they make a lamp in a jar (ghaṭe) and enter. Even mud-sprites (paṃsupisācakā) assail those devoid of development of lovingkindness, how much more then powerful nonhumans? Amanussa, lit. “nonhuman,” usually denotes a malevolent spirit or demon.
362 Be and Se: okkhāsataṃ; Ee: ukkhāsataṃ. Spk: = mahāmukhaukkhalīnaṃ sataṃ. Spk-pṭ: = mahāmukhānaṃ mahantakoḷumbānaṃ sataṃ. The reference is to large pots used to boil a great quantity of rice. AN IV 394-96 makes the same point somewhat differently, and adds that developing the perception of impermanence even for a fingersnap is still more fruitful than developing a mind of lovingkindness.
363 Spk: Gadduhanamattan ti goduhanamattaṃ (lit. “the extent of a cow’s milking”), that is, the extent of time needed to take one pull on a cow’s teat. Or else (gadduhanamattaṃ =) gandhaūhanamattaṃ (lit. “the extent of a scent-sniff”), that is, the extent of time needed to take a single sniff of a piece of incense picked up with two fingers. If, for even such a short time, one is able to develop a mind of lovingkindness, pervading all beings in immeasurable world systems with a wish for their welfare, this is more fruitful even than that alms given three times in a single day.
364 Spk explains the three verbs thus: paṭileṇeti, having struck the top, bending it like a cotton wick, one makes it fuse together as if it were a strand of resin; paṭikoṭṭeti, having struck it in the middle and bent it back, or having struck it along the blade, one makes the two blades fuse together; paṭivaṭṭeti, turning it around as if making a cotton wick (?), one twirls it around for a long time, unravels it, and again twirls it around.
365This sutta also appears in the introduction to Ja No. 476, which turns upon the same theme. In this story the Bodhisatta, in his incarnation as the swift goose Javanahaṃsa, performs the remarkable feat to be described just below.
Spk explains the stock description of the archers thus: Firm-bowed archers (daḷhadhammā dhanuggahā): archers with firm bows (daḷhadhanuno issāsā). A “firm bow” is called the strength of two thousand. “The strength of two thousand” means that a weight of metal, such as bronze or lead, etc. (used for the arrowhead), bound to the string when the bow is lifted (for the shot), is released from the earth when the bow is grasped by its handle and drawn back the full length of the arrow. Trained (Se and Ee: sikkhitā; Be: susikkhitā, “well trained”): they have studied the craft in their teacher’s circle for ten or twelve years. Dexterous (katahatthā): one who has simply studied a craft is not yet dexterous, but these are dexterous, having achieved mastery over it. Experienced (katūpāsanā): they have displayed their craft in the king’s court, etc.
366 Āyusaṅkhārā. Spk: This is said with reference to the physical life faculty (rūpajīvitindriya); for this perishes even faster than that. But it is not possible to describe the breakup of formless phenomena (i.e., of mental states, because according to the Abhidhamma they break up sixteen times faster than material phenomena).
367 Spk: The Dasārahas were a khattiya clan, so called because they took a tenth portion from a hundred (satato dasabhāgaṃ gaṇhiṃsu—reference not clear). The Summoner (ānaka) was the name of a drum, made from the claw of a giant crab. It gave off a sound that could be heard for twelve yojanas all around and was therefore used to summon the people to assembly on festival days.
368 Spk: Deep (gambhīra) by way of the text (pāḷivasena), like the Salla Sutta (Sn III, 8; Se: Sallekha Sutta = MN No. 8); deep in meaning (gambhīrattha), like the Mahāvedalla Sutta (MN No. 43); supramundane (lokuttara), i.e., pointing to the supramundane goal; dealing with emptiness (suññatāpaṭisaṃyutta ), explaining mere phenomena devoid of a being (sattasuññata-dhammamattam eva pakāsakā), like the Saṅkhittasaṃyutta (?).
This passage recurs at 55:53, in commenting on which Spk cites as examples texts that sometimes differ from those cited here. See V, n. 366.
369 Spk glosses sāvakabhāsitā as tesaṃ tesaṃ sāvakehi bhāsitā, referring back to the outsiders (bāhiraka). Spk-pṭ clarifies: “By the disciples of any of those who were not known as the Buddha’s disciples.”
370 “Block of wood” is kaliṅgara. Spk: In the first period of the Buddha’s ministry the bhikkhus would practise meditation from the time they finished their meal (before noon) through the first watch of the night. They would sleep in the middle watch, resting their heads on pieces of wood (kaṭṭhakaṇḍa, a gloss on kaliṅgara); then they would rise early and resume their walking meditation.
The mood of this sutta is similar to the “fears of the future” suttas, AN III 105-10.
371 The elephant simile is also at Vin II 120, used in relation to Devadatta.
372 Pasannākāraṃ karonti. Spk: They give the four requisites. See n. 275.
373 See the following sutta for an explanation.
374 Sandhisamalasaṅkaṭīre. Spk explains sandhi as an alley between two detached houses; samala as a channel for the discharge of waste from a house; and saṅkatīra as a rubbish bin; see too Ps III 418,16 (commenting on MN I 334,27). At MLDB p. 433 the compound was translated, “by a door-post or a dust-bin or a drain,” but it seems these last two nouns should be inverted.
375 Aññataraṃ saṅkiliṭṭhaṃ āpattiṃ āpajjati yathārūpāya āpattiyā vuṭṭhānaṃ paññāyati. An offence motivated by a defilement (in this case lust) but of a kind that can be expiated by undergoing the appropriate penalty (as opposed to an offence of the pārājikā class, which does not allow for expiation but requires permanent expulsion from the Saṅgha).
376 See 17:8 and n. 322 above. Spk identifies the “certain person” as Devadatta. I understand Sakyaputtiya to be an adjective meaning “following the Sakyan son,” not a noun meaning “Sakyan son.” The Sakyan son is the Buddha himself, who went forth from the Sakyan clan (see 55:7, V 352,18). Thus a samaṇa sakyaputtiya (see 28:10 (III 240,3-4) and 42:10 (IV 325,19-21)) is an ascetic following the Sakyan son, i.e., a Buddhist monk.
377Spk: This too is said with reference to the behaviour of Devadatta. Spk relates an anecdote about a jackal who had been rescued from a python by a farmer. When the python grabbed the farmer, the jackal, out of gratitude, went to the farmer’s brothers and led them to the scene, thereby enabling them to rescue the farmer.
21. Bhikkhusaṃyutta
378 Kolita was Mahāmoggallāna’s personal name, Moggallāna being derived from his clan name. The present sutta is nearly identical with 40:2 and must be simply a variant on the latter, formulated in terms of noble silence rather than the second jhāna. As Spk makes clear, the sutta refers back to Moggallāna’s week of striving for arahantship.
379 Spk explains that the second jhāna is called noble silence (ariya tuṇhībhāva) because within it thought and examination (vitakka-vicārā) cease, and with their cessation speech cannot occur. At 41:6 (IV 293,24-26) thought and examination are called the verbal formation (vacīsaṅkhāra), the mental factors responsible for articulation of speech. But, Spk adds, when the Buddha says “either speak on the Dhamma or observe noble silence” (e.g., at MN I 161,32-33), even attention to a meditation subject can be considered noble silence.
380 Spk: It is said that by this means, over seven days, the Teacher helped the elder to develop concentration on occasions when it was tending to decline (hānabhāgiya) and thus led him to “greatness of direct knowledge” (mahābhiññatā), i.e., to the six direct knowledges.
381 Upatissa was Sāriputta’s personal name.
382 We should read simply āvuso with Be and Se, as against Ee āvuso Sāriputta.
383 Spk: For a long time: he says this referring to the time that had passed since the Buddha taught the wanderer Dīghanakha “The Discourse on the Discernment of Feelings” at the door of the Boar’s Cave. For it was on that day that these defilements inherent in the round of existence were uprooted in the elder. See n. 97 above.
384 Spk: The dwelling is called gross on account of its object. For he dwelt in the exercise of the divine eye and divine ear element, which take gross objects, namely, the form base and the sound base.
385 I translate the peculiar Pāli idiom here a little freely to bring out the meaning. My rendering follows Spk’s paraphrase: “The elder wondered, ‘Where is the Blessed One now dwelling?’ Having extended light, he saw him with the divine eye sitting in his Fragrant Cottage in Jeta’s Grove; then he heard his voice with the divine ear element. The Teacher did the same, and thus they could see each other and hear each other’s voices.”
386 As at 12:22 (II 28,24-28).
387 See 51:10 (V 259,18-20). Spk glosses kappa here as āyukappa, meaning the full human life span of 120 years. However, there seems to be no textual basis for taking kappa in this passage as meaning anything other than a cosmic aeon, the full extent of time required for a world system to evolve and dissolve. See V, n. 249.
388 The word “nāga” here is used in the sense of arahant.
389 Jetvā Māraṃ savāhanaṃ. Spk does not comment on the “mount,” but other commentaries explain it as either the elephant Girimekha (Pj II 392,3 to Sn 442) or Māra’s army (Mp III 18,26 to AN II 15,29). At Ja I 72, Māra is shown mounting his elephant Girimekha before going to attack the future Buddha under the Bodhi Tree.
390 His name means “Bhaddiya the Dwarf.” The prose portion is at Ud 76; see too Ud 74,20-75,6. Spk notes that it was the monks of the “gang of six” (chabbhagiyā bhikkhū, the mischief-makers of the Saṅgha often mentioned in the Vinaya Piṭaka) who had been ridiculing him. Bhaddiya’s ugliness, according to Spk, was the kammic result of his behaviour in a previous life when he was a king who mocked and harassed old people. Though ugly in appearance, he had a lovely voice, which resulted from another past life when he was a cuckoo who offered a sweet mango to the Buddha Vipassī. The Buddha declared him the foremost of bhikkhus having a sweet voice (mañjussara; AN I 23,24). His verses at Th 466-72 do not include the verses here.
391 His verses are at Th 209-10. The same description is given of Sāriputta’s talk at 8:6. This entire sutta is at AN II 51.
392 We should read with Be (and Ee at AN II 51,29): nābhāsamānaṃ jānanti. The readings no bhāsamānaṃ (Ee) and na bhāsamānaṃ (Se) give a meaning opposite to the one required. The BHS parallel of the verse at Uv 29:43-44 supports Be: nābhāṣamānā jñāyante.
393 He was the son of the Buddha’s father Suddhodana and his aunt and foster mother, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī. Hence, though he was also the Buddha’s half-brother through their common father, the text refers to him as mātucchāputta, “maternal cousin.” His story is at Ud 21-24 and, more elaborately, at Dhp-a I 115-22; see BL 1:217-23.
Spk: Why did the elder behave thus? To find out what the Teacher thought about it, thinking: “If the Teacher says, ‘My half-brother is beautiful like this,’ I’ll conduct myself in this way all my life. But if he points out a fault here, I’ll give this up, wear a rag-robe, and dwell in a remote lodging.”
394 Aññātuñchena yāpentaṃ. Spk: Scraps gained by one seeking delicious, well-seasoned food at the homes of affluent and powerful people are called “scraps of known people” (ñātuncha, lit. “known scraps”). But the mixed food obtained by standing at the doors of houses is called “scraps of strangers” (lit. “unknown scraps”).
395 He was the Buddha’s pitucchāputta, son of the Buddha’s paternal aunt, Amitā (DPPN, s.v. Tissa Thera (14)).
396 Spk explains that while he was still a novice, when elders arrived at the monastery from distant regions to see the Buddha he remained seated and did not perform any services to them or show them due respect. This was all because of his khattiya pride and his pride of being the Buddha’s cousin. The other bhikkhus had surrounded him and censured him sharply for his lack of courtesy. A variant of this incident is recorded at Dhp-a I 37-39; see BL 1:166-67.
397 Aññataro bhikkhu theranāmako. Spk does not explain this peculiar name or further identify the monk.
398 Spk: The past is said to be abandoned (pahīnaṃ) by the abandoning of desire and lust for the five aggregates of the past; the future is relinquished (paṭinissaṭṭhaṃ) by the relinquishing of desire and lust for the five aggregates of the future. Cp. MN III 188-89, 195-98. The plural attabhāvapaṭilābhesu is hard to account for; perhaps it means the five aggregates taken individually, though this would be an unusual use of the expression. See n. 346.
399 The first three pādas are at Sn 211 and, with a variation, at Dhp 353. Spk: All-conqueror (sabbābhibhuṃ): one who abides having overcome all aggregates, sense bases, and elements, and the three kinds of existence. Unsullied (anupalittaṃ , or “unstuck”) among those very things by the paste (lepa) of craving and views. Liberated in the destruction of craving (taṇhakkhaye vimuttaṃ): liberated in Nibbāna, called the destruction of craving by way of the liberation that takes this as its object.
400 He was the foremost bhikkhu disciple among those who exhort bhikkhus (bhikkhu-ovādaka; AN I 25,13). His verses are at Th 547-56, and he is commended by the Buddha at 54:7. Spk: He had been a king who ruled over the city of Kukkuṭavatī. As soon as he heard about the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha from a group of travelling merchants he left his kingdom for Sāvatthī together with his thousand ministers, intending to go forth. His queen Anojā followed him, accompanied by the ministers’ wives, all with the same intention. The Buddha came out to meet both parties. He first ordained the men as bhikkhus with the “Come, bhikkhu” ordination, and then he had the women ordained as bhikkhunīs by the elder nun Uppalavaṇṇā.
401 Spk: It is said that they had been companions in five hundred past births.
Part III
The Book of the Aggregates (Khandhavagga)
Introduction
The Khandhavagga, The Book of the Aggregates, continues along the trail of philosophical exposition opened up by The Book of Causation, but this time breaking into another major area of early Buddhist discourse, the five aggregates. Like its predecessor, the Khandhavagga is named after its opening saṃyutta, which dominates the entire collection. Though the Vagga contains thirteen saṃyuttas, none of the minor ones even approaches the length of the Khandhasaṃyutta, which in the PTS edition takes up 188 of the 278 pages in this volume. But even more, within this Vagga three minor saṃyuttas—SN 23, 24, and 33—focus on the aggregates as their point of interest. These chapters seem to be offshoots from the original Khandhasaṃyutta which at some point were broken off and made into autonomous saṃyuttas. Thus the theme of the five aggregates leaves its stamp throughout this whole collection.
22. Khandhasaṃyutta
The Khandhasaṃyutta contains 159 suttas arranged into three divisions called paññāsakas, “sets of fifty.” Each paññāsaka is made up of five vaggas consisting of approximately ten suttas each, though several vaggas have slightly more than ten. The length and character of the suttas vary widely, ranging from texts several pages long with a unique flavour of their own to extremely terse suttas that merely instantiate a common template.
The topic of this saṃyutta is the five aggregates (pañcakkhandha ), the primary scheme of categories the Buddha draws upon to analyse sentient existence. Whereas the teaching on dependent origination is intended to disclose the dynamic pattern running through everyday experience that propels the round of birth and death forward from life to life, the teaching on the five aggregates concentrates on experience in its lived immediacy in the continuum from birth to death.
Examination of the five aggregates plays a critical role in the Buddha’s teaching for at least four reasons. First, because the five aggregates are the ultimate referent of the first noble truth, the noble truth of suffering (see 56:13), and since all four truths revolve around suffering, understanding the aggregates is essential for understanding the Four Noble Truths as a whole. Second, because the five aggregates are the objective domain of clinging and as such contribute to the causal origination of future suffering. Third, because the removal of clinging is necessary for the attainment of release, and clinging must be removed from the objects around which its tentacles are wrapped, namely, the five aggregates. And fourth, because the removal of clinging is achieved by wisdom, and the kind of wisdom needed is precisely clear insight into the real nature of the aggregates.
The five aggregates are at once the constituents of sentient existence and the operative factors of lived experience, for within the thought world of the Nikāyas existence is of concern only to the extent that it is implicated in experience. Thus the five aggregates simultaneously serve the Buddha as a scheme of categories for analysing human identity and for explicating the structure of experience. However, the analysis into the aggregates undertaken in the Nikāyas is not pursued with the aim of reaching an objective, scientific understanding of the human being along the lines pursued by physiology and psychology; thus comparisons of the Buddhist analysis with those advanced by modern scientific disciplines can easily lead to spurious conclusions. For the Buddha, investigation into the nature of personal existence always remains subordinate to the liberative thrust of the Dhamma, and for this reason only those aspects of human existence that contribute to the realization of this purpose receive the spotlight of his attention.
The word khandha (Skt skandha) means, among other things, a heap or mass (rāsi). The five aggregates are so called because they each unite under one label a multiplicity of phenomena that share the same defining characteristic. Thus whatever form there is, “past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near,” is incorporated into the form aggregate, and so for each of the other aggregates (22:48). Two suttas in the Khandhasaṃyutta (22:56, 57) spell out the constituents of each aggregate, doing so in much simpler terms than the later, more elaborate analyses found in the Visuddhimagga and the commentaries. The breakdown of the aggregates according to the suttas is shown in Table 5. Another sutta (22:79) explains why each aggregate is called by its assigned name, and it is revealing that these explanations are phrased in terms of functions rather than fixed essences. This treatment of the aggregates as dynamic functions rather than substantial entities already pulls the ground away from the urge to grasp upon them as containing a permanent essence that can be considered the ultimate ground of being.
The Five Aggregates according to the Suttas (based on SN 22:56 and 57)
| Aggregate | Contents | Condition | form | 4 great elements and form derived from them | nutriment | feeling | 6 classes of feeling: feeling born of contact through eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind | contact | perception | 6 classes of perception: perception of forms, sounds, odours, tastes, tactiles, and mental phenomena | contact | volitional formations | 6 classes of volition: volition regarding forms, sounds, odours, tastes, tactiles, and mental phenomena | contact | consciousness | 6 classes of consciousness: eye-consciousness, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mind-consciousness | name-and-form |
|---|
The Khandhasaṃyutta stresses in various ways that the five aggregates are dukkha, suffering, a point clearly articulated by the Buddha already in his first sermon when he states, “In brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering” (56:11). The aggregates are suffering because they tend to affliction and cannot be made to conform with our desires (22:59); because attachment to them leads to sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair (22:1); because their change induces fear, distress, and anxiety (22:7). Even more pointedly, the five aggregates are already suffering simply because they are impermanent (22:15) and thus can never fulfil our hopes for perfect happiness and security. While they give pleasure and joy, which is the gratification (assāda) in them, eventually they must change and pass away, and this instability is the danger (ādīnava) perpetually concealed within them (22:26). Though we habitually assume that we are in control of the aggregates, in truth they are perpetually devouring us, making us their hapless victims (22:79). To identify with the aggregates and seek fulfilment in them is to be like a man who employs as his servant a vicious murderer out to take his life (22:85).
The five aggregates are the objective domain of the defilements that bind living beings to the round of existence, particularly the taints (āsava) and clinging (upādāna). Whatever in the world one might cling to, it is only form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness that one clings to (22:79). For this reason the aggregates that make up our mundane experience are commonly called the five aggregates subject to clinging (pañcupādānakkhandha). Clinging, it will be recalled, is one of the links in the chain of dependent origination, the link that leads into the production of a new existence in the future. In 22:5, the five aggregates are spliced into the second half of the formula for dependent origination, thereby revealing how clinging to the five aggregates in this existence brings forth a new birth and thus the reappearance of the five aggregates in the next existence. Sutta 22:54 states that because of attachment to the five aggregates, consciousness grows and thrives from life to life; but with the destruction of lust, consciousness becomes unsupported and is then peaceful and liberated. This sutta assigns to consciousness a special place among the five aggregates, since consciousness stands supported by the other aggregates and passes away and undergoes rebirth in dependence on them. This dictum accords with the suttas on dependent origination (such as 12:12, 38, and 64) that treat consciousness as the channel or vehicle of the rebirth process.
Clinging to the five aggregates occurs in two principal modes, which we might call appropriation and identification. In clinging to the aggregates, one either grasps them with desire and lust (chandarāga) and assumes possession of them, or one identifies with them, taking them as the basis for conceit or for views about one’s real self. In a phrase often met with in the Khandhasaṃyutta, we are prone to think of the aggregates, “This is mine, this I am, this is my self” (etaṃ mama, eso ’ham asmi, eso me attā). Here, the notion “This is mine” represents the act of appropriation, a function of craving (taṇhā). The notions “This I am” and “This is my self” represent two types of identification, the former expressive of conceit (māna), the latter of views (diṭṭhi).
To break our appropriation of the aggregates, the Buddha often enjoins us to abandon desire and lust for them (22:137-45). Sometimes he tells us to abandon the aggregates themselves, for they are as completely alien to us as the twigs and foliage in Jeta’s Grove (22:33-34). But to give up clinging is difficult because clinging is reinforced by views, which rationalize our identification with the aggregates and thus equip clinging with a protective shield.
The type of view that lies at the bottom of all affirmation of selfhood is called identity view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi). All views of self are formulated with reference to the five aggregates either collectively or individually (22:47). The suttas often mention twenty types of identity view, obtained by considering one’s self to stand in any of four relations to each of the five aggregates: either as identical with it, as possessing it, as containing it, or as contained within it (22:1, 7, 47, 81, 82, etc.). The Buddha describes identity view as the leash that keeps the worldling bound to the round of rebirths, revolving in circles like a dog going around a post (22:99, 117). He also makes identity view the first of the ten fetters to be eradicated on the path to liberation. The most common way the suttas distinguish between “the uninstructed worldling” (assutavā puthujjana) and “the instructed noble disciple” (sutavā ariyasāvaka) is precisely by way of identity view: the worldling perpetually regards the aggregates as a self or a self’s accessories; the noble disciple never does so, for such a disciple has seen with wisdom the selfless nature of the aggregates (22:1, etc.).
As the formula for dependent origination demonstrates, clinging to the five aggregates is ultimately sustained by ignorance (avijjā). In relation to the aggregates, ignorance weaves a net of three delusions that nurture desire and lust. These delusions, which infiltrate cognition at a variety of levels, are the notions that the five aggregates are permanent, a true source of happiness, and a self or the accessories of a self. The antidote needed to break the spell of this delusion is wisdom (paññā) or knowledge (vijjā), which means knowing and seeing the five aggregates as they really are: as impermanent (anicca), as suffering (dukkha), and as nonself (anattā). These are known in the Buddhist tradition as the three characteristics (tilakkhaṇa), and in the Khandhasaṃyutta they are extensively applied to the five aggregates in a variety of patterns. The suttas devoted to this theme can be highly repetitive, but the repetition is designed to serve a vital purpose: to strip away the delusions of permanence, pleasure, and selfhood that envelop the five aggregates and keep us trapped in the chain of dependent origination.
Perhaps the original nucleus of the Khandhasaṃyutta consisted of the template suttas at 22:9-20, along with the auxiliary template suttas prevalent in The Final Fifty. These suttas were never intended to be read merely to gather information, but to offer concise instructions on the development of insight (vipassanābhāvanā ). Behind the repetitive utterances, occasionally irksome on first acquaintance, the attentive eye can discern subtle variations attuned to the diversity in the proclivities and intellectual capacities of the people to be guided. Some suttas seem to make the contemplation of one or another of the three characteristics alone sufficient for reaching the goal, though the exegetical texts insist that all must be contemplated to some degree. As the three characteristics are closely intertwined, the most common formula throughout the Nikāyas is the one that discloses their internal relationship. This formula, first enunciated in the Buddha’s second discourse at Bārāṇasī (22:59), uses the characteristic of impermanence to reveal the characteristic of suffering, and both conjointly to reveal the characteristic of nonself. But whatever approach is taken, all the different expositions of the three characteristics eventually converge on the eradication of clinging by showing, with regard to each aggregate, “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.” The lesson this maxim teaches is that there is no point in appropriating anything, no point in identifying with anything, because the subject of appropriation and identification, the “self,” is merely a fabrication of conceptual thought woven in the darkness of ignorance.
Different suttas within the Khandhasaṃyutta speak of the three characteristics under various synonyms, and to navigate one’s way through this chapter it is important to recognize which characteristic is being indicated. Thus the statement that the five aggregates are “impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, to vanishing, to fading away, to cessation” (22:21) is obviously using different terms to point out the characteristic of impermanence. Less obviously, the sutta on the fragile (22:32) and the two on arising, vanishing, and alteration (22:37, 38) are doing the same thing. The suttas that speak of knowing the aggregates as subject to arising and vanishing are also commending contemplation of impermanence (22:126-28). Such suttas as the one on the burden (22:22), on misery (22:31), and on being devoured (22:79), emphasize the contemplation of suffering. Among the many suttas that directly expound nonself, one that deserves special attention is the discourse on the lump of foam (22:95), with its striking similes for the empty, insubstantial nature of the aggregates.
Besides the three characteristics, the Khandhasaṃyutta makes use of other patterns as guidelines for contemplation and understanding. The “gratification triad” is often applied to the aggregates (22:26, 107, 130), sometimes expanded into a pentad by the addition of “origin and passing away” (22:108, 132). Another is the four-truth pattern: understanding each aggregate, its origin, its cessation, and the way to its cessation (22:56, 114). A sevenfold hybrid is obtained by merging the four-truth pattern with the gratification triad (22:57). In two suttas (22:122, 123) the Venerable Sāriputta recommends a scheme of eleven ways of attending to the aggregates, obtained by differentiating various aspects of the three characteristics. This method of contemplation, he says, leads all the way from the first steps on the path of meditation to the final stage of arahantship and can even be recommended to the arahant.
According to a stock formula attached to most of the suttas on the three characteristics, the insight into the five aggregates as impermanent, suffering, and nonself induces revulsion (nibbidā), dispassion (virāga), and liberation (vimutti). Revulsion is explained by the commentaries as a profound inward turning away from conditioned existence that comes with the higher stages of insight. Dispassion is the supramundane path, particularly the path of arahantship, which eliminates the last traces of craving. Dispassion culminates in liberation, the release of the mind from clinging and the taints, and liberation is in turn ascertained by the subsequent “knowledge and vision of liberation,” a reviewing knowledge that gives the assurance that the round of rebirths has been stopped and nothing further remains to be done.
The Khandhasaṃyutta shows that the elimination of clinging occurs in two distinct stages. The first is the elimination of the conceptual types of clinging expressed by wrong views, above all by identity view. This stage of release comes with the breakthrough to the Dhamma, the attainment of stream-entry. At this point the disciple sees the selfless nature of the aggregates and thus overcomes all views of self. For this reason the defining mark of the “instructed noble disciple,” the one who has made the breakthrough, is the elimination of every kind of identity view. However, disciples in training (sekha), even those at the penultimate stage of nonreturner, still retain a subtle notion of “I am” that continues to linger over the five aggregates like the scent of soap over newly washed clothes. This is spoken of as “a residual conceit ‘I am,’ a desire ‘I am,’ an underlying tendency ‘I am’” (22:89). However, as the noble disciple continues to contemplate the rise and fall of the aggregates, in time even this residual notion of “I am” disappears. It is only the arahant who has fully understood the five aggregates down to the root and thus eradicated the subtlest tendencies to self-affirmation.
Elsewhere in the Khandhasaṃyutta the distinction between the trainee and the arahant is drawn in other terms, based on the same principle but differently expressed. Sutta 22:56 explains that trainees have directly known the five aggregates by way of the four-truth pattern and are practising for their fading away and cessation; thereby they “have gained a foothold in this Dhamma and Discipline.” Arahants have also directly known the five aggregates by way of the four-truth pattern, but they have extirpated all attachment to the aggregates and are liberated by nonclinging; thus they are called consummate ones for whom “there is no round for describing them” (see too 22:57, which expands the sphere of direct knowledge into a sevenfold pattern). While direct knowledge (abhiññā) of the aggregates is ascribed to both trainees and arahants, only arahants are said to have full understanding (pariññā) of the aggregates, for full understanding implies the destruction of lust, hatred, and delusion (22:106; see too 22:23). At 22:79 the trainee is described as one who is abandoning the five aggregates and does not cling to them. The arahant, in contrast, is one who neither abandons nor clings, but “abides having abandoned.” And at 22:109-10, the stream-enterer is defined as one who understands the five aggregates by way of their origin, passing away, gratification, danger, and escape, while the arahant is one who, having understood the aggregates thus, is liberated by nonclinging. Thus these passages indicate the essential difference between the trainee and the arahant to consist in the extent to which they have developed liberating knowledge. The trainee has arrived at this knowledge and thereby eliminated the conceptually explicit types of ignorance crystallized in wrong views, but he has not yet fully utilized it to eradicate the emotively tinged types of ignorance manifest as clinging. The arahant has mastered this knowledge and fully developed it, so that in his mind all the defilements along with the subtlest shades of ignorance have been abolished. The trainee might be compared to a person walking along a mountain path who catches a distant glimpse of a splendid city but must still walk across several more mountains to reach his destination. The arahant is like one who has arrived at the city and now dwells comfortably within its bounds.
Beneath its repetitiveness and copious use of template formulas, the Khandhasaṃyutta is a rich compilation of texts, and no brief introduction can do justice to all its suggestive themes. Special mention, however, might be made of the Theravagga, the fourth vagga, on the elder monks. Here we find Ānanda’s first-hand account of his breakthrough to the Dhamma while listening to a discourse on the aggregates (22:83); Sāriputta’s refutation of the annihilationist interpretation of Nibbāna (22:85); Anurādha’s puzzlement about the Tathāgata’s status after death (22:86); the story of Vakkali, who attained final Nibbāna while dying at his own hand (22:87); the Khemaka Sutta, on the distinction between the trainee and the arahant (22:89); and the story of the refractory monk Channa whose change of heart proved abundantly fruitful (22:90).
23. Rādhasaṃyutta
This saṃyutta is virtually an appendix to the Khandhasaṃyutta as it revolves entirely around the five aggregates, but it has a distinct internal unity in that all its suttas are addressed to a single bhikkhu named Rādha. According to the commentary, the Buddha liked to speak to this monk on deep and subtle matters, and thus a large number of texts have come down through him. The saṃyutta consists of four vaggas with a total of forty-six suttas, all relating to the aggregates. Suttas 23:4-10 have exact counterparts in the Khandhasaṃyutta. The contents of the second and third vagga largely overlap, while the third and fourth vaggas are identical except for the circumstances of their delivery.
24. Diṭṭhisaṃyutta
This saṃyutta, too, is an extension of the Khandhasaṃyutta, an outgrowth of its last vagga, called Diṭṭhivagga and dealing with views. However, while the Diṭṭhivagga focuses only on a few basic views, here an attempt is made to cover a much wider range. The aim of the chapter is to show, from various angles, how all these views originate from clinging to the five aggregates.
The views fall into several distinct classes: first comes a strange philosophy, not encountered elsewhere in the Nikāyas, but apparently a species of eternalism; then come several familiar views—the view “this is mine,” etc., eternalism, and annihilationism (24:2-4). This is followed by four philosophical theories advocated by the Buddha’s contemporaries, all of which he condemned as morally pernicious (24:5-8); and next come the ten speculative views that the Buddha consistently rejected as invalid (24:9-18). Beginning with the second vagga, eighteen additional views are introduced, all concerning the nature of the self after death (24:19-36). It is unclear why these views are not included in the first vagga, as they would have fit in there without any difficulty.
The saṃyutta contains four vaggas, which centre upon the same collection of views, except that the first vagga lacks the eighteen views of self. Each mode of treatment in the four vaggas is called a “trip” (gamana), though the word appears only from the second vagga on. The suttas of the first trip define the mark of the stream-enterer as the overcoming of perplexity (kaṅkhā) regarding six things—namely, the arising of views from clinging to the five aggregates and the four types of sense objects (the four counted as one), which are impermanent, suffering, and subject to change—and the overcoming of perplexity about the Four Noble Truths. The second shows that since the five aggregates are impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, views arise by clinging and adhering to suffering. The third includes the refrain that the views arise by clinging to the five aggregates, which are suffering because they are impermanent. The fourth applies the catechism, “Is form permanent or impermanent?” to the five aggregates to expose their nature as nonself, showing how liberation arises through realizing the selflessness of the aggregates.
25. Okkantisaṃyutta
26. Uppādasaṃyutta
27. Kilesasaṃyutta
26. Uppādasaṃyutta
27. Kilesasaṃyutta
These three saṃyuttas can be treated together, as they are each built upon a common foundation, differing only in the way they use this material to articulate their distinctive themes. The foundation on which they are built is a tenfold scheme for classifying the factors of experience already encountered in the Rāhulasaṃyutta (18): the six internal sense bases; the six external sense bases; the six classes each of consciousness, contact, feeling, perception, volition, and craving; the six elements; and the five aggregates. Thus each saṃyutta contains ten suttas, one devoted to each group of items.
In relation to these ten groups, the Okkantisaṃyutta makes a distinction between two types of individuals who enter upon “the fixed course of rightness” (sammattaniyāma), i.e., the transcendental Noble Eightfold Path, the path of stream-entry. The difference between them is determined by their dominant faculty. The one who emphasizes faith resolves (adhimuccati) on the impermanence of the factors in the ten groups; this type of person is called a faith-follower (saddhānusārī). The one who emphasizes wisdom gains understanding of the impermanence of the factors in the ten groups; this type of person is called a Dhamma-follower (dhammānusārī). Of both it is said that they cannot pass away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry. Regardless of this distinction in means of entering the path, when they know and see the truth of the teaching for themselves, they become stream-enterers. This saṃyutta does not distinguish between their character as stream-enterers, but elsewhere (MN I 478) it is indicated that the stream-enterer who gives prominence to faith is called “liberated by faith” (saddhāvimutta) while one who gives prominence to wisdom is called “attained by view” (diṭṭhippatta). A third class, without counterpart among path-attainers, consists of one who gains the formless meditations; this type is known as a “body-witness” (kāyasakkhī).
28. Sāriputtasaṃyutta
The Venerable Sāriputta was the Buddha’s foremost disciple with respect to wisdom, but here he is depicted as an adept in meditation as well. The first nine suttas of the saṃyutta are composed from a stereotyped formula in which Sāriputta explains how he enters and emerges from the nine meditative attainments without giving rise to ego-affirming thoughts. Each time his reply is applauded by Ānanda. In the tenth sutta Sāriputta replies to some provocative questions from a female wanderer and his answers win her approval.
29. Nāgasaṃyutta
30. Supaṇṇasaṃyutta
31. Gandhabbasaṃyutta
32. Valāhakasaṃyutta
30. Supaṇṇasaṃyutta
31. Gandhabbasaṃyutta
32. Valāhakasaṃyutta
These four saṃyuttas can be discussed together, as they all deal with certain classes of sentient beings that, from a modern perspective, would be considered mythological. In each the Buddha enumerates the different species into which the class can be divided and the courses of kamma that lead to rebirth into that particular mode of existence. By counting separately each type of gift given by the aspirant for rebirth into those destinies, and connecting them with the subdivisions among the beings, a large number of very short suttas are generated.
The nāgas are dragons, serpent-like beings, powerful and mysterious, believed to reside in the Himalayas, beneath the earth, and in the depths of the ocean. They are often thought to have access to hidden treasures and the ability to grant favours to their human benefactors. They also appear on earth and can assume human form, though only temporarily. The Vinaya Piṭaka even relates the story of a nāga who obtained ordination as a bhikkhu but was forced to relinquish his monastic status; as a result, every candidate for ordination must affirm, before the Saṅgha, that he is a human being (and not a nāga in disguise; see Vin I 86-87). The supaṇṇas, identical with the garuḍas, are their arch-enemies: fierce birds of prey that pounce on unwary nāgas, carry them away, and devour them. The gandhabbas are more benign: though sometimes depicted as celestial musicians, here they are obviously plant deities. They are identified as the spirits of fragrant plants because gandha means fragrance. The identity of the valāhakas or cloud-dwelling devas is evident from the explanation given in the texts.
These beings do not fit neatly into the scheme of cosmology outlined in the Introduction to Part I. The nāgas and gandhabbas are said to be ruled over by two of the Four Great Kings presiding over the heaven of that name, though as depicted here they can hardly be described as dwelling in heavenly worlds themselves. Rather, all these beings seem to belong to an intermediate zone between the human world and the lowest heaven, twilight creatures described with striking uniformity in the mythologies of many different cultures.
33. Vacchagottasaṃyutta
Vacchagotta was a wanderer who often approached the Buddha to ask questions, almost always of a philosophical hue. Finally convinced, he became a bhikkhu and attained arahantship (see MN Nos. 71-73).
This saṃyutta shows him during his phase as an inquirer. The saṃyutta has fifty-five chapters, undivided into vaggas, created by a process of permutation. In the first five suttas, in response to Vaccha’s questions, the Buddha explains why the ten speculative views arise in the world, namely, from not knowing the five aggregates. Each sutta deals with a separate aggregate, treated by way of the four-truth pattern; hence five suttas. The remaining fifty suttas are created by taking ten synonyms for not knowing—e. g., not seeing, etc.—and relating them individually to the five aggregates in exactly the same way.
34. Jhānasaṃyutta
This saṃyutta is concerned with the types of skills required for success in attaining concentration (samādhi). Despite the title, it does not deal explicitly with the jhānas as states of meditation but with the process of meditation. A proper Jhānasaṃyutta, concerned with the jhānas, is found in Part V. Perhaps at one point this chapter was called the Jhāyanasaṃyutta, which seems more appropriate. The saṃyutta explores, in pairwise combinations, ten meditative skills. Each pair is related to four types of meditators: one who possesses one skill but not the other, one who has neither, and one who has both. In each case the last in the tetrad is extolled as the best. In this way fifty-five suttas are generated covering all possible permutations.
[1] PART III: The Book of the Aggregates (Khandhavagga)
Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One
378 Kolita was Mahāmoggallāna’s personal name, Moggallāna being derived from his clan name. The present sutta is nearly identical with 40:2 and must be simply a variant on the latter, formulated in terms of noble silence rather than the second jhāna. As Spk makes clear, the sutta refers back to Moggallāna’s week of striving for arahantship.
379 Spk explains that the second jhāna is called noble silence (ariya tuṇhībhāva) because within it thought and examination (vitakka-vicārā) cease, and with their cessation speech cannot occur. At 41:6 (IV 293,24-26) thought and examination are called the verbal formation (vacīsaṅkhāra), the mental factors responsible for articulation of speech. But, Spk adds, when the Buddha says “either speak on the Dhamma or observe noble silence” (e.g., at MN I 161,32-33), even attention to a meditation subject can be considered noble silence.
380 Spk: It is said that by this means, over seven days, the Teacher helped the elder to develop concentration on occasions when it was tending to decline (hānabhāgiya) and thus led him to “greatness of direct knowledge” (mahābhiññatā), i.e., to the six direct knowledges.
381 Upatissa was Sāriputta’s personal name.
382 We should read simply āvuso with Be and Se, as against Ee āvuso Sāriputta.
383 Spk: For a long time: he says this referring to the time that had passed since the Buddha taught the wanderer Dīghanakha “The Discourse on the Discernment of Feelings” at the door of the Boar’s Cave. For it was on that day that these defilements inherent in the round of existence were uprooted in the elder. See n. 97 above.
384 Spk: The dwelling is called gross on account of its object. For he dwelt in the exercise of the divine eye and divine ear element, which take gross objects, namely, the form base and the sound base.
385 I translate the peculiar Pāli idiom here a little freely to bring out the meaning. My rendering follows Spk’s paraphrase: “The elder wondered, ‘Where is the Blessed One now dwelling?’ Having extended light, he saw him with the divine eye sitting in his Fragrant Cottage in Jeta’s Grove; then he heard his voice with the divine ear element. The Teacher did the same, and thus they could see each other and hear each other’s voices.”
386 As at 12:22 (II 28,24-28).
387 See 51:10 (V 259,18-20). Spk glosses kappa here as āyukappa, meaning the full human life span of 120 years. However, there seems to be no textual basis for taking kappa in this passage as meaning anything other than a cosmic aeon, the full extent of time required for a world system to evolve and dissolve. See V, n. 249.
388 The word “nāga” here is used in the sense of arahant.
389 Jetvā Māraṃ savāhanaṃ. Spk does not comment on the “mount,” but other commentaries explain it as either the elephant Girimekha (Pj II 392,3 to Sn 442) or Māra’s army (Mp III 18,26 to AN II 15,29). At Ja I 72, Māra is shown mounting his elephant Girimekha before going to attack the future Buddha under the Bodhi Tree.
390 His name means “Bhaddiya the Dwarf.” The prose portion is at Ud 76; see too Ud 74,20-75,6. Spk notes that it was the monks of the “gang of six” (chabbhagiyā bhikkhū, the mischief-makers of the Saṅgha often mentioned in the Vinaya Piṭaka) who had been ridiculing him. Bhaddiya’s ugliness, according to Spk, was the kammic result of his behaviour in a previous life when he was a king who mocked and harassed old people. Though ugly in appearance, he had a lovely voice, which resulted from another past life when he was a cuckoo who offered a sweet mango to the Buddha Vipassī. The Buddha declared him the foremost of bhikkhus having a sweet voice (mañjussara; AN I 23,24). His verses at Th 466-72 do not include the verses here.
391 His verses are at Th 209-10. The same description is given of Sāriputta’s talk at 8:6. This entire sutta is at AN II 51.
392 We should read with Be (and Ee at AN II 51,29): nābhāsamānaṃ jānanti. The readings no bhāsamānaṃ (Ee) and na bhāsamānaṃ (Se) give a meaning opposite to the one required. The BHS parallel of the verse at Uv 29:43-44 supports Be: nābhāṣamānā jñāyante.
393 He was the son of the Buddha’s father Suddhodana and his aunt and foster mother, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī. Hence, though he was also the Buddha’s half-brother through their common father, the text refers to him as mātucchāputta, “maternal cousin.” His story is at Ud 21-24 and, more elaborately, at Dhp-a I 115-22; see BL 1:217-23.
Spk: Why did the elder behave thus? To find out what the Teacher thought about it, thinking: “If the Teacher says, ‘My half-brother is beautiful like this,’ I’ll conduct myself in this way all my life. But if he points out a fault here, I’ll give this up, wear a rag-robe, and dwell in a remote lodging.”
394 Aññātuñchena yāpentaṃ. Spk: Scraps gained by one seeking delicious, well-seasoned food at the homes of affluent and powerful people are called “scraps of known people” (ñātuncha, lit. “known scraps”). But the mixed food obtained by standing at the doors of houses is called “scraps of strangers” (lit. “unknown scraps”).
395 He was the Buddha’s pitucchāputta, son of the Buddha’s paternal aunt, Amitā (DPPN, s.v. Tissa Thera (14)).
396 Spk explains that while he was still a novice, when elders arrived at the monastery from distant regions to see the Buddha he remained seated and did not perform any services to them or show them due respect. This was all because of his khattiya pride and his pride of being the Buddha’s cousin. The other bhikkhus had surrounded him and censured him sharply for his lack of courtesy. A variant of this incident is recorded at Dhp-a I 37-39; see BL 1:166-67.
397 Aññataro bhikkhu theranāmako. Spk does not explain this peculiar name or further identify the monk.
398 Spk: The past is said to be abandoned (pahīnaṃ) by the abandoning of desire and lust for the five aggregates of the past; the future is relinquished (paṭinissaṭṭhaṃ) by the relinquishing of desire and lust for the five aggregates of the future. Cp. MN III 188-89, 195-98. The plural attabhāvapaṭilābhesu is hard to account for; perhaps it means the five aggregates taken individually, though this would be an unusual use of the expression. See n. 346.
399 The first three pādas are at Sn 211 and, with a variation, at Dhp 353. Spk: All-conqueror (sabbābhibhuṃ): one who abides having overcome all aggregates, sense bases, and elements, and the three kinds of existence. Unsullied (anupalittaṃ , or “unstuck”) among those very things by the paste (lepa) of craving and views. Liberated in the destruction of craving (taṇhakkhaye vimuttaṃ): liberated in Nibbāna, called the destruction of craving by way of the liberation that takes this as its object.
400 He was the foremost bhikkhu disciple among those who exhort bhikkhus (bhikkhu-ovādaka; AN I 25,13). His verses are at Th 547-56, and he is commended by the Buddha at 54:7. Spk: He had been a king who ruled over the city of Kukkuṭavatī. As soon as he heard about the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha from a group of travelling merchants he left his kingdom for Sāvatthī together with his thousand ministers, intending to go forth. His queen Anojā followed him, accompanied by the ministers’ wives, all with the same intention. The Buddha came out to meet both parties. He first ordained the men as bhikkhus with the “Come, bhikkhu” ordination, and then he had the women ordained as bhikkhunīs by the elder nun Uppalavaṇṇā.
401 Spk: It is said that they had been companions in five hundred past births.